house will not render the company liable to one injured while attempting to get off a train, unless such condition contributed to the injury.'

$45. Protecting Passengers Between Depot or Station and Cars.

It is the duty of railroad companies at all times so to adjust their business as to make it safe for passengers, including those who are partially disabled in sight, hearing, limbs or physical strength, on the arrival and stoppage of a train, to pass between it and the depot, and when from any unusual contingency it is not safe, it is the duty of its employés to know it and to take proper precaution to prevent passengers exposing themselves to danger, as the latter have a right to assume that it is safe for them to proceed in the usual manner until notified to the contrary.' The principle has been applied to providing for a passenger a safe and convenient way and manner of access to the train.'

Unless notice is given that passengers can only enter the train from the platform, it is not per se negligence to attempt entrance elsewhere. If employés permit passengers to enter from other points, they must use great care to avoid injury resulting.' The diligence and care of a railroad company in protecting its passengers in coming to and going from its stations, and of the passengers themselves, must be proportioned to the risk incurred by them on account of the number of trains and the like."

By stopping its trains at a sharp curve where there is not sufficient light to enable passengers to see an unguarded hole between the platform of the car and that of the station, an elevated railway invites its passengers to alight at that point, and is thereby charged with the duty of using due care to provide proper and safe means of getting from the platform of the cars to the plat

'Dunn v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Pa. C. P.) 47 Phila. Leg. Int. 524. 'Gonzales v. New York & H. R. Co. 39 How. Pr. 407; Allender v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 43 Iowa, 276; Bennett v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 102 U. 8. 577, 26 L. ed. 235.

'Warren v. Fitchburg R. Co. 9 Allen, 227.

Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Kane, 69 Md. 11.

'Allender v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 43 Iowa, 276.

Wallace v. Wilmington & N. R. Co. (Del.) Dec. 13, 1889.

form of the station. Where a passenger leaves a train and in making his way to the station is injured by the negligence of the servants, the company is liable.'

A conductor is the general agent of the company so far as concerns the rights of passengers when alighting from the train.❜ But a conductor, as the representative of a railroad company, has neither actual nor ostensible authority to instruct one who, holding a ticket upon the railroad, has by mistake entered the wrong train, and who, in accordance with his advice leaves the train, as to what path or road he should walk to reach a distant station, to secure a place upon the proper train on the same road, proceeding in a contrary direction; and the railroad company is not responsible for the accidental killing, by a passing train, of such person while upon its track in pursuance of such instruction.*

Whether it is the duty of a railroad company to require its employés to aid and assist passengers in entering or leaving a train must be determined by the circumstances of each case and the degree of danger involved. The fact that a conductor upon a passenger railway train fails to assist a passenger in disembarking from the car is not negligence as matter of law, but it may be considered with other evidence of negligence."

In a Massachusetts case it appeared that the defendant did not provide proper safeguards against injury for a passenger leaving the place where he alighted from the cars. Mr. Justice Colt said in the opinion: "The plaintiff was a passenger, and while that relation existed, the defendants were bound to exercise towards him the utmost care and diligence in providing against those injuries which can be avoided by human foresight. He was entitled to this protection so long as he conformed to the reasonable

'Boyce v. Manhattan R. Co. 118 N. Y. 314, 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 111. Imhoff v. Chicago & M. R. Co. 22 Wis. 682; Gaynor v. Old Colony & N. R. Co. 100 Mass. 208; Indiana Cent. R. Co. v. Hudelson, 13 Ind. 325. But see Cincinnati, H. & I. R. Co. v. Carper, 11 West. Rep. 225, 112 Ind. 26. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Wood, 13 West. Rep. 319, 113 Ind. 570; Carter v. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. 98 Ind. 552; Evansville & T. H. R. Co. v. McKee, 99 Ind. 519; Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 47 Ind. 79; Indianapolis, P. & C. R. Co. v. Anthony, 43 Ind. 183; Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Rogers, 38 Ind. 118; Pennsylvania Co. v. Hoagland, 78 Ind. 208; Columbus, C. & I. C. R. Co. v. Powell, 40 Ind. 87; Great Western R. Co. v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305; Bass v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 36 Wis. 450. Cincinnati, H. & 1. R. Co. v. Carper, 11 West. Rep. 221, 112 Ind. 26. 'Simms v. South Carolina R. Co. 27 S. C. 268.

regulations of the company, not only while in the cars, but while upon the premises of the defendants; and this requires of the defendants due regard for the safety of passengers, as well in the location, construction and arrangement of their station buildings, platforms and means of egress as in their previous transportation." A passenger is not precluded from recovery from a railroad company for injuries received in leaving a car by a way used by the other passengers, but unsafe, by the fact that a safe way was provided, unless he knew of such safe way, and that the rules of the company required passengers to use it."

A railroad company is responsible for injuries received by a passenger attempting to board one of its trains at night who finds no one to inform him how to reach a sleeping car attached to the train, which car is left standing outside the yards, and to which a sidewalk erected by the company under a contract with the city leads, on the direct route which the passenger follows and from which he falls because of defective or insufficient lights at the approach to such sleeping car. It is the duty of a railroad company to furnish safe and ready passageway to and from its cars on either side thereof and between them and its station buildings, when no notice to the contrary is given, and in all this to exercise the highest degree of skill and care.'

The highway crossing rule has no application to a case where by the arrangement of the corporation it is made necessary for passengers to cross the track in going to or from the depot to the cars. Properly applied there is no doubt as to the correctness of this proposition. But it will be found in every case where this rule has been applied the cars were standing at the place appointed and designated by the corporation for the exit or entrance of passengers."

If the trains of the defendant railroad company were accustomed

'Gaynor v. Old Colony & N. R. Co. 100 Mass. 208. See also language of Chief Justice Shaw in McElroy v. Nashua & L. R. Corp. 4 Cush. 400. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Long (Tex.) June 2, 1891. Moses v. Louisville, N. O. T. R. Co. 39 La. Ann. 649. tell, 84 Va. 231.

But see Reed v. Ax

Gonzales v. New York & H. R. Co. 38 N. Y. 440, 39 How. Pr. 407.

'Terry v. Jewett, 78 N. Y. 340; Brassell v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. 84 N. Y. 241, Klein v. Jewett, 26 N. J. Eq. 474; Dekay v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 4 L. R. A. 632, 41 Minn. 178.

to stop at the platform at which the plaintiff desired to alight although it was neither constructed nor owned by the company, an implied contract that passengers might stop there may be raised. A trainman on an elevated railroad, who opens the door as the train is approaching a station, and lets go of it just as a passenger takes hold of the door casing to save herself from falling, thereby causing the door to slam shut and injure the passenger's hand, is guilty of such negligence as will render the company liable.' In an action for a personal injury received in alighting from a car, the mere fact that the platform where plaintiff alighted was higher than that at another station of the road was immaterial."

A woman, in alighting from a railroad car at a station in the night time, fell and was injured, and sued the company for negligence, in that the station platform was too far from the car. The platform had been in use for several years, and no one had ever before been injured or inconvenienced on account of its distance from the cars. It was held that the company was not legally responsible. A depot platform must be sufficiently near to make the entrance and exit to car safe and yet avoid passing trains." But where a station of an elevated railroad is located on a curve and is convex to the train, a space of 3 to 4 inches between the centre of the train and the platform, and of 6 to 7 inches between the ends of the train and the platform, is as little as is safe or prudent, taking into view the swaying and oscillation of the cars." A space 24 inches wide between a platform and the steps of a car is not a dangerous opening implying negligence on the part of a railroad company. In a recent case, where a passenger was injured in stepping from a car on to the platform, because, as he alleged, the platform was too far from the steps of the car, the rule was announced that the company was not bound so to construct the platform as to make accidents to passengers using the same impossible,

Colwell v. Manhattan R. Co. 57 Hun, 452.

2 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Johnston, 79 Ala. 436. Nichols v. Dubuque & D. R. Co. 68 Iowa, 732.

Laflin v. Buffalo & S. W. R. Co. 7 Cent. Rep. 739, 106 N. Y. 136.

Praeger v. Bristol & E. R. Co. 24 L. T. N. S. 105; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Sue, 25 Neb. 772.

Ryan v. Manhattan R. Co. 121 N. Y. 126.

Hodges v. New Hanover Transit Co. 107 N. C. 576.

or to use the highest degree of diligence to make it safe, convenient and useful. It was bound simply to exercise ordinary care, in view of the dangers attending its use, to make it reasonably adequate for the purpose to which it was devoted.'

The accidental slipping of a servant of a railroad company in performance of his duty, against a passenger entering the car, thereby injuring him, is no ground for recovery from the company, there being no negligence, as the passenger assumed the risk of such an accident. A passenger who, upon alighting from a train upon a dark night, and when no sufficient light is furnished by the company, commits himself to the guidance of a third person, thereby waives the duty of the company to furnish him with safe means of departure. The passenger may by his own act relieve the carrier from this duty.

$46. Exposing Passengers to Danger from Passing Trains.

A passenger is justified in assuming that no train will be permitted to pass a station at which a passenger train has stopped for the discharge and receipt of passengers, in such manner as to interfere with him. Hence he cannot be held guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law because he failed, before leaving the car on which he was traveling, to look out for an approaching train, by which he was injured. Where a passenger is injured while attempting to alight from a train at a regular station, by another train belonging to the same carrier and in charge of its servants, which runs past the station platform while the passengers of the former train are being received and discharged, the carrier, to relieve itself from liability for damages, must show that it used the degree of care which the law imposes upon it.* A passenger crossing the track to reach the cars, has a right to some extent to rely on signal of danger being given. It is gross negligence in a railroad company so to arrange its time table that

'Laflin v. Buffalo & S. W. R. Co. 7 Cent. Rep. 793, 106 N. Y. 136. *Skinner v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 39 Fed. Rep. 188.

3 Wallace v. Wilmington & N. R. Co. (Del.) Dec. 13, 1889.

♦Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Anderson, 8 L. R. A. 673, 72 Md. 519. Mayo v. Boston & M. R. Co. 104 Mass. 137; Sonier v. Boston & A. R. Co. 1 New Eng. Rep. 493, 141 Mass. 10.