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confused and agitated state of her mind, and the fear of being carried beyond her destination, she did not notice the distance of the car step from the ground. It was said that she had a right to rely on the assistance offered by the conductor and brakeman at such a place, and, if they failed to assist her from the car without injury, the fault was the defendant's and not hers. This case in principle, is not different from another New Hampshire case, where the rear car, in which plaintiff was riding, did not reach the platform, and she was injured on leaving it by the steps, which were about three feet from the ground. The plaintiff recovered a verdict, and the court in the opinion decided that “these facts were evidence from which a jury might find that the plaintiff exercised due care in leaving the train at the place which she knew was a bad one for alighting, and, further, might find that the defendant intended she should leave at that place.”? In that case the car step was fourteen inches further from the ground than in the Foss case, but the plaintiff had no assistance in alighting, and the distance from the station platform was very much less. The question of the reasonable care of the parties was the same in each case. In the Foss case the defendant requested the instruction that the plaintiff, enfeebled as she was, should not have attempted to get off the car at the place she did, but should have notified the attendant train hands of her condition, that they might have set the train back to the station, where she could have alighted on the platform in safety; that, no notice being given them of her feeble condition, she cannot recover. But it was ruled that such a request was properly refused. It left out of sight the fact that, at the time, the train had passed the station platforin a long distance, and the step of the car, from which she inust leap, was too high for a well person to step from safely. The request, too, leaves out of sight the bewildered condition of the plaintiff's mind under fear of being carried beyond her destination, and the fact that, until she struck the ground, she was not aware that the car had passed beyond the station platform. The instruction which the court gave was declared to be sufficiently explicit. The jury were told, “ If the place [where the plaintiff left the car] was suitable, and the defendant fully performed the duty it owed to the plaintiff, the defendant is not liable for any injury the plaintiff may have received.” “If the place was unsuitable, and the plaintiff received injury in consequence, the defendant is liable therefor, unless the plaintiff's want of care contributed to the injury. Was the plaintiff in fault for being left at that place, or for leaving the car without objection, or not saying anything about her feeble condition! Was she induced to alight there by the defendant's servants? Did her want of ordinary care contribute to her injury?” These pertinent instructions and inquiries made to the jury were plain and explicit, covered the ground of the case, contained the settled law on the subject and were sufficiently favorable to the defendant.
* Foss v. Boston & M. R. Co. (N. H.) 11 L. R. A. 367. 'Bullard v. Boston & M. R. Co. 2 New Eng. Rep. 899, 64 N. H. 27.
$ 50. Train must Stop at Station a Reasonable
Time. It is a part of the duty imposed upon the carrier to afford the traveler a reasonable time to enter the train, or to leave it in safety upon its arrival at his destination or point of departure and to announce the starting of the train, and also the station before it is reached, that the passenger may not inadvertently pass his station.' A passenger on a railroad train the servants on which knew at what point he desired to alight and did not stop a sufficient time to permit him to alighit in safety, who is injured in attempting to alight, is entitled to recover.'
A sufficient time to permit a passenger to get off the train in safety means time to alighit safely in the use of reasonable diligence and care, having regard to all the circumstances." What would be a reasonable time for a light, young, active man might, and ordinarily would not be, a sufficient length of time for an old lady to get safely off a train, and where an injury occurs to such a passenger the jury cannot determine whether sufficient time has been allowed without considering what kind of a passenger she was—her age, sex and physical condition. But while it is the duty of a railroad company to afford a reasonable time to passengers, whether young or old, to alight from the cars in safety,' yet, the age and decrepitude of a particular passenger will not determine the time proper for a stoppage of a train on its arrival at a station. The increased risk arising from conditions of health or age affecting the fitness of aged or disabled persons to travel must be assumed by the passenger, especially where such conditions are unknown to the carrier. One physically deficient is required to exercise cantion and prudence in proportion to his defect;' but they are, if their condition be known to the carrier, entitled to more attention and care than those in good health and under no such disability, at least in the time allowed and in the assistance rendered them in getting on and off the carrier's conveyance.'
'Post v. Koch, 30 Fed. Rep. 208; Suigert v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 75 Mo.
475; Galreston, H. & 11. R. Co. v. Crispi, 73 Tex. 236; Dawson v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.) 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 134; McDonald v. Long Island R. Co. 116 N. Y. 546; Detroit & M. R. Co. v. Curtis, 23 Wis. 152; Leris v. London C. & D. R. Co. L. R. 9 Q. B. 132; Brooks v. Boston & M. R. Co. 135 Mass. 21; Bridges v. North London R. Co. L. R. 7 H. L. 224; Bucher v. Neno York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. 98 N. Y, 128; Southern R. Co. v. Kendrick, 40 Miss. 374; Nero Orleans, J. & G. N. R. Co. v. Statham, 42 Miss. 607: Mississippi & T. R. Co. v. Gill, 66 Miss. 39; Central R. & Bkg. Co. v. Perry, 58 Ga. 461; Toledo, W. & W. R. (0. v. Baddeley, 54 m. 19; Ruben v. Central Iowa R. Co. 73 Iowa, 579; Louiscille
N. A. & C. R Co. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 546. Ridenhour v. Kansas City Cable R. Co. 102 Mo. 270. *Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Lyon8, 129 Pa. 113.
A railroad company owes the same duty, in respect to allowing a reasonable time to leave the train, to one who goes upon it to aid a passenger who is in an enfeebled condition requiring assistance to alight, that it owes to a passenger, although the services were voluntary."
Negligence cannot be imputed to a passenger because she does not anticipate culpable negligence on the part of the carrier. A passenger has the right to presume that the employés will use the
Hickman v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 8 West. Rep. 564, 91 Mo. 433. "Ewigert v. Hannibal & St. J.R. Co. 75 Mo. 475; Wabash St. L. & P. R. Co.
v. Rector, 104 III. 296. * Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Baddeley, 54 Ill. 19. *Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Barker, 4 Colo. 344. 5 Simms v. South Carolina R. Co. 27 S. C. 268. See opinion of Chief Justice
Black, Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. 147. * Sheridan v. Brooklyn City & N. R. Co. 36 N. Y. 39; Louisville, N. A. & C.
R. Co. v. Snider, 3 L. R. A. 434, 117 Ind. 435, 10 Am. St. Rep. 66, note; Broron v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 54 Wis. 342, 360, 41 Am. Rep. 41 Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346, 355; Lapleine v. Morgan's L. & T. R. & 8. 8. Co. 1 L. R. A. 378, 40 La. Ann. 661, 666. See,
however, New Orleans, J. & G. N. R. Co. v. Statham, 42 Miss. 607. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Crunk, 119 Ind. 542. Franklin v. Southern Cal. M. R. Co. 85 Cal. 63.
degree of care which persons of ordinary prudence are accustomed to employ under the circumstances.' Where a female passenger accompanied by three children, on arriving at an intermediate station, attempted to alight with them, and after two children had left the car and while she was in the act of alighting, the car started and she thereupon sprang on the platform, on which one of the children had fallen prostrate and was injured, it was held that this was not such negligence as would prevent her recovering damages for injuries sustained by the premature starting of the train. In this case a premature starting of the train created the apparent peril, which excused the passenger's acting under an impulsive effort to escape danger. Upon the question whether the cars have remained at the station a reasonable time for the passengers to leave, evidence of the usual and customary period of stoppage is admissible."
A train should remain standing a length of time sufficient to enable a passenger safely to remove himself, his wife and minor children and baggage. A railroad company is guilty of negligence in starting a train after stopping at a station, without allowing sufficient time for passengers to alight in safety by using that degree of care required of every prudent person. It is the duty of those in charge of a street passenger railway car to stop the car a sufficient length of time to give a passenger reasonable opportunity to alight in safety at the point of his destination.' It is the reciprocal duty of a railroad company and a passenger, the former to give reasonable time to leave the train at the place of destination, and the latter to use reasonable diligence and care in getting off. But refusal to delay for dilatory passenger is not a breach of duty. Ordinary diligence as to such signals, accordFranklin v. Southern Cull. M. R. Co. 83 Cal. 63; Robinson v. Western Pac, R.
Co. 48 Cal. 421. See Jumison v. San José & S. C. R. Co. 55 Cal. 593. ? Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Kilgore, 32 Pa. 292. 3 Southwestern R. Co. v. Paulk, 24 Ga. 356. *Fuller v. Naugatuck R. Co. 21 Conn. 557. Hurt v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 13 West. Rep. 233, 94 Mo. 255. •Leggett v. Western New York & P. R. Co. (Pa.) 28 W. N. C. 236. 'Ridenhour v. Kansas City Cable R. Co. 102 Mo. 283. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Lyons, 129 Pa. 113; Murphy v. Rome, W. &0. R.
Co. 32 N. Y. S. R. 381; McDonald v. Long Island R. Co. 116 N. Y. 546;
Ridenhour v. Kansas City Cable R. Co. 102 Mo. 270. Paulitsch v. Nero York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. 102 V. Y. 280.
ing to what is usual on such occasions, is required on both sideson the side of the carrier in giving them, and of the passenger looking, listening for and observing them. What are sufficient and proper signals is a question for the jury.'
Where, before a passenger had safely alighted at a station the conductor signalled the train to start and jerked the passenger to. the ground and injured him, the carrier is liable.' A passenger
A " on a railroad train has the right to assume that he will be given reasonable opportunity to get off the train before it starts, and his omission to retain his hold upon the railing at the moment he is about to step froin the car on to the platform of the station is not a ground for imputing negligence to him.' Where, after the arrival of a train at a station, a passenger waited in the doorway for the guard to open the gates to the platform, and he opened the gate and pulled the strap at the same instant, signaling the train to start, and the motion of the car caused the door to swing to upon the passenger's finger, the company is liable for the negligence of the guard. Upon stopping a train to let off passengers, it is the duty of those in charge to see that all who are getting off have safely landed, before the train is again started."
An elevated railroad company is liable for injuries caused by the reckless act of an engineer in starting the train while the track was crowded in front of it with people who had just alighted from it. Total inattention to a passenger getting on in the dark
* and starting the train while, with ordinary care, he is attempting to get on, when the circumstances are such as constitute an invitation to the passenger to make the attempt, render the railroad company liable for injuries to him caused thereby.' The degree of care required of a carrier in stopping at stations for passengers
Central R. & Bkg. Co. v. Perry, 58 Ga. 461; Svigert v. Hannibal & St. J.
R. Co. 75 No. 475. * Terms & P. R. Co. v. Miller, 11 L. R. A. 395, 79 Tex. 78; Louisrille, N. A.
& C. Co. v. Wood, 12 West. Rep. 303, 113 Ind. 544. ; McDonald v. Long Island R. Co. 116 N. Y. 546; Franklin v. Southern Cal.
M. R. R. Co. 85 Cal. 63; Robinson v. Western Pac. R. Co. 48 Cal. 421. “Baker v. Manhattan R. Co. 118 N. Y. 533. 'Dunn v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Pa. C. P.) 47 Phila. Leg. Int. 524. 6 Weiler v. Manhattan R. Co. 53 Hun, 372. *Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Drake, 33 III. App. 114.