time as to indicate an invitation to passengers to alight, and the backward movement is made without warning while they are alighting. A passenger who by direction of the ticket agent at at railroad station from which he had purchased a ticket, gets on board a train which does not stop at the station to which he is destined, may recover the actual damages occasioned by the mistake, from the railroad company." Notice to the owner of a plantation that his landing is abandoned and that steamers will no longer stop there will not justify the owner of the line of steamers and of a railroad from refusing to land there in accordance with the terms of a contract in a ticket purchased on the railroad, which gives the passenger an option, in case he travels by steamer, to stop at that point.' The conductor and engineer of a train who have been long in the service of the railroad company are competent to testify whether under a special order, it is necessary for a train to stop at a certain station. In the absence of a special contract a passenger cannot complain that the carrier refused to stop its train at a point other than one of its stations, even if the passenger mistakenly embarked thereon and paid his fare, if he is put off in a civil manner at the stopping place nearest his destination.* A conductor may contract to put a passenger off at a flag station, and on failure the passenger may recover damages; but the mere belief of a passenger, in reliance upon assurances of a ticket agent as to stopping places or change of cars, does not justify him in disregarding announcements of the conductor to a different effect, without making any effort to learn the truth.' The acceptance of the regular fare by a conductor, after knowledge that a passenger took the train desiring to be put off at a point where there was no regular station, is not of itself sufficient to constitute a special contract of the company to put the passenger off at the point desired, where the fare so collected was the proper fare for Sherwood v. Chicago & W. M. R. Co. 82 Mich. 374, 44 Am. & Eng. R Cas. 337. 2 Alabama G. 8. R. Co. v. Heddleston, 82 Ala. 218. Brulard v. The Alvin, 45 Fed. Rep. 766. Albert v. Sweet, 116 N. Y. 363. Wells v. Alabama G. S. R. Co. 67 Miss. 24, 40 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 645. Hull v. East Line & R. R. R. Co. 66 Tex. 619, 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 221. Dye v. Virginia M. R. Co. (D. C.) 19 Wash. L. Rep. 369. a passage to any point not exceeding a certain distance, and the point at which the passenger wished to get off was within that distance, especially where such passenger had previously applied to and been refused a ticket by the ticket agent.' Passengers on railroad trains are not presumed to know the rules and regulations which are made for the guidance of the conductors and other employés of railroad companies, as to the internal affairs of the company; nor are they required to know them.' But the fact that one who asked a ticket agent for a ticket on a limited or fast train was refused a ticket because the train was not allowed to stop at his destination is sufficient notice to him that any agreement the conductor might afterwards make to put him off at his destination would be a violation of the rules of the company, so as to exempt the company, which provided another train which made stops at all stations, from liability where he paid fare to the conductor, who agreed to let him off at, but carried him beyond his destination." A person who by a tip or bribe induces the conductor of a train not intended for the conveyance of ordinary passengers, as he had reason to know, to permit him to travel on the train contrary to the regulations of the railway company, travels at his own risk, and is not entitled to damages for any injury to person or property sustained by him while so traveling.* A passenger who during the journey is told by the conductor that the train will not go to the station to which he has paid, and that he can either get off where the train is then stopping or go to some other point, whereupon he leaves the train,—has a right of action; but, if he voluntarily receives back the fare for the uncompleted part of the journey, he waives his right of action.* As a general rule, the sale of a ticket to a particular station, to be used on a given train, imports an undertaking on the part of the company, not only to take the passenger to that station, but to stop there, and allow him reasonable time and opportunity to alight. 'Wells v. Alabama G. S. R. Co. 67 Miss. 24, 40 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 645. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Carmichael, 9 L. R. A. 388, 90 Ala. 19. Leaving out of consideration, for the present, the question whether or not there may be instances when this rule should not operate, it would seem, in the absence of some special reason for requiring a passenger to notify the conductor of his destination before being called upon to exhibit his ticket, that so doing would be engrafting upon the contract a condition outside of its terms, and not usually contemplated by the purchaser. The holder of the ticket has ordinarily the right to assume, when he buys it, that the company will safely land him at his destination. Accordingly, he has the right to presume the conductor will call for his ticket before reaching the station specified, and thus obtain notice of the fact that he desires to stop at such station. Of course, when the conductor takes up and examines the ticket, the information will be thus conveyed to him that he has a passenger for this station; and there will be no difficulty at all in his carrying out the contract which has been made between the company and the passenger. When a railroad company sells tickets to a station of this kind, it unquestionably does so for the purpose of obtaining the money of its customers; and all of its employés, certainly, ought to know that upon every passenger train there are likely to be one or more passengers for such stations. Beyond doubt, the agent who sells the ticket is aware of the fact that there will be on the train for which the ticket is sold a passenger of this kind, and in most cases the conductor will be able to ascertain the fact by prompt and proper attention to his duties. Every company should so conduct its passenger business as to adequately serve all its customers; and if any company, without sufficient excuse, fails to do this, the omission amounts to negligence, and it will be responsible for the consequences. The general rule, therefore, as to the duties of railroad companies towards passengers holding tickets for flag stations should be as stated; but, as already intimated, this rule should not be inflexible. There may be circumstances under which a passenger for a flag station is carried beyond his destination when it would not be fair or just to attribute the fact to the company's negligence. In a recent Texas case' it appeared that defendant in error bought a ticket to a flag station, knowing it was such, and that trains did not stop there "unless some request 'Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ryan (Tex. App.) March 23, 1892. was made upon the conductor to do so." It would seem that he bought the ticket subject to the condition that he must notify the conductor of his destination; and, failing to do so, it was held he was not entitled to recover. Aside from instances like this, there may be other occasions when the conductor will be prevented, without fault on his part, from ascertaining in time the desire of a passenger to stop at a flag station, or when, under the circumstances, it is manifestly the duty of the passenger to see to it that the conductor has the necessary information. In cases of doubt as to which should take the initiative the question may very properly be left to the jury.' $49. Train must be Stopped at Proper and Safe Place. Wherever passengers are accustomed to be received upon trains, or to alight therefrom, whether at a station house, a water tank or elsewhere, railroad companies are bound to keep in a safe condition for transit the ordinary space in which passengers go to and from the train; and travelers have the right to assume that this duty has been performed. Such stopping of the train must be at a suitable place. A railroad company stopping a passenger car at a point where there is no platform, it is said, owes a passenger, not only a reasonably safe appliance for enabling her to alight, but the safest that has been known and tested.* A carrier is liable for injuries sustained by a passenger in consequence of directing her to alight on a dark night at a distance from the station. Stopping a train at an unusual place for discharging passengers, where no provision has been made for their safety in alighting from the cars, is such negligence as will render the company liable for injuries sustained by a passenger who was directed by the conductor to get off at that place." 'Chattanooga, R. & C. R. Co. v. Lyon (Ga.), 15 L. R. A. 857. Hulbert v. New York Cent. R. Co. 40 N. Y. 145. M'Gee v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 10 West. Rep. 282, 92 Mo. 208; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Wilkinson, 77 Ga. 75; Hurt v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 13 West. Rep. 233, 94 Mo. 255, 4 Am. St. Rep. 381, note. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Wortham, 3 L. R. A. 368, 73 Tex. 25. Warden v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 35 Mo. App. 631; Wilburn v. St. Louis, 1. M. & S. R. Co. 36 App. 203. International & G. N. R. Co. v. Smith (Tex.), 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 324. A railroad company which negligently and wrongfully carries a passenger beyond its usual stopping place into its switch yard, where there are no accommodations for passengers, owes the passenger the duty to use every precaution for her protection.' The stopping of a train at a place other than a station, to be negligence as to persons injured while attempting to leave it, must be sufficiently long to indicate to passengers that they are to alight, and not a mere momentary pause.* 3 A woman carried by a railroad train beyond her station at which railroad employés refused to put her off and to whom they were "indecorous or insulting, either in words, tone or manner" may be allowed to recover punitive damages. The failure of a railroad company to put a passenger, a woman advanced in pregnancy, off at the usual platform, without good reason, is an act of negligence for which such passenger can recover, if injured by reason thereof without fault on her part.* It was ruled that a passenger who is, by fault of a railroad company, landed at a place other than his destination, and, being in a hurry, proceeds on foot along the track until he reaches a bridge, in order to get across which he has to mount freight car, in jumping from which car, under a fear that the train will start, breaks his leg, cannot recover from the company; but this decision was reversed on rehearing on the ground that it is a proper question for the jury.* In a recent case the motion for a nonsuit for want of evidence to charge the defendant was held to be properly denied under the circumstances in evidence. The plaintiff, without apparent fault of her own, was carried some distance-500 to 700 feetbeyond her destination, to which she had a ticket, and there hurriedly assisted from the car to the ground, over steps of which the lowest was twenty-two inches above the ground. The injury she received in leaping to the ground was aggravated by being compelled to walk from her landing place to the station. In the 2 1Franklin v. Southern California M. R. Co. 85 Cal. 63. Dunn v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Pa.) 47 Phila. Leg. Int. 524. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ballard (Ky.) 2 L. R. A. 694. 4Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Leapley, 4 Cent. Rep. 253, 65 Md. 571. Adams v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 100 Mo. 555, 41 Am. & Eng. R. Caa. 105, Rev'd in 100 Mo. 570. |