pened to a child on account of falling through or over the guard on the side of a float used by passengers going upon and leaving a ferry boat, the fact that multitudes of persons had passed over the same bridge without injury was said to negative the likelihood of such an accident.'

$ 38. Liability to Stranger for Defective Station Platform.

The carrier is not under the same degree of obligation to a stranger as it is to a passenger; to its passenger the utmost care and diligence are required, while to a stranger only reasonable care is due.' Its duty is governed by the general principle of conforming conduct to the rights of others, and using reasonable precautions to avoid their injury.'

One who goes to a railroad station and on the platform as a mere spectator for his own pleasure and convenience is there at his own risk and peril, and cannot recover for injuries received in consequence of a defective platform, unless there was gross and wanton negligence on the company's part equivalent to intentional mischief."

Burbank v. Ill. Cent. R. Co. was a suit for damages for personal injuries received by the plaintiff by falling through a hole in the platform of the defendant company at the town of Tangipahoa, on the night of the 23d of September, 1889. There was judgment for the plaintiff for the sum of $1,500. The defendant company appealed. The plaintiff, in company with two other ladies, visited the defendant's depot for the purpose of being present on the arrival of the 8 o'clock passenger train from New Orleans. In her petition the plaintiff alleges that she was expecting friends on the train from New Orleans who might desire to stop at the boarding-house of which she was the proprietor. On this important fact in her

'Loftus v. Union Ferry Co. 84 N. Y. 455; Dongan v. Champlain Transp. Co. 56 N. Y. 1; Crocheron v. North Shore S. I. Ferry Co. 56 N. Y. 656; Cleveland v. New Jersey S. B. Co. 68 N. Y. 306; Burke v. Witherbee, 98 N. Y. 562; Marsh v. Chickering, 2 Cent. Rep. 419, 101 N. Y. 396. Brand v. Schenectady & T. R. Co. 8 Barb. 368; Virginia Cent. R. Co. v. Sanger, 15 Gratt. 230.

Snyder v. Natchez, R. R. & T. R. Co. 42 La. Ann. 302.

Burbank v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 11 L. R. A. 720, 42 La. Ann. 1156, 45 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 593.

testimony she is silent. The ladies who accompanied her state that the plaintiff was expecting no particular visitor or visitors that evening, but she went to the train for the purpose of seeing if there were any persons on the train who might wish to go to her boarding-house. It is not stated in the petition, nor is there any evidence to show, that the plaintiff was in the habit of going to the train to solicit custom for her boarding-house. It is evident from the statement of the witnesses, and from her silence as to the particular reason which induced her to go to the depot, that she had no defined purpose in going there. Her presence on the platform and at the depot was not for the purpose of transacting any business with the company, to receive freight, welcome friends or for any purpose for which the depot had been built. She was at the depot, it is true, by the general license from the company, in the absence of any express prohibition. It would not be practical for a railroad company, in the immensity of its business, to designate particular individuals who should be permitted to enter its depot. But there was no express or implied invitation to the plaintiff to go to the depot and on the platform. Had the plaintiff been on the platform for the purpose of receiving expected guests, or on any other business connected with the railroad, to transact which the platform was built, she would be entitled to recover damages for the injuries received from a defective platform, the result of the company's negligence.'

train.

From the evidence in the record it is said the fact is clearly established that the plaintiff was on the platform for pleasure only, and not with the intention of transacting any business with the company, or for the purpose of receiving friends expected on the Her presence on the platform was at her own risk and peril. Railroad platforms are not made for the use of the public, and, if persons not invited and having no business with the company are injured in consequence of a defect in the platform, they have no redress. The court concluded that there was no inducement offered by the defendant to plaintiff which was equivalent to an invitation to go upon the platform. Mere permission, be'Peniston v. Chicago, St. L. & N. O. R. Co. 34 La. Ann. 780; Turner v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co. 37 La. Ann. 648; Moses v. Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. 39 La. Ann. 649; Sullivan v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co. 39 La. Ann. 800.

cause it is impossible to refuse it, is not an inducement or an invitation to enter on the premises of another. The person entering on the premises of another under such circumstances goes at his own risk, and enjoys the license subject to its attendant perils. The law does not impose the duty upon the owner to keep his premises in a condition of such repair as to suit the convenience of those who go there solely for their own pleasure, and who are not invited or induced to go upon them. The defendant company under the facts in this case could only be made liable if the uncovered platform through which the plaintiff fell was in its nature a trap. There must have been on the part of the company such gross and wanton negligence that it was equivalent to intentional mischief.

The station-house offered ample accommodations for passengers and visitors on business. There was a waiting-room for passengers, with all requisite appliances for egress and ingress. There was a graveled walk along the track, and between it and the depot, for passengers and visitors in waiting. From this walk an inclined plane reached up to the platform. There were platforms on the several sides of the building. The south side platform was used exclusively for freight. The flooring on this had been taken up for repairs. There was a lamp at the north side of the building which threw a light along the west platform intended for the use of passengers. This light did not reach the south platform, which was at the south end of the building, and at right angles to the west platform. The plaintiff was sitting on the edge of the west platform. She jumped to the gravel walk, and went to the end of the platform at the south side, ascended the inclined plane, and fell through an opening on the south platform. The change of position by the plaintiff, it is alleged, was to get a better view of the inside of the coaches as the train approached. But it seems this was a needless change of position, if the plaintiff really intended to see people coming from the train. The gravel walk was specially designed for the purpose of going to or coming from the train. The part of the system of platforms through which plaintiff fell was dark, and this fact alone ought to have warned her of danger. The absence of a light was at least a notice that no one was expected on that part of the platform. Being a freight plat

form, it was not to be expected that it would used as a promenade. In repairing this part of the platform around the depot on the south side, the act of leaving it unprotected did not make the opening in the nature of a trap, and the defendant company was not guilty of that degree of gross negligence that was equivalent to intentional mischief.'

'Snyder v. Natchez, R. R. & T. R. Co. 49 La. Ann. 302.

CHAPTER VII.

CONTROL AND CARE OF DEPOTS AND GROUNDS.

$39. Regulations for Admission and Exclusion from Depot Grounds. § 40. Carrier Cannot Exclude Employé of Passenger.

$41. Exclusion of other Carriers.

42. Approaches Provided upon the Premises of others.

$43. Who are Entitled to Protection in Use of Waiting Rooms, Platforms, etc.

$44. Depots and Stations must be Lighted and Warmed.

45. Protecting Passengers Between Depots or Stations and Cars. §46. Exposing Passengers to Danger from Passing Trains.

$39. Regulations for Admission and Exclusion from Depot Grounds.

The question of reasonableness of the rules of a railroad company, affecting third persons, is generally a mixed question of law and fact, and it is always proper to submit such a question to the jury under instructions.' It is true that, inasmuch as the law charges the carrier with certain responsibilities for the condition of its depot and station and the grounds embraced and for the maintainance of order and security therein, a railroad company can make all needful reasonable rules and regulations concerning the use of its depots and grounds, and can exclude all persons therefrom who have no business with the railroad or passengers going to and coming from the trains or depots, and it is reasonable for a railway company to provide that a person must purchase a ticket, or be excluded from its station. And it may establish and enforce a rule requiring a person desiring passage to procure, and to exhibit to its employés, a ticket entitling him to such passage, before entering the cars. And it probably can 'Bass v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 36 Wis. 450, 17 Am. Rep. 495.

Harris v. Stevens, 31 Vt. 79.

*Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Vandyne, 57 Ind. 576.