CHAPTER IX. ACCEPTANCE AND REFUSAL OF PASSENGERS. § 52. Duty as to Acceptance of all Passengers. § 53. Right and Duty to Remove Passengers. § 54. Regulations Regarding Transportation of Passengers. § 55. Removal of Passenger; Power of Conductor, and Duty of Pas senger. § 56. Removal of Passenger Destined for a Station at which Cars do not Stop. $52. Duty as to Acceptance of all Passengers. The idea which lies at the very base of the law of common carriers, is that they are public servants and serve all alike. Every one constituting a part of the public, for whose benefit the special powers and privileges are given to the carrier, is entitled to an equal and impartial participation in the use of the facilities which they are capable of affording.' Passengers cannot be excluded on account of color, religious belief or political relations." Railway companies have no right to discriminate between persons, and sell tickets to some and refuse others. It is the duty of a railroad carrier to transport a passenger from stations where two railroads intersect, on payment of the charge fixed by statute, 'Samuels v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 31 Fed. Rep. 57; Southern Exp. Co. v. Memphis, etc. R. Co. 8 Fed. Rep. 802; Hays v. Pennsylvania Co. 12 Fed. Rep. 311; Galena & C. U. R. Co. v. Yarwood, 15 Ill. 468; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Bryan, 90 Ill. 126; Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumn. 221; Indianapolis, P. & C. R. Co. v. Rinard, 46 Ind. 293; Pearson v. Duane, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 605, 18 L. ed. 447: Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Swift, 79 U. S. 12 Wall. 262, 20 L. ed. 423; Mershon v. Hobensach, 22 N. J. L. 372; Beekman v. Saratoga & S. R. Co. 3 Paige, 45, 3 L. ed. 50; Cheney v. Boston & M. R. Co. 11 Met. 121; Coger v. Northwestern & N. Packet Co. 37 Iowa, 145; West Chester & P. R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209; McBride v. McLaughlin, 5 Watts, 375; Phillips v. Lawrence, 6 Watts & S. 154; McDon ald v. Scaife, 11 Pa. 381; Blair Iron & C. Co. v. Lloyd, 3 W. N. C. 103; Amer v. Longstreth, 10 Pa. 145; Nagle v. Mullison, 34 Pa. 53; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Rosenzweig, 4 Cent. Rep. 712, 113 Pa. 544; New Orleans, J. & G. N. R. Co. v. Hurst, 36 Miss. 660; Baltimore & Y. Turnp. Co. v. Boone, 45 Md. 344. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185, 8 Am. Rep. 641; West Chester & P. R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209. 'Indianapolis, P. & C. R. Co. v. Rinard, 46 Ind. 293. whether he has a ticket or not; and no regulation in conflict with the law can be given effect. It has been held that the proprietors of a stage coach, who hold themselves out as common carriers of passengers, are bound to receive all who require a passage, so long as they have room, and there is no legal excuse for refusal; and it is not a lawful excuse that they run their coach in connection with another coach, which extends the line to a certain place, and have agreed with the proprietor of such other coach not to receive passengers who come from that place on certain days, unless they come in his coach.' But while carriers are bound ordinarily to receive all who apply and are prepared to comply with reasonable regulations, and a railroad company, as a common carrier, may make reasonable rules for the regulation of its business and the performance of its public duties, and where the facts are indisputable, it is the province of the court to determine, as a matter of law, the reasonableness of a regulation by which a railroad company refuses to sell tickets or check baggage to a regular stopping place of a passenger train, yet carriers may refuse or remove those whose purpose is to impair the patronage of the carrier, or who act as agents for rival carriers,' or one who threatens to assault a passenger, or to commit any illegal act, or an outlaw, or one who is escaping from justice, or one suffering from any contagious disease." So they may exclude or remove persons offensively rude and disgusting in their manners or of notorious immoral or licentious character, if their reputation is such as to give reasonable cause for apprehension that they will misconduct themselves on the trip, or persons who by reason of intoxication create this reasona 'Eddy v. Rider, 79 Tex. 53. 2 Bennett v. Dutton, 10 N. H. 481. 5 See also The Pacific, 1 Blatchf. 569; Hurst v. Great Western R. Co. 19 C. B. N. S. 310; Bretherton v. Wood, 3 Brod, & B. 54; Willis v. Long Island R. Co. 34 N. Y. 670. 3 Evans v. Memphis & C. R. Co. 56 Ala. 246. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Lyon, 2 L. R. A. 489, 123 Pa. 140. Barney v. Oyster Bay & H. S. B. Co. 67 N. Y. 301; Com. v. Power, 7 Met. 596; The D. R. Martin, 11 Blatchf. 233; Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumn. 221; Fell v. Knight, 8 Mees. & W. 269; Burgess v. Clements, 4 Maule & S. 306; Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523; Ansell v. Waterhouse, 2 Chit. 1. Pittsburg & C. R. Co. v. Pillow, 76 Pa. 510; Thurston v. Union Pac. R. Co. 4 Dill. 321; Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Vandyne, 57 Ind. 576; Arnold v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 83 Ill. 273. ble belief. But slight intoxication will not justify such exclusion or removal.' But the fact that a passenger on a street car used vulgar and indecent language in a tone of voice sufficiently loud to attract the attention of passengers will not justify the conductor in putting him off, unless he used such language in a voice sufficiently loud to annoy and disturb the passengers. Gamblers and men whose purpose on the train is to defraud the passengers may be excluded or removed.' 3 The expulsion from a railroad train of a passenger who has paid his fare cannot be justified by his use of improper language in response to a false charge of failure to pay, though heard by other passengers. But if a passenger in a street car, without having been reasonably provoked thereto by the improper conduct of the conductor, willfully and in anger call him a liar in the presence and hearing of the other passengers, he is guilty of disorderly conduct justifying his removal from the car by the conductor. So the carrier cannot accept as a passenger, one whose presence on the train will, with the knowledge of its officers, expose the entire train to an assault from a mob, or if it accept such a person it must place him where others will not be exposed to danger from his presence. Where a passenger train was stopped, not at a regular station, but in the midst of a mob to take on persons whom the mob were seeking to maltreat, and they were put into an ordinary car with other passengers and were captured at the next railroad 1Railroad Co. v. Valleley, 32 Ohio St. 345; Lemont v. Washington & G. R. Co. 1 Mackey, 180; Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Van Houten, 48 Ind.90; Baltimore, P. & U. R. Co. v. McDonald, 68 Ind. 316; Sullivan v. Old Colony R. Co. 1 L. R. A. 513, 148 Mass. 119; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Logan (Ky.) 3 L. R. A. 80; Indianapolis, P. & C. R. Co. v. Pitzer, 7 West. Rep. 396. 109 Ind. 191; Stone v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 47 Iowa, 82; State v. Chovin, 7 Iowa, 204; Crocker v. New London, W. & P. R. Co. 24 Conn. 249; Murphy v. Union R. Co. 118 Mass. 228; New Orleans, St. L. & C. R. Co. v. Burke, 53 Miss. 209; Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumn. 221; Brown v. Memphis & C. R. Co. 5 Fed. Rep. 499. But see Prendergast v. Compton, 8 Car. & P. 454. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Vandyne, 57 Ind. 576; Putnam v. Broadway & 8. A. R. Co. 55 N. Y. 108. Chicago City R. Co. v. Pelletier, 184 Ill. 120. Thurston v. Union Pac. R. Co. 4 Dill. 321. See Pearson v. Duane, 71 U. Eads v. Metropolitan R. Co. 43 Mo. App. 536. See Chicago City R. Co. v. . crossing by the mob, who broke into the car and injured a passenger therein, the carrier was declared liable for needlessly exposing the passenger to such injury.' The carrier is bound to use all force at its command to repel violence to passengers." But the social penalties of exclusion of unchaste women from hotels, theaters and other public places cannot be imported into the law of carriers. Such persons so long as they conduct themselves with decency have the right to travel in ordinary public conveyances. The carrier has the duty imposed upon him to carry all individuals whose present conduct is unobjectionable, unless there is reasonable grounds to fear it will not continue so; and undoubtedly the close companionship of a coach would authorize the exclusion of persons, where it would not be justified in a railroad train, where a separation can be made. But generally the police power of removal committed to the carrier, will require him to accept all persons, presenting no present reason for their exclusion in their appearance or behavior.* Where a woman was excluded from the "ladies' car" because she was of notoriously bad character, the reasonableness of a regulation authorizing her exclusion was held to be a mixed question of law and fact." So the carrier may decline to accept, or may remove from the vehicle, one who will not conform to his reasonable regulations when brought to his attention or known to him." 'Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Pillsbury, 11 West. Rep. 757, 123 Ill. 9. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. v. Hinds, 53 Pa. 512; New Orleans, St. L. & C. R. Co. v. Burke, 53 Miss. 200; Britton v. Atlanta & C. A. L. R. Co. 88 N. C. 536, 43 Am. Rep. 749. Vinton v. Middlesex R. Co. 11 Allen, 304. Brown v. Memphis & C. R. Co. 5 Fed. Rep. 499; Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumn. 221. 'Brown v. Memphis & C. R. Co. 4 Fed. Rep. 37, 7 Fed. Rep. 51. 'Mackay v. Ohio River R. Co. 9 L. R. A. 132, 34 W. Va. 65; Crocker v. New London, W. & P. R. Co. 24 Conn. 249; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Bryan, 90 Ill. 126; Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumn. 221; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Griffin, 63 Ill. 499; Patry v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 77 Wis. 218; Carpenter v. Washing ton & G. R. Co. 121 U. S. 474, 30 L. ed. 1015; Louisville & N. R. C. v. Mybin, 66 Miss. 83; Weaver v. Rome, W. & O. R. Co. 3 Thom. & C. 270; Frederick v. Marquette, H. & O. R. Co. 37 Mich. 343; McCarthy v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 41 Iowa, 432; Terre Haute, A. & St. L. R. Co. v. Vanatta, 21 Ill. 188; Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Rose, 11 Neb. 177; State v. Goold, 53 Me. 279; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Blocher, 27 Md. 277; Post v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 14 Neb. 110. 853. Right and Duty to Remove Passengers.' If one who has been admitted as a passenger, be afterwards discovered to be of such a dangerous disposition or offensive habits as would have justified his exclusion, had the facts been known at the time he was accepted, the question may arise as to the power of the carrier to remove him upon discovery of the facts. Permitting a passenger to enter a train knowing him to be intoxicated does not deprive the carrier of a right to eject him when he becomes boisterous and obnoxious during the journey.' And an intoxicated passenger may be removed after tendering him such "proportion of the fare he has paid as the distance he then is from the place to which he has paid his fare bears to the whole distance for which he has paid his fare.” It has been held that although a railroad or steamboat company can properly refuse to transport a drunken or insane man, or one whose character is bad, they cannot expel him, after having admitted him as a passenger, and received his fare, unless he misbehaves during the journey.** Where the libelant had been banished by a vigilance committee under penalty of death if he returned, and having secured passage upon a return steamer, without the knowledge of the captain as to the circumstances of his banishment, he was sent back upon a vessel met on the way, it was held that although the captain's motive was to save his life, the action was not justified. But nevertheless, a judgment for $4,000 was reduced to $50, as having, under the circumstances, been excessive. In this case there *Where a street car driver removes a passenger who is stricken with apoplexy, in such a manner as to render the company liable, the mistake of such driver in supposing that the passenger was drunk, when he had ridden a considerable distance without misbehavior, will not excuse the company from 'iability. Where a passenger stricken with apoplexy is removed from a street car by the driver, in a helpless condition, and laid in the street, on a bleak, drizzling day, and there abandoned, with no effort to procure him attention, the company is liable. Conolly v. Crescent City R. Co. 41 La. Ann. 63. 'See also § 67. Louisville N. R. Co. v. Logan (Ky.) 3 L. R. A. 80. "Coppin v. Braithwaite, 8 Jur. 875; Prendergast v. Compton, 8 Car. & P. 462. |