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to alight is such as persons of the greatest care and prudence would use in similar cases.'
Until a passenger has alighted from the cars, a railroad company must exercise the highest degree of care to enable the descent to be made in safety. The fact that the conductor did not know that a passenger intended to leave the car, and did not see him leaving it, does not excuse the company for not giving such passenger reasonable time to get off the train, unless he was so situated as to conceal himself from the conductor's obervation. But if after a train stops at a station a passenger remains in his seat after a reasonable opportunity to get up, it is not necessarily negligence for the conductor to assume that he did not intend to leave at that station.'
A railroad company cannot be held liable for failure of its train to come to a full stop at a station where a passenger alights, thereby causing injury to the passenger, where, before the train has stopped, another passenger pulls the bell rope, causing it to acquire speed again, the alighting passenger being aware of such .action and of its effect." A railroad company, unless aware that some have left the train, is under no duty to its passengers to give signals before starting at a wood station at which it has stopped to take in wood.'
Where a train is stopped at a station to which the company contracts to carry a passenger, the company is liable if a reasonable time to leave is not afforded, and he is injured in an attempt to alight after it has started and while in motion, if he does not, in getting off, incur a danger obvious to the mind of a reasonable man. Where a train has stopped a sufficient time to enable
passengers, exercising proper diligence, to alight in safety, it will be negligence, after the train has fully started, on the part of the passenger, to attempt to alight."
Texas & P. R. Co, v. Miller, 11 L. R. A. 395, 79 Tex. 78. 'St. Louis, A. & T. R. Co. v. Finley, 79 Tex. 85; Alexandria & F. R. Co. v.
Herndon, 87 Va. 193. 3 Raben v. Centrul Ionca R. Co. 73 Iowa, 579, 33 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 520;
Mc Donald v. Long Island R. Co. 116 N. Y. 546. * Mississippi & T. R. Co. v. Harrison, 66 Miss. 419, 39 Am. & Eog. R. Cas. 449. 5 Malcom v. Richmond & D. R. Co. 106 N. C. 63. • Central R. & Bkg. Co. v. Miles, 88 Ala. 256. 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 149;
Covington v. Western & A. R. Co. 81 Ga. 273.
Where a railroad company accepts a passenger, knowing that he intends to stop at a particular station on its road, a duty rests upon it to stop its cars at that station, and it is not sufficient that the speed of the cars is slackened. If, without coming to a full stop, the station is passed, and the speed of the cars is again checked that the passenger may get off, and under the direction of the conductor, he is injured in attempting to alight, the company will be held liable unless the danger was so apparent that the passenger could be charged with reckless conduct. It is not want of ordinary care if a passenger prudently uses the means the company affords him to get off. It is the passenger's duty to exercise his judgment whether or not it is safe; and if the danger is so apparent that a prudent man similarly situated would not have attempteil to leap from the train, then he cannot be permitted to recover.'
If a railroad company fails to stop its trains at a station a sufficient time for passengers to safely leave it, and the passenger using reasonable care is injured in consequence of the starting of the train, in the attempt to alight, the company will be liable.' It is not necessarily negligence to attempt to leave a train after it has started from the station. The circumstances under which the attempt is made must be considered. The rate of speed which the train has attained, and whether the train was stopped a sufticient time to enable passengers to get off, are proper matters in determining the question of the negligence of the passenger.* *Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. v. McCurdy, 45 Ga. 288; Lambeth v. North Carolina
R. Co. 66 N. C. 494; Chicago & A. R. Co v. Randolph, 53 Ill. 510; Jeffer. son ville R. Co. v. Hendricks, 26 Ind. 228; Filer v. New York Cent. R. Co.
49 N. Y. 47. 'Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Randolph, 53 Ill. 510; Damont v. New Orleans & C.
R. Co. 9 La. And. 441; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. 147; Gavett v. Manchester & L. R. Co. 16 Gray, 501; Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Swift, 26 Ind. 459; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Able, 59 ITT. 131; Lambeth v, North Carolina R. Co. 66 N. C. 494; Kelly v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 70 Mo. 604; Straus v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. Co. 75 Mo. 185; Nelson v. Atlantic & P. R. Co. 68 Mo. 593; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Leslie, 57 Tex. 83; Southwestern R. Co. v. Singleton, 67 Ga. 306; Burrouos v. Erie R. Co. 63 N. Y. 556; Jewell v. Chicago, St. P. & M. R. Co. 54 Wis. 610; Lake Shore & M. 8. R. Co. v. Bangs, 47 Mich. 47C; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Chambers, 71 111. 519; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Lutz, 84 III. 598; Dougherty v. Chicago
B. & Q. R. Co. 86 Ill. 467. *Pennsylcania R. Co. v. Kilgore, 32 Pa. 292; Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Hen.
dricks, 26 Ind. 228; Filer v. New York Cent. R. Co. 49 N. Y. 47. *Suigert v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 75 Mo. 475; Burroos v. Erie R. Co. 3
Tbomp. & C. 44; Burrows v. Erie R. Co. 63 N. Y. 556; Price v. St. Louis K. C. & N. R. Co. 72 Mo. 414; Southwestern R. Co. v. Singleton, 66 Ga. 252.
But the fact that the passenger accepted the risk in order to
Trains to Eating Station.
It is to be presumed that the passenger when entering upon a. continuous journey has regard to the facilities furnished by a. particular carrier, not only for transportation but for refreshments during his journey; and the usual stopping places announced in the advertisements by the carrier and the time fixed cannot be varied except under circumstances of urgency, which justify the sacrifice of the temporary convenience of the passenger for the purpose of securing his safety. Where a stop has been made at a station for refreshments, or indeed for any purpose which justifies passengers temporarily leaving the train, it is the duty of the car. rier before starting again, to give sufficient warning to enable the passengers to resume their places in the train, without exposing themselves to peril. A passenger is, whenever the performance
Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Bangs, 47 Mich. 470.
597; Jeffersonville, M. & 1. R. Co. v. Riley, 39 Ind. 586; Keokuk N. L.
of the contract of carriage in a usnal and proper way, permits the passengers to leave the vehicle and return to it, entitled to protection as such, as well while so leaving and returning as at any other time.' Where no means are provided to prevent passengers leaving the train at such point on the side where there is no platform, it is a question for the jury whether reasonable care was used by the company.
A passenger on a steamboat, who has purchased a ticket not entitling him to meals, can properly go on shore for a meal at any intermediate stopping-place before reaching his destination, and has a passenger's right to protection during his egress, in the proper manner, from the steamer for that purpose.'
A passenger on a railroad train does not lose his character as such by alighting from the cars at a regular station from motives of either business or curiosity, although he has not yet arrived at the terminus of his journey. Thus a passenger on board a transoceanic steamship has a right to go ashore just on the eve of her departure, even if it be for no other purpose than to buy tobacco.“. And a passenger upon a railroad, in the absence of any rule of the
a road or any stipulation on the ticket, has a right to stop off at any interinediate station."
It cannot properly be said, if a passenger leaves a train for the purpose of obtaining refreshments at a regular station, or transacting business during its stay there, but intending to return and continne his passage, ceases to be a passenger or loses the right of heing protected by the regulations which the company has provided for the safety of persons traveling on its cars and using its station grounds. He may not stand upon the tracks or go
thereon without using the care and caution required of prudent persons under the circumstances of the case; but if a person under such • State v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 58 Me. 176; Dodge v. Boston & B. SS. Co. 2
L. R. A. 83, 148 Mass. 207; Pitcher v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 28 N.
29 Fed. Rep. 298; Dice v. Willamette Transp. & L. Co. 8 Or. 60. * VcKimble v. Boston & M. R. Co. 2 New Eng. Rep. 48, 141 Mass. 463. * Drige v. Boston & B. 8. S. Co. 2 L. R. A. 83, 148 Mass. 207. * Hrebrik v. Carr, 29 Fed. Rep. 298. *Burnham v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 63 Me. 298; Keeley v. Boston & M. R. Co.
67 Me. 163; McKimble v. Boston & M. R. Co. 2 New Eng. Rep. 48, 141 Mass. 463.
circumstances is injured by the omission of the servants of the company to obey rules adopted for the protection of persons in that situation, it becomes liable for injuries thus received.
The rule which prescribes it to be the duty of persons to exercise care and caution in going upon railroad tracks and to use their senses of sight and hearing for the purpose of discovering and avoiding dangers, is one frequently found in reported cases, and, as a general rule, is salutary and just.
But the duty of active vigilance must be adapted to the circumstances of the case; and if the offending company has by its own conduct and by its published regulations, led the public to believe that trains would not be run on its tracks at specified times and places, persons having occasion to cross them have the right to rely upon the assurance of the company and are not necessarily guilty of negligence when injured by prohibited trains while doing so.
A person injured by a collision while the cars were stopped for dinner, is not guilty of negligence in resuming his place in the (ar before directed to do so by the trainmen.' Evidence that a person in the uniform of a carrier, directed passengers to enter a train away from a platform, is sufficient prima facie, to warrant them in supposing that such person was its officer.'
"Parsons v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. 3 L. R. A. 683, 113 N. Y. 355. "Lakin v. Oregon Pac. R. Co. 15 Or. 220. 3 Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Kane, 12 Cent. Rep. 95, 69 Md. 11.