The reasonableness of rules prescribed by railroad companies, and like corporations with like powers, is a question of law to be decided by the courts, and not a question of fact to be decided by juries.' It was In the case of Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Whittemore, the Supreme Court of Illinois says: "The circuit court left it to the jury to say whether the rule was reasonable. This was error. proper to admit testimony, as was done; but either with or withont this testimony, it was for the court to say whether the regulation was reasonable, and therefore obligatory upon the passengers. The necessity of holding this to be a question of law, and therefore within the province of the court to settle, is apparent from the consideration that it is only by so holding that fixed and permanent regulations can be established. If this question is to be left to the juries, one rule would be applied by them to-day, and another to-morrow. In one trial a railway would be held liable, and in another presenting the same questions, not liable. Neither the companies nor passengers would know their rights or their obligations. A fixed system for the control of the vast interests connected with railways would be impossible, while such a system is essential equally to the road and to the public.". That railroad companies have the power to prescribe such reasonable rules and regulations as may be found necessary in the conduct of their business is indisputable. The validity of the rule depends upon its reasonableness. If reasonable it has the force and effect of law, but if unreasonable it is not obligatory upon the public to obey it. Webster defines a rule to be "That which is prescribed or laid down as a guide to conduct; that which is settled by authority or custom; a regulation; a prescription; a minor law; a uniform course of things." It is the duty of courts to pass upon and construe the laws of the land, and the reasonable rules and regulations established by a railroad being laws-minor laws-there is no good reason why the courts should not pass upon them and pro'Louisville, N. & G. 8. R. Co. v. Fleming, 14 Lea, 128, 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 347; Vedder v. Fellows, 20 N. Y. 126; Maroney v. Old Colony & N. R. Co. 106 Mass. 153, 8 Am. Rep. 305; Yorton v. Milwaukee, L. Š. & W. R. Co. 54 Wis. 234, 41 Am. Rep. 23; Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Nazum, 50 Ind. 141, 19 Am. Rep. 703; Pierce v. Randolph, 12 Tex. 290; Rorer, Railroads, 226, 227; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Whittemore, 43 Ill. 420. nounce them reasonable and binding, or unreasonable and not binding, as the case may be.' Rules of a railroad company requiring persons passing through its gates for the purpose of taking trains to exhibit their tickets to, and have them punched by, the gate-keeper, and that no passenger shall be allowed to board any train while in motion, are reasonable; and persons knowing of such rules, and having a reasonable opportunity to do so must comply therewith.' A regulation of a railroad company which is ancient and public, requiring passengers without tickets to pay an extra fare, is presumed to be the act of the corporation; and a party ejected for noncompliance has no right to question the fact or the method of its adoption.' A passenger has no right to travel on a lost season ticket. A condition requiring him to exhibit his ticket is a reasonable one.* A by-law of a railway company, that "any passenger traveling without a ticket, or failing or refusing to show or deliver up his ticket to any duly authorized servant of the company when required to do so," shall be required to pay the fare from the station whence the train originally started to the end of his journey, as against a passenger who had, in good faith, traveled a short distance upon the line without having procured a ticket, is unreasonable and void. The fact that a person has previously ridden in passenger cars upon a livestock ticket, which gave him a right to ride only on a freight train, does not vary his legal rights as evidenced by such a ticket accepted by him, or give him any right to ride thereon in a passenger train." Railroad companies have the right to adopt reasonable regulations as to the method of paying fares by passengers, and may South Florida R. Co. v. Rhoads, 3 L. R. A. 733, 25 Fla. 40. 'Dickerman v. St. Paul Union Depot Co. 44 Minn. 433. McGowen v. Morgan's L. & T. R & SS. Co. 5 L. R. A. 817, 41 La. Ann. 732, 39 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 460. Cresson v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 11 Phila. 597; Cooper v. London B. & 8. C. R. Co. L. R. 4 Exch. Div. 88; Duke v. Great Western Co. 14 U. C. G. B. 369. London & B. R. Co. v. Watson, L. R. 3 C. P. Div. 249. Thorp v. Concord R. Co. 61 Vt. 378. discriminate between fares paid for tickets at stations and those paid in the cars.' A railroad company may charge a reasonable sum more than regular fare, to passengers who tender their fare on the train provided a reasonable opportunity has been given to purchase tickets before the passengers entered the train. A regulation that a railroad passenger who fails to purchase a ticket must pay 10 cents more than the regular fare, for which extra charge a check will be given by the conductor, which will be cashed at any ticket office is not unreasonable; and is not a part of the "fare or charge for transportation," within the meaning of the statute fixing the maximum rate of fare. And a requirement of passengers without tickets to pay 25 cents extra, is not unreasonable. That a railroad company gives a drawback coupon for the extra fare, on which a passenger may collect it back from any agent at a station does not affect the validity of a regulation requiring passengers without tickets to pay an extra fare. A passenger who refuses to comply with the regulations of a railroad company requiring passengers without tickets to pay 25 cents extra may be lawfully ejected in a proper manner and at a proper place. It is a reasonable regulation for a railway company to fix its rates of fare by a tariff posted at its stations, and to allow a uniform discount on these rates to those who purchase tickets before entering the cars; and a provision that if such a ticket is not purchased, the full rate of fare shall be charged, does not violate a rule prescribed by statute, that the rates of fare shall be the same for all persons between the same points." A railroad company may discriminate in its rates against those 'McGowen v. Morgan's L. & T. R. & SS. Co. 5 L. R. A. 817, 41 La. Ann. 732, 39 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 460. State v. Hungerford, 39 Minn. 6; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Cɔ. v. Brisbane, 24 Ill. App. 463; Hall v. South Carolina R. Co. 25 S. C. 564. 'Reese v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 6 L. R. A. 529, 131 Pa. 422. 'Du Laurans v. First Div. of St. Paul & P. R. Co. 15 Minn. 49; St. Louis, N. & C. R. Co. v. Dalby, 19 Ill. 353. McGowen v. Morgan's L. & T. R. & 8S. Co. 5 L. R. A. 817, 41 La. Aun. 732, 39 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 460. 'State v. Goold, 53 Me. 279. Swan v. Manchester & L. R. Co. 132 Mass. 116; Hoffbauer v. Davenport & who do not purchase tickets if reasonable opportunities are afforded to procure them.' Such a regulation is reasonable." Passengers who neglect to purchase tickets at stations before embarking on cars may be charged additional fare if proper conveniences and facilities are furnished them for procuring tickets." A passenger wrongfully upon a train, may be removed, and the corporation will only be liable for unnecessary violence. Where the rules of the company require all passengers to purchase a ticket before entering the cars and forbid the conductors from taking money for fares, a passenger who neglects to supply himself with a ticket may be removed from the car although he tenders his fare in money. Such requirements are reasonable ones to protect the carrier against imposition and the fraud of its employés. But if the rate exceed that fixed by statute, the passenger need only tender the legal amount.' So where a person is wrongfully in possession of his ticket, although innocently, he may be ejected from the train unless he rectifies the wrong upon demand." A rule prescribed by a railroad company, inhibiting the wearing on their cars the uniform caps and badges of the officers and employés of an independent line of steamers is not a reasonable rule, and hence not binding upon the persons wearing them; and if the company expels any such passenger for wearing such cap or badge, such expulsion is illegal, and the passenger so expelled is entitled to damages therefor. Railroad companies have no right to so prescribe the dress of any passenger." Б Forsee v. Alabama G. 8. R. Co. 63 Miss. 67; Georgia Southern & F. R. Co. v. Asmore, (Ga.) 16 L. R. A. 53. 2 Wilsey v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 83 Ky. 511. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Parks, 18 Ill. 460; St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v. South, 43 Ill. 176; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Flagg, 43 Ill. 364; State v. Goold, 53 Me. 279; St. Louis, A. & C. R. Co. v. Dalby, 19 Ill. 353; Porter v. New York Cent. R. Co. 34 Barb. 353; Crocker v. New London, W. & P. R. Co. 24 Conn. 249. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Pierce, 47 Mich. 277; Shelton v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 29 Ohio St. 214. McCarthy v. Dublin, W. & W. R. Co. 5 Ir. C. L. Rep. 244; Lane v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. 5 Lea, 124. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Reed, 75 Ill. 125. "Smith v. Pittsburg, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. 23 Ohio St. 10. 8 Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Chastine, 54 Miss. 503. South Florida R. Co. v. Rhoads, 3 L. R. A. 733, 25 Fla. 40. Exemplary damages may be given for the refusal to sell a passenger a ticket or to check his baggage to a regular station of a passenger train, in pursuance of an unreasonable regulation of the company, which indicates a wanton disregard of the rights of passengers.' $ 55. Removal of Passenger-Power of Conductor and Duty of Passenger. A conductor of a railroad train is somewhat like the master of a ship; he has police powers and disciplinary control over the train; and the quiet and comfort of the passengers and their safety are under his protection; and while the conditions are not identical, yet on analogous principles it is the duty of the passenger to avoid resistance to his authority, beyond a distinct protest, and to submit to his orders, unless resistance is necessary to defend himself against personal injury.' Carriers of passengers are legally bound to reasonable conduct on the facts brought to their knowledge or to the knowledge of their agents and employés. It is the duty of the conductor to ascertain whether a passenger has purchased a ticket before ejecting him from the cars. If the plaintiff has forfeited his right to be carried as a passenger by refusing to show his ticket when requested to do so by the conductor, and if the right was not restored by subsequently complying, then his expulsion is lawful and he has nothing to complain of, unless greater force and violence is used than his own resistance rendered necessary." It is no excuse for the expulsion of a passenger from a railroad train that the conductor made a negligent mistake as to the station indicated on the ticket which the passenger had surrendered to him,' and where the conductor through mistake gives back 'Indianapolis, P. & C. R. Co. v. Rinard, 46 Ind. 293; Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v Lyon, 2 L. R. A. 489, 123 Pa. 140. 'Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gants, 38 Kan. 608, and authorities cited; Bellman v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. 42 Hun, 135; Spohn v. Mis souri Pac. R. Co. 2 West. Rep. 118, 87 Mo. 74. Hall v. Memphis & C. R. Co. 15 Fed. Rep. 61; Southern Kansas R. Co. v. Rice, 38 Kan. 398. Buck v. Webb, 58 Hun, 185. Quigley v. Central Pac. R. Co. 11 Nev. 350. Hibbard v. New York & E. R. Co. 15 N. Y. 455. Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. v. Eskew, 86 Ga. 641. |