less violence.' And a passenger wrongfully upon a train may be removed, and the corporation will only be liable for unnecessary violence. But ignorance may excuse his acts done in violation of regulations unknown to him so as not to constitute him a trespasser. So a passenger who enters a car by mistake is not a trespasser; and while the railway company may eject him, it must not put him off at an improper place.' That the agent made a mistake or violated the instructions of his principals will not make the passenger a trespasser. Where a railroad train is scheduled to stop only at certain designated stations, and a passenger holds a ticket to a point at which it will not stop, the conductor, upon discovering the fact, has a right, there being no statute forbidding, to stop the train soon after it has left the starting place, and require the passenger to leave it; and if he refuses to pay a sum which in addition to his ticket will pay his fare to the first stopping place, the conductor may eject him.* If trains are arranged and their time fixed with regard to points of stoppage, and the time limited, a conductor would never be safe, nor the passenger secure from collision, if at his peril, the conductor must stop on the assertion of a mere stranger, that an agreement had been made to stop for him at an unusual place." If the agreement has in fact been made by a duly authorized agent, the passenger has his remedy on the contract." Where a railroad company's agent from whom a passenger pui. chased a return ticket was informed and understood that such passenger purchased the ticket with the intention of returning from his destination on the night train, if that train did not stop 1Chicago, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Bills, 104 Ind. 13. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Pierce, 47 Mich. 277; Shelton v.Lake Shore & 'Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Rosenzweig, 4 Cent. Rep. 712, 113 Pa. 519. An Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gants, 38 Kan. 608. at his station, it was the duty of the agent to notify him of the fact.' A conductor of a railroad train, who has invited a passenger to ride to a station beyond that mentioned in his ticket, with full knowledge of the facts upon which the latter claimed the right to be carried to such further station, has no right to eject him for refusal to pay the fare thereto from the station named in the ticket.' A plaintiff in an action for wrongful ejection from a car must aver in his complaint that the rules of the company provided that the train on which he took passage should stop at the station named in his ticket. He must show that he was rightfully on the train when ejected. One who insists upon traveling upon a railroad train after a schedule of its time and stoppages has been published, to a point at which he is informed the train will not stop, cannot recover damages for being carried beyond that point.* 1St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Adcox, 52 Ark. 406, 40 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 682. Hardy v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. 34 N. Y. S. R. 902. 3 Chicago, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Bills, 104 Ind. 13. Texas & P. R. Co. v. White (Tex. App.) Oct. 31, 1891. CHAPTER X. TICKETS, SALE AND PRODUCTION OF-CONCLUSIVENESS— REMOVAL OF PASSENGER. § 57. Opportunity Must be Given for Purchase of Tickets. § 58. Refusal to Exhibit Ticket or Pay Fare. § 59. Refusal to Pay or Exhibit Ticket. $60. Conclusiveness of Ticket as to Rights of Passenger. § 61. Denial of such Conclusiveness in Case of Error through Carrier's Negligence. § 62. Point where Passenger may be Removed from Train. § 63. Removal while Cars are in Motion. § 57. Opportunity must be Given for Purchase of Tickets. An extra charge for failure to buy a ticket is a reasonable regulation for a railway company, but in order to justify this charge the company must give reasonable facilities for the purchase of tickets." A reasonable opportunity to purchase tickets is all a passenger can demand, and a railroad company is under no duty to hold a train at a station, to enable a passenger to procure a ticket and thereby pay a less rate of fare than is charged when payment is made upon the train.' But railway companies are required to keep open their office for the sale of tickets to passengers for a reasonable time before the departure of each train, and up to the time fixed by its published rules for its departure. Where it was apparent from the original declaration that the cause of action was the expulsion of a passenger from the cars because he refused to pay an alleged overcharge, consisting of the difference between the ticket rate and the conductor's rate, an amend'Du Laurans v. First Div. St. Paul & P. R. Co. 15 Minn. 49; St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v. South, 43 Ill. 176; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Cunning. ham, 67 Ill. 316: Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Rogers, 28 Ind. 1, 38 Ind. 116; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Reed, 75 Ill. 125; Lane v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. 5 Lea, 124; Nellis v. New York Cent. R. Co. 30 N. Y. 505. Everett v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 69 Iowa, 15. Easton v. Waters (Tex. App.) April 12, 1890. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v. South, 43 Ill. 176; Chicago, R. 1. & P. R. Co. v. Brisbane, 24 Ill. App. 463. ment showing more fully why a ticket was not and could not be procured was allowed; and the explanation being that there was no agent at the station to furnish a ticket, the declaration as amended was considered sufficient.' In a recent case it was said that if the office where a passage on a railroad train is taken is not open, with an agent therein ready upon call to sell tickets, long enough before the actual departure of the train, whether delayed or not, to enable passengers to purchase tickets and safely board the train, no excess fare can be collected.* In two similar Illinois cases' much the same language was used, but this was explained, as in fact limited to the actual advertised time, denying the right of one thereafter to demand passage or that the office should be kept open for delayed trains to start.* Offices must be kept open for the sale of tickets for a reasonable time before the departure of each train, and up to the published time for its departure, but not, in all cases, necessarily up to the time of actual departure. The peculiar circumstances of each case must largely determine the duty: certainly the rule that railroad companies must furnish passengers a reasonable opportunity to purchase tickets before entering their trains does not require ticket offices to be kept open after persons purchasing tickets would no longer be able to reach the train before it began to move. The same rule applies to freight trains as well as passenger trains. Indeed it has been said they are not bound to keep their ticket offices open at or for any particular time, and that the fact that a passenger is unable to procure a ticket in consequence of the office being shut will not entitle him to be carried to his place of destination upon payment of the amount for which he could have procured a ticket at the office had it been open.' 1Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. v. Murden, 83 Ga. 753. Atchinson, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Dwelle, 44 Kan. 394. 3 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Parks, 18 Ill. 460; St. Louis, A. & C. R. Co. v. Dolby, 19 Ill. 353. 4St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v. South, 43 Ill. 176. "See Swan v. Manchester & L. R. Co. 132 Mass. 116. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Brisbane, 24 Ill. App 463. State v. Hungerford. 39 Minn. 6. Brown v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & G. R. Co. 38 Kan. 634; Southern Kan. R. Co. v. Hinsdale, 38 Kan. 507. 'Bordeaux v. Erie R. Co. 8 Hun, 579. But the rule above stated is the more logical one, and it is true generally that if they fail to keep their ticket office open a reasonable time before departure they cannot demand extra fare on account of the failure of a passenger to purchase a ticket.' It is the duty of a ticket agent to use reasonable care in delivering a ticket to the purchaser. It is no delivery to put the ticket on the counter in his absence.2 A person who endeavors to procure a ticket, but is unable to do so in consequence of the absence of the agent, unless under exceptional circumstances excusing such absence, and where the passenger has been somewhat in fault in making his application, cannot be charged an extra rate of fare.' Where a railroad company charges passengers without tickets a higher rate than those provided therewith, a passenger who boards a train at a station where there is no office may pay such higher rate to a ticket station, and there buy a ticket and travel for the reduced fare; and if such office is closed when it should be open, he can again board the train and travel at the lower rate." § 58. Refusal to Exhibit Ticket or Pay Fare. A regulation made by a railroad corporation requiring passengers to exhibit their tickets whenever requested by the conductor, and directing the ejection from the cars of those who should refuse to do so, is a reasonable and proper one. The passenger is bound to conform to such regulation, and forfeits his right to be carried further by his refusal to comply with it. But on exit from the train, as the fare is a mere debt, a passenger cannot be detained to secure his ticket or pay his fare." But where the custom on a steamboat requires the delivery of the ticket at the Georgia S. & F. R. Co. v. Asmore (Ga.) 16 L. R A. 53; Nellis v. New York Cent. R. Co. 30 N. Y. 505; Atchison, T. & S. F. Co. v. Dwelle, 44 Kan. 394; Hall v. South Carolina R. Co. 25 S. C. 564. Quigley v. Central Pac. R. Co. 5 Sawy. 107. Georgia S. & F. R. Co. v. Asmore (Ga.) 16 L. R. A. 53; St. Louis Cent. R. Co. v. Sutton, 42 Ill. 438; Porter v. New York Cent. R. Co. 34 Barb. 353. Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. v. Murden, 86 Ga. 434. Hibbard v. New York & E. R. Co. 15 N. Y. 455; Frederick v. Marquette, H. & O. R. Co. 37 Mich. 342; Duke v. Great Western R. Co. 14 U. C. Q. B. 369; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Reed, 75 Ill. 125. Lynch v. Metropolitan Elev. R. Co. 90 N. Y. 77. |