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incurred is, by the statute, cast upon the owner, and his promise to pay therefor is one implied by law, even against his protestation. Such a contract necessarily implies a lien in favor of the contractor into whose hands the goods are taken for disinfection, to secure him for the expense properly incurred in his work.'

The Florida Quarantine Act of 1885, taken by itself alone, does not, by virtue of the general powers it confers on county boards of health authorize charges to be made against a vessel for quarantine purposes."

The laws in reference to the quarantine apply to a contract to furnish a pier for a steamship while in port, if in force when the contract is made.:

A reasonable charge, according to tonnage, of the material for the use of a crib erected by a county board of health for receiving

a ballast, is proper where the discharge of the ballast is for the

purpose of disinfection; but it is not proper to base any charge upon the tonnage of the vessel. The county boards of health, under the Florida Act of 1885, construing that Act in connection with the quarantine acts of 1879 and 1883, are authorized to make charges against a vessel for qnarantine services, if, under the authority given by the latter act, they have made proper provision therefor."

Under the Florida Act of 1885 (chap. 3603) and the acts in pari materia prior thereto, county boards of health have no authority, without an examination or inspection, to require vessels, upon entering ports within the jurisdiction of said boards, to deviate from their course six miles and go to a quarantine station for inspection and examination."

A port inspector appointed by a county board, under Florida Act 1885, chap. 3603, has the powers and duties described by Florida Act 1869, chap. 3162. Under Florida Acts 1879, chap. 3162, and 1885, chap. 3603, a county board may establish quarantine at any place, when in its judgment, it is expedient to do so.

The quar

* Train v. Boston Disinfecting Co. 4 New Eng. Rep. 437, 144 Mass. 523.
? Ferrari v. Board of Health, 24 Fla. 390.
3 Elwell v. Fabre, 52 Hun, 70.
Ferrari v. Board of Health, 24 Fla. 390.
Forbes v. Escanbia County Board of Ilealth (Fla.) 13 L. R. 1. 519.

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antine regulations which Florida Act 1885, chap. 3603, anthorizes the board of health to make, are not operative except during the existence of a quarantine duly established by the board in accordance with the Act.'

The system of quarantine laws established by statutes of Louisiana is a rightful exercise of the police power for the protection of health, which is not forbidden by the Constitution of the United States.?

But a state cannot levy a tonnage tax on vessels owned in foreign ports, entering her harbors in pursuit of commerce, in order to defray the expenses of her quarantine regulations."

An ordinance prohibiting second-hand clothing to be brought into or offered for sale within a town, without first proving that it did not come from a place where contagion or infection is or has been prevailing, is unreasonable and void in the absence of any epidemic or other apparent necessity therefor.

Where no damage to either passengers or freight is to be reasonably apprehended from both remaining on board during the probable delay of a few days in quarantine, the vessel is not required to tranship either."

"O'Donovan v. Wilkins, 24 Fla, 281. Morgan's L. & T. R. & SS. Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U. S.

455, 30 L. ed. 237. * Peete v. Morgan, 86 U. S. 581, 22 L. ed. 201. *Kosciusko v. Slomberg, 12 L. R. A. 528, 68 Miss. 469. The Bohemia, 38 Fed. Rep. 756.

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CHAPTER XVI.

STATUTORY REGULATION OF STEAM VESSELS-PENALTIES. § 90. Regulation of Steam Vessels. § 91. Protection of Passengers by Limiting their Number. $ 92. Examination of Applicants for License as Ship Officer. 8 93. Action for Penalty for Carrying Excess of Passengers. § 94. Proceedings in Rem for Penalty for Excess of Passengers. 8 95. Prohibition of Dangerous Articles on Passenger Vessels.

$ 90. Regulation of Steam Vessels. Congress has passed statutes prescribing rules for the regulation of steam vessels, which include steamboats, when engaged in carrying passengers. Under U. S. Revised Statutes, SS 4426 and 4470, the steamboat inspectors may require ferryboats to be provided with the same precautions against fire, so far as applicable, that are expressly provided in reference to any other steam vessels carrying passengers; and when the boat passes inspection on the basis of having a steam pump provided in accordance with section 4471, the boat is bound to maintain it in the condition required by that section. Indeed all vessels engaged in the carrying of passengers and freight, from port to port, are carriers, whether upon rivers, bays, lakes, or along the coast;" and this whether the vessel ply regularly between stated ports, or only when specially chartered, from a designated port to another named port; and if they receive passengers generally, and freight, they are common carriers as to them and as to the special class of freight accepted. If they transport passengers or freight for the public, whether on river, lake or sea coast, their character as common carrier is fixed."

1 The Hazel Kirke, 25 Fed. Rep. 601. ? The Garden City, 26 Fed. Rep. 766. 3 La Tourette v. Burton, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 43, 17 L. ed. 609. * Liter Alkali Co. v. Johnson, L. R. 7 Exch. 267, L. R, 9 Exch. 338. 5 The Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U. 8. 21 How. 16, 26, 16 L. ed. 44, 47; Crosby v.

Fitch, 12 Conn. 410; Citizens Bunk v. Nantucket S. B. Co. 2 Story, 16; Clark v. Barnwell, 53 U. S. 12 How. 272, 13 L. ed. 985; The Commerce,

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Mr. Justice Swayne, speaking for the United States Supreme Court, said: “The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all navigable waters of the United States, which are accessible from a state, other than those in which they lie. For this purpose they are the public property of the nation and subject to all the requisite legislation of Congress.” Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the court in another case, said: “ The power to regulate commerce authorizes appropriate legislation for the protection of either interstate or foreign commerce; and for that purpose such legislation as will insure the convenient or safe navigation of all navigable waters of the United States, whether that legislation consists in regulating the removal of obstructions to their use, in prescribing the form and size of vessels employed upon them, or in subjecting the vessels to inspection and license in order to insure their proper construction and equipment.”? That in the case of steamboats, the inspections of their hulls and boilers, the licensing of their pilots and engineers, the carrying of prescribed lights, and the giving and answering of prearranged signals when meeting and passing, do materially increase the safety and convenience of navigable water, considered as a highway of commerce, there is no doubt, and therefore there is no question that Congress may make regulations on these subjects, which are applicable to vessels engaged in intrastate commerce as well as foreign or interstate commerce.' The power to regulate the navigation of the waters of the United States being comprehended in the grant of power to regulate commerce, not merely as an incident but a part of it, Congress has power “to make all laws which shall be

66 U. S. 1 Black, 574, 17 L. ed. 107; Hastings v. Pepper, 11 Pick. 41; McClure v. Hammond, 1 Bay, 99; Waring v. Clarke, 46 U. S. 5 How. 452, 12 L. ed. 23; The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U. S. 12 How. 443, 13 L. ed. 1058; Jackson v. The Magnolia, 61 U. S. 20 How. 298, 15 L. ed.910; Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Philadelphia & H. DeG. S. T. B. Co. 64 U. 8. 23 How. 215, 16 L. ed. 435; The Reeside, 2 Sumn. 567; McGregor v. Kilgore, 6 Obio, 358; Powell v. Myers, 26 Wend. 591; Hale v. New Jersey S. Nav. Co. 15 Conn. 539; Dunseth v. Wade, 3 III. 285; Parker v. Flagg. 26 Me. 181; Porterfield v. Humphreys, 8 Hump. 497; Warden v. Greer, 6 Waits.

424. "Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 724, 18 L. ed. 99. 'The Daniel Ball, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 564, 19 L. ed. 1001. *The City of Salem, 2 L. R. A. 380, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 418, 37 Fed. Rep.

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necessary and proper for carrying into execution” such power.' Chief Justice Marshall said: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.” And again :

And again: “But where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground."

In a Minnesota case, plaintiff was injured by the explosion of a boiler of a steamboat upon which he was a deck hand. It was held that 5 U. S. Stat. at L. p. 306, § 13, providing "that in all suits and actions against proprietors of steamboats, for injuries arising to person or property from the bursting of the boiler of any steamboat,

the fact of such bursting shall be taken as full prima facie evidence sufficient to charge the defendant, or those in his employment, with negligence, until he shall show that no negligence has been committed by him, or those in his employment,” made it incumbent upon the defendant, although a suitor in a state court, to disprove negligence. Although this statute has been repealed, the rule of evidence fixed by it has not been abandoned in the United States courts. Negligence may be inferred from the fact of the explosion of the boiler of the vessel, althouglı the defendant is under no contract obligation to protect the plaintiff. As was said by Justice Wallace: "Undoubtedly, the presumption has been more frequently applied in cases against carriers of passengers than in other cases of negligence, but there is no founda tion in authority or reason for any such limitation of the rule of evidence. The presumption originates from the nature of the act, not from the nature of the relations between the parties. It is indulged as a legitimate inference whenever the occurence is such as in the ordinary course of things does not take place when

U. S. Const. art. 1, § 8.
2 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 4 Wheat. 421, 4 L. ed. 605.
3 Mc Vahon v. Davidson, 12 Minn, 357.
* Rose v. Stephens & C. Transp. Co. 20 Blatchf. 411.

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