was no fraud on the part of the libelant in procuring his passage. He talked freely with officers of the vessel, and it does not appear that he would have been refused a passage had the facts been known in the first instance.

But where the permission of the passenger to remain in the⚫ train becomes a question involving the safety of the passengers, the non-exercise of the police power possessed by the carrier for their protection, cannot, it would seem, be excused because of an error in admitting the passenger. If it is a duty for the protec tion of the passengers, not to receive persons who endanger their safety, and police power is given him at common law to enforce his refusal,' no error of the carrier in accepting such a person, can relieve it from the obligation to remove him, when the danger attending his presence is discovered, unless additional care in guarding him, on the part of the carrier, can remove the hazard. While as between the obnoxious passenger and the carrier, the act of accepting him, if he has practiced no fraud to secure his passage, might be held as an estoppel, no such effect can be given to it on legal principles, if the act imperil those whose safety the police power of removal, has been given the carrier to insure.' Of course consideration must be given to the safety and reasonable comfort of the passenger whose removal becomes necessary.' No unnecessary hardship must be imposed upon him, and the original wrong in admitting him, and the subsequent inconvenience growing out of this wrong, must be answered for to him, if he be guiltless in the matter. The question will become more involved, when the passenger is on shipboard, or on a railway train passing through a desolate country, and the power to confine a dangerous passenger, expressly conferred by statute in some states, but always accompanying the possession of police

'Brown v. Memphis & C. R. Co. 5 Fed. Rep. 499; Pittsburg & C. R. Co. v. Pillow, 76 Pa. 510.

Vinton v. Middlesex R. Co. 11 Allen, 304; Pittsburg & C. R. Co. v. Pillow, 76 Pa. 510; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Logan (Ky.) 3 L. R. A. 80.

Atchison, T. & 8. F. R. Co. v. Weber, 33 Kan. 543; Railroad Co. v. Valleley, 32 Ohio St. 345; Cincinnati, 1. & St. L. R. Co. v. Cooper, 6 L. R. A. 241, 120 Ind. 469.

Mykleby v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 39 Minn. 54; Indianapolis, P. & C. R. Co. v. Pitzer, 4 West. Rep. 256, 109 Ind. 179.

Beckwith v. Cheshire R. Co. 3 New Eng. Rep. 186, 143 Mass. 68.

power at common law,' may be resorted to if necessary for the protection of the passengers and the safety of the unwelcome intruder. But under no circumstances will mere rudeness or impoliteness justify the removal of a passenger. It must be some infraction of decency or regulation or indication of danger apparent, or reasonably to be anticipated.'

It must be conceded under the adjudicated cases that the carrier, as an incident to its public employment, not only has the power, but is bound to take all reasonable and proper means to insure the safety and provide for the comfort and convenience of its passengers and it follows, that it has the right, in the exercise of this authority and duty, to repress and prohibit all disorderly conduct in its vehicles, and to expel* or exclude therefrom any person whose conduct or condition is such as to render acts of impropriety, rudeness, indecency or disturbance either inevitable or reasonably probable. Certainly the person in charge of the vehicle is not bound to wait until some overt act of violence, profaneness or other misconduct has been committed, to the annoyance, inconvenience or injury of other passengers, before exercising his authority to exclude or expel the offender. It may remove gamblers engaged in their vocation; and drunken men creating a disturbance. But a father cannot be removed for the misbehavior of a grown son.'

The right to remove a disorderly passenger without arresting him, which corporations possess at common law, is not intended to be taken away by a public statute which provides that railroad police officers may arrest and remove such passengers to the baggage car or other suitable place of detention, and a passenger who is guilty of disorderly conduct may be placed in a baggage car without arresting him, and carried to his destination when it

'Sullivan v. Old Colony R. Co. 1 L. R. A. 513, 148 Mass. 119.

'Prendergast v. Compton, 8 Car. & P. 454; Putnam v. Broadway & S. A. R. Co. 55 N. Y. 108.

'Gould v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co. 18 Fed. Rep. 155; Hoffbauer v. Darenport & N. W. R. Co. 52 Iowa, 342; State v. Goold, 53 Me. 279; Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Van Houten, 48 Ind. 90.

"Vinton v. Middlesex R. Co. 11 Allen, 304.

'Thurston v. Union Pac. R. Co. 4 Dill. 321.

'Sullivan v. Old Colony R. Co. 1 L. R. A. 513, 148 Mass. 119; Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C. R. Co. v. Cooper, 6 L. R. A. 241, 120 Ind. 469.

'Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Maybin, 66 Miss. 83.

is reasonable that this should be done without rendering the company liable.'

The law makes it the duty of a railroad company to use all reasonable care in operating trains for both the safety and protection from molestation and insult of passengers; otherwise elderly and infirm persons and females, who, upon the faith of such protection, frequently travel unattended, would have no security against turbulent, bad men. And as it is obvious a train must be run with skill and system in order to assure safety and comfort, the conduct of anyone who interferes with the management, or without just cause attempts to do bodily injury to, or put in fear, those in charge, is reprehensible and unlawful. But a railroad company is not required to keep at hand armed police to resist an attack from an unexpected mob,' or to arrest and confine on a moving train those who violate its necessary rules, or do injury to other passengers; nor can the employés neglect their duties, upon the faithful performance of which the safety of all depends, in order to do so. Consequently, the only effectual remedy for or security against disorderly and lawless behavior on board a passenger train is the immediate and summary expulsion of the wrongdoer; and plenary authority of the conductor to do it is universally recognized, and required to be exercised whenever necessary for the safety or protection of either passengers or employés.*

A passenger who is guilty of gross misconduct, either by insulting or assaulting other passengers or the conductor, or who uses vile or profane language in the car, or who threatens to assault other passengers or the conductor, may lawfully be expelled from the train. The officers and employés in charge of railway trains have the right and power to preserve order and decorum, and to that end may eject all drunken, riotous and disorderly persons and

'Sullivan v. Old Colony R. Co. 1 L. R. A. 513, 148 Mass. 119.

Rommel v. Schambaher, 120 Pa. 579; Simmons v. New Bedford, V. & N. S. B. Co. 97 Mass. 361.

Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. v. Hinds, 53 Pa. 512; Simmons v. New Bedford, V. & N. S. B. Co. 97 Mass. 361.

Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Logan, 3 L. R. A. 80, 88 Ky. 232.

'Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Van Houten, 48 Ind. 90.

all persons violating the reasonable rules of the company.' This right and power is everywhere conceded by the courts. From this power and from the obligation resting upon carriers of persons to transport their passengers safely to their destination, arises a duty to exercise that power and authority. It is the duty of the railway company and of its conductor to use the utmost vigilance and care in maintaining order and in protecting passengers from violence and insults from others, though such other persons be passengers, and a failure so to do will render the company liable for damages to a passenger injured by reason of such neglect. The company, it has been held, is as much liable for an omission in this respect as it is for a negligent failure to provide safe machinery.'

But where such care does not involve the personal safety of the passenger, the degree of care required of a carrier to prevent injury to a passenger while in transit or getting on or off its cars or other vehicles, from the careless or wrongful acts of others, is not the utmost care which a very cautious person would exercise, but reasonable care, not only on the part of its servants, but also in preventing injury from the careless or wrongful act of any other person whom it permits to come on its premises, which could have been foreseen. The power and right to prevent the occurrence of improper or disorderly conduct in a public vehicle is equally as essential and vital as the authority to stop a disturbance or repress acts of violence or breaches of the peace or of decorum after they have been inaugurated and the mischief partially done. The safeguard against the unjust and oppressive abuse of the power is in the consideration that the carrier will never be sustained, except where it can be satisfactorily proved that the reputation, condition or conduct of a person was such as to render it reasonably certain that he would occasion discomfort

1Carpenter v. Washington & G. R. Co. 121 U. S. 474, 30 L. ed. 1015; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Maybin, 66 Miss. 83; Cincinnati, S. & C. R. Co. v. Skillman, 39 Ohio St. 444; Havens v. Hartford & N. H. R. Co. 28 Conn. 69.

Flint v. Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co. 34 Conn. 554; New Orleans, St. L. & C. R. Co. v. Burke, 53 Miss. 200; Pittsburg & C. R. Co. v. Pillow, 76 Pa. 510; Pittsburgh, Fl. W. & C. R. Co. v. Hinds, 53 Pa. 512; Rommel v. Echambaher, 120 Pa. 579.

Buck v. Manhattan R. Co. 32 N. Y. S. R. 51.

or annoyance to other passengers, if he were admitted into a public vehicle, or having secured such entrance, if he were allowed longer to remain, unless such removal be for some violation of, or failure to comply with the reasonable rules of the company, or other improper conduct.' For injury suffered from the negligence or timidity of the carrier in failing to exercise this power of removal on proper occasions, he must answer in damages as well as for its wrongful exercise.'

A railroad company cannot subject passengers although in a second. class car, to noxious influences, not necessarily, nor ordinarily incident to such travel,-such as hearing rough, profane, and obscenelanguage, and witnessing acts of violence and drunkenness which the company, by the exercise of proper care and due regard for the welfare of passengers could prevent."

§ 54. Regulations Regarding Transportation of Passengers.

A railroad company has a right to enforce reasonable rules and regulations relating to passengers, and to employ such force as may be necessary for that purpose; and its gate-keeper may seize hold of and detain passengers so far as necessary to prevent their boarding trains in motion.*

1Cain v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. 39 Minn. 297; Du Laurans v. First Div. St. Paul & P. R. Co. 15 Minn. 49; Southern Kansas R. Co. v. Hins dale. 38 Kan. 507; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gants, 38 Kan. 608; Southern Kansas R. Co. v. Rice, 38 Kan. 398; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Griffin, 68 III. 499; State v. Chovin, 7 Iowa, 204; Stone v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 47 Iowa, 82; Crocker v. New London, W. & P. R. Co. 24 Conn. 249; New Orleans, St. L. & C. R. Co. v. Burke, 53 Miss. 209; Murphy v. Union R. Co. 118 Mass. 228; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Williams, 55. Ill. 185.

'Pittsburg & C. R. Co. v. Pillow, 76 Pa. 510; Vinton v. Middlesex R. Co. 11 Allen, 304; King v. Ohio & M. R. Co. 22 Fed. Rep. 413; New Orleans, St. L. & C. R. Co. v. Burke, 53 Miss. 209; Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. v.. Hinds, 53 Pa. 512; State v. Chovin, 7 Iowa, 204; Flint v. Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co. 6 Blatchf. 158; Stone v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 24 Conn. 249; Flint v. Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co. 34 Conn. 554; Murphy v. Union R. Co. 118 Mass. 228; Bass v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co 36 Wis. 450; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Griffin, 68 Ill. 499; Craker v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 36 Wis. 657; Britton v. Atlanta & C. A. L. R. Co. 88 N. C. 536; Goddard v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 57 Me. 202; Batton v. South & N. Ala. R. Co. 77 Ala. 591; Ramsden v. Boston & A. R. Co 104 Mass. 117; Flannery v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 4 Mackey, 111: Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185; Spohn v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 87 Mo. 77, 101 Mo. 417.

St. Louis, A. & T. R. Co. v. Mackie, 1 L. R. A. 667, 71 Tex. 491. ♦Dickerman v. St. Paul Union Depot Co. 44 Minn. 433, 45 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 596.