He is entitled to the protection of a passenger, although the officer was forbidden to receive passengers on such trains.' The act of a servant of a railway company in inviting a passenger to ride on a handcar, cannot be assumed to be the company's act unless the servant's authority to thus use the handcar is shown.' But in an action for personal injuries sustained by a passenger while riding on a handcar, evidence that the train master who authorized plaintiff to ride on the car was the representative of the company on that part of the road in respect to all matters connected with the use of the road, cars of all kinds, and the services of its employés, is sufficient to justify a finding that the train master had authority to use the hand car for transporting passengers." A passenger on a railroad train, who in ignorance of a rule requiring the employés on the train to prevent passengers riding in baggage cars, goes into and is allowed to ride in a baggage compartment of a combination car upon finding himself unable to obtain a seat in the smoking compartment of such car, and who has frequently been permitted to ride in the baggage compartment, is not guilty of negligence, even though his presence there contributes to injuries received in a collision which occurs.* Where plaintiff was directed by defendant's agent, whose duty it was to direct passengers, to take passage on a freight train, he became a passenger, notwithstanding a rule of the company, unknown to plaintiff, forbidding passengers to ride upon that train.* One who boards a freight car being loaded, with permission of the conductor, is not a trespasser; nor is he guilty of contributory negligence, unless he does so with knowledge that the conductor is exceeding his authority. Where the train was one on which the passengers were allowed to be carried, even if the person injured had boarded it without the permission or knowledge of the conductor, yet where the conductor, after he became aware of his presence on the train, suffered him to remain, he was enti 'Hanson v. Mansfield R. & Transp. Co. 38 La. Ann. 111. International & G. N. R. Co. v. Cook, 98 Tex. 713. International & G. N. R. Co. v. Prince, 77 Tex. 560. New York, L. E. & W. Co. v. Ball, 53 N. J. L. 283. · McGee v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 10 West. Rep. 282, 92 Mo. 208. tled to the same protection as if he had paid his fare.' This rule applies to carriage on freight and construction trains. It was applied by the Supreme Court of the United States to a case where plaintiff was injured while riding on the locomotive." It is not important in determining the question of recovery for want of ordinary care, that the person complaining of injury through the carrier's negligence, did not take passage as an ordinary passenger, or that he paid no fare, nor whether the plaintiff stood in the proper relation to the defendant of a passenger toward whom it owed the peculiar duty which grows out of such relation. But a person who has purchased no ticket and paid no fare, who goes to a caboose attached to a freight train, and, without the knowledge of those in charge of such train, attempts to get into said car at a place where the railroad company is not accustomed to receive passengers, is not a passenger; and if he is injured in such attempt to board the train, and those in charge of it have no knowledge of his presence, the company is not liable for the injury. A person who by a tip or bribe induces the conductor of a train not intended for the conveyance of ordinary passengers, as he had reason to know, to permit him to travel on the train contrary to the regulations of the railway company, travels at his own risk, and is not entitled to damages for any injury to person or property sustained by him while so traveling.' A railway company owes no duty to an intruder upon one of its timber trains upon which passengers are not carried, except not to wantonly or willfully injure him, and is not liable for personal injuries sustained by him by the negligence of its employés. One who undertakes 'Muehlhausen v. St. Louis R. Co. 6 West. Rep. 857, 91 Mo. 344. Sherman v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 72 Mo. 65; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Muhling, 30 Ill. 9; St. Joseph & W. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 35 Kan. 185. 'Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Derby, 55 U. S. 14 How. 468 14 L. ed. 502. Jacobus v. St. Paul & C. R. Co. 20 Minn. 125. 'Creed v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 86 Pa. 139; Secord v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. 18 Fed. Rep. 221; Lucas v. Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. 33 Wis. 41; Wilton v. Middlesex R. Co. 107 Mass. 108; Gradin v. St. Paul & D. R. Co. 30 Minn. 217. 'Haase v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. 19 Or. 354. 'Canadian Pac. R. Co. v. Johnson, Montreal L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 213; Powers v. Boston & M. R. Co. 153 Mass. 188. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Meacham (Tenn.) April Term, 1892. to ride on an elevator, or platform car, used in lowering or raising freight, on an inclined track between a railroad depot and the water's edge, without consent of the railroad company, is not a passenger, but a mere stranger or trespasser, for whose death in consequence of the sudden breaking of the rope by which the car is operated, the railroad company is not liable.' $77. Removal of Traveler from Freight Train. A carrier has a right to make such reasonable rules and regulations as will tend to the better protection of its patrons and to the greater convenience of itself; and the rule that requires them to procure tickets before taking passage upon freight trains, or be expelled therefrom is reasonable.' A railroad company which has made and published a rule for a reasonable time, sufficient to create a presumption of knowledge by the passenger, prohibiting all persons from riding on its freight trains has the right to eject persons coming upon such trains, even though the rule has often before been violated.' The carrier may completely sever his business of passenger from that of freight transportation, and require the traffic to be on different trains.* A single instance of fare having been accepted by a conductor in violation of this rule will not justify a person in disregarding it. A passenger who knowingly disregards the rule of requiring tickets to be purchased before taking passage upon a freight train is upon the same footing with one who refuses to pay fare, and may be expelled at any regular station. Nor can he recover 1Snyder v. Natchez R. R. & T. R. Co. 42 La. Ann. 302. Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Rose, 11 Neb. 177; Brown v. Kansas City, F. S. & G. R. Co. 38 Kan. 634; Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 77 Ind. 507; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Flagg, 43 Ill. 364; Arnold v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 83 Ill. 273; Eaton v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 57 N. Y. 382, 15 Am. Rep. 513; Cleveland, C. & C. R. Co. v. Bartram, 11 Ohio St. 457; Law v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 32 Iowa, 534; Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Vandyne, 57 Ind. 576. Hobbs v. Texas & P. R. Co. 49 Ark. 357; Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Rose, 11 Neb. 177. Eaton v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 57 N. Y. 382; Thomas v. Chicago & G. T. R. Co. 72 Mich. 355. Southern Kansas R. Co. v. Hinsdale, 38 Kan. 507. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Flagg, 43 Ill. 364; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Nelson, 59 Ill. 110. as a passenger for injury by a wreck of the train.' But it is no defense in favor of a railroad company wrongfully ejecting a passenger, that the train from which he was expelled was a freight train, where it was a train on which passengers were customarily carried and invited to travel. And it must answer for injury to such a passenger.' A passenger is not supposed to know of a regulation by the railroad company, except on special trains, as coal cars, that passengers riding on freight trains must procure tickets before starting; and if he gets on the train in ignorance of such a regulation, he is not a trespasser until he is informed thereof. And mere posting of a notice of a change in the regulations to this effect is not notice to the passenger. But an announcement, in the caboose of a freight train, before the train starts, that all persons that desire to ride upon the train must procure tickets before it starts, is sufficient notice of the rule of the company, and will justify the expulsion from the train of a passenger refusing to buy his ticket.' But when a ticket has been sold with the statement that it entitled the holder to a passage on the train, his removal must be answered for in punitory damages. Unless special circumstances create a presumption that one injured on a freight train was legally there, no presumption, that he is a passenger, arises, but the reverse.' But no legal presumption of negligence of the injured person is created by his presence on the train.1o The extra care and expense of managing a freight train on which passengers are permitted, is held sufficient to sustain a contract limiting liability." A statute providing that railroad, companies shall eject persons 'Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Moore, 49 Tex. 31 'Eddy v. Rider, 79 Tex. 53. Secord v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. 18 Fed. Rep. 221. 8 Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Kessler, 18 Kan. 523. 9 Eaton v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 57 N. Y. 382. 10 Creed v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 86 Pa. 139. "Arnold v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 83 Ill. 273; Johnson v. Great S. & W. R. Co. 9 Ir. C. L. Rep. 708. from their trains at stations only, is restricted to passengers refusing to pay their fare; and a trespasser on a freight train, in violation of a published rule, may be ejected at another place. It is not an unreasonable regulation for a railroad company to require passengers to get upon a coach attached to a freight train at some reasonable and safe point other than the station or platform from which passengers usually enter passenger cars. $78. Stopping Freight Train at Stations. The law, even to protect intelligent beings from injury, is not unreasonable in its demands. It does not require freight trains, because a caboose car is attached, where regular passenger trains, with all proper conveniences and appliances are also run upon the road, to draw up at a passenger station platform, and then receive the passengers who choose to travel upon the train, nor does it require the same conveniences to be provided for receiving passengers or for their discharge. It is held that the regulation of a railroad company that passengers on a freight train cannot require the passenger coach attached to the train to be pulled up to the platform at a station for the purpose of getting off and on, is reasonable. In Iowa, however, on July 10, 1891, the state railroad commission rendered a decision against the company in the case of Selma v. The Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. Co., because the railroad did not stop its freight trains so the caboose would be at the depot platform. The attorney for the Rock Island contended that the company did not have to stop its freights under regulations governing the stoppage of passenger trains. The commission disagreed and has made an order compelling the company under penalty to stop the cabooses at the platforms of the depots on its lines. The passenger, having the choice of travel by a regular passenger train, although subject to some delay, cannot, if he select for any cause a freight train, reasonably demand more than the ordinary accommodation found in such trains, and the main purpose 1 Hobbs v. Texas & P. R. Co. 49 Ark. 357. Browne v. Raleigh & G. R. Co. 108 N. C. 34. 'Connell v. Mobile & O. R. Co. (Miss.) Feb. 17, 1890; Browne v. Raleigh & G. R. Co. 108 N. C. 34. |