opinion in that case:

"When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created." The elaborate discussions of the question in the dissenting opinions in that case, and the present cases when under consideration in the Court of Appeals of the state of New York, it is said, seem to forbid anything more than a general declaration of dissent. The vice of the doctrine in the view of the dissenting judges is, that it places a public interest in the use of property upon the same basis as a public use of property. Property, they say, is devoted to a public use when, and only when the use is one which the public in its organized capacity, to wit, the state, has a right to create and maintain, and, therefore, one which all of the public have a right to demand and share in. The use is public, because the public may create it, and the individual creating it is doing thereby and pro tanto the work of the state. The creation of all highways is a public duty. Railroads are highways. The state may build them. If an individual does that work, he is pro tanto doing the work of the state. He devotes his property to a public use. The state doing the work fixes the price for the use. It does not lose the right to fix the price, because an individual voluntarily undertakes to do the work. But this public use is very different, it is contended, from a public interest in the use. There is scarcely any property in whose use the public has no interest. No man liveth unto himself alone, and no man's property is beyond the touch of another's welfare. Everything, the manner and extent of whose use affects the wellbeing of others, is property in whose use the public has an interest. Take, for instance, the only store in a little village. All the public of that village are interested in it; interested in the quantity and quality of the goods on its shelves, and their prices, in the time at which it opens and closes, and generally, in the way in which it is managed; in short, interested in the use. Does it follow, it is asked, that that village public has a right to control these matters? That which is true of the single small store in the village, it is asserted, is also true of the largest mercantile establishment in the great city. The magnitude of the business does

not change the principle. There may be more individuals interested, a larger public, but still the public. The country merchant who has a small warehouse in which the neighboring farmers are wont to store their potatoes and grain preparatory to shipment, it is claimed, occupies the same position as the proprietor of the largest elevator in New York. The public has in each case an interest in the use, and the same interest, no more and no less. It is denied that when the owner of property has by his industry, skill, and money made a certain piece of his property of large value to many, he has thereby deprived himself of the full dominion over it which he had when it was of comparatively little value, or that the control of the public over one's property or business is at all dependent upon the extent to which the public is benefited by it.

It is insisted that the matters in which the public has the most interest, are the supplies of food and clothing; yet it is denied that by reason of this interest the state may fix the price at which the butcher must sell his meat, or the vendor of boots and shoes his goods. Resting upon the primary truth that men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;" and to "secure," not grant or create, these rights governments are instituted, it is asserted that property which a man has honestly acquired he retains full control of, subject to these limitations: First, that he shall not use it to his neighbor's injury, and that does not mean that he must use it for his neighbor's benefit; second, that if he devotes it to a public use, he gives to the public a right to control that use; and, third, that whenever the public needs require, the public may take it upon payment of due compensation.

The dissenting opinion refers to the suggestion that there is a monopoly, and that that justifies legislative interference. But it is said there are two kinds of monopoly; one of law, the other of fact. The one exists when exclusive privileges are granted. Such a monopoly, the law which creates alone can break; and being the creation of law, justifies legislative control. A monopoly of fact any one can break, and there is no necessity for legislative interference. It exists where any one by his money and labor furnishes facilities for business which no one else has. A man puts

up in a city the only building suitable for offices. He has therefore a monopoly of that business; but it is a monopoly of fact, which any one can break who, with like business courage puts his means into a similar building. Because of the monopoly feature, subject thus easily to be broken, it is asked, may the Legislature regulate the price at which he will lease his offices? So, it is insisted, there are no exclusive privileges given to these elevators. They are not upon public ground. If the business is profitable, any one can build another; the field is open for all the elevators, and all the competition that may be desired. If there be a monopoly it is one of fact and not of law, and one which any individual can break.

The paternal theory of government is condemned and the utmost possible liberty to the individual, and the fullest possible protection to him and his property, is claimed as both the limitation and duty of government. If it may regulate the price of one service, which is not a public service, or the compensation for the use of one kind of property which is not devoted to a public use, why, it is questioned, may it not with equal reason regulate the price of all service, and the compensation to be paid for the use of all property?

The dissent is emphasized in these cases, because the statute, it is insisted, in effect compels service without any compensation. It provides that the parties seeking the service of the elevator "shall only be required to pay the actual cost of trimming or shoveling to the leg of the elevator when unloading, and trimming cargo when loading." This work of trimming or shoveling is fully explained in the briefs of counsel. It is work performed by longshoremen with hand-scoops or shovels, on the vessel unloading or receiving the grain. They are not in the regular employ of the elevator; but engaged in an independent service, and yet one whose careful and skillful performance is essential to the successful transfer of grain into and through the elevator. The full service required of the elevator compels its proprietor to employ and superintend the work of these longshoremen. For this work of employment, and superintendence, and for the responsibility for the proper performance of their work, the act says that the proprietor of the elevator shall receive no compensation; he can

charge only that which he pays out, the actual cost. It is denied that a man can be required to render any service to another individual without some compensation.

Again it is said that in the Pinto case, it appears that Mr. Pinto is the owner of a stationary elevator, built on private grounds. It is not on grounds devoted to a public use, like the right of way of a railroad company. There is nothing to indicate on his part a purpose to dedicate his property to public uses. So far as it is possible to make the business of an elevator a purely private business, he has done so. It is denied that the transferring of grain through an elevator is one step in the process of transportation; and that, therefore, they are quasi common carriers, discharging a public duty, and subject to public control. It is insisted that they are not carriers in any proper sense of the term. They may facilitate carriage; so does the boxing and packing of goods for transportation. The engineers, firemen, brakemen, and all the thousands of employés of a railroad company are helping the business of transportation; but are they all common carriers, it is asked, simply cause their work tends to facilitate the business of transportation, and may the legislature regulate their wages?

In concluding the dissent the conviction is expressed that the time is not distant when the evils resulting from this assumption of a power on the part of government to determine the compensation a man may receive for the use of his property, or the performance of his personal services, will become so apparent that the courts will hasten to declare that government can prescribe compensation only when it grants a special privilege, as in the creation of a corporation, or when the service which is rendered is a public service, or the property is in fact devoted to a public use.

It has been often ruled that corporations, as such, have no legal existence outside of the state by whose laws they are created, and cannot transact business in another state except by the comity of its laws. This doctrine is subject to much qualification. The habits of business have so changed since the decision in the earlier cases,' and corporate organizations have been found so convenient, especially as avoiding a dissolution at every change of membership, that a large part of the business of the country has come to be 1Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U. S. 13 Pet. 519, 10 L. ed. 274.

transacted by their instrumentality, while their most objectionable feature the nonliability of corporators-has in most instances been abrogated in whole or in part; and to deny their admission from one state to another in ordinary cases, at the present day, would go far to neutralize that provision in the fourth article of the Constitution which secures to the citizens of one state all the privileges and immunities of citizens in another, and that provision of the 14th Amendment, which secures to all persons the equal protection of the laws. So strongly is this felt that in a recent case the doctrine that corporations are not citizens or persons within the protective language of the Constitution, was unanimously disapproved, and the court expressly held that they are entitled, as well as individuals, to the equal protection of the laws under the 14th Amendment of the Constitution.

It is undoubtedly just and proper that foreign corporations should be subject to the legitimate police regulations of the state and should have, if required, an agent in the state to accept service of process when sued for acts done or contracts made therein. In reference to some branches of business, like those of banking and insurance, which affect the people at large, they may also be subject to more stringent regulations for the security of the public, and may be even prohibited from pursuing them except on such terms and conditions, not unlawful in themselves, as the state chooses to impose. A state legislature may prescribe conditions upon which foreign corporations may do business unless engaged in interstate commerce.' Corporations are not citizens within the meaning of clause 1, § 2, of article four of the Constitution of the United States, declaring that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states." Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, declaring that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," does not prohibit a state from imposing such conditions upon foreign corporations as it may choose, as a condition of their admission within its limits.

'Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. Co. 118 U. S. 394-396, 30 L. ed. 118. List v. Pennsylvania, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 784, 118 Pa. 322, Indiana v. Woodruff Sleeping & P. C. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 798, 114 Ind. 155; Stockton v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 411, 32 Fed. Rep. 9; Barron v. Burnside, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 295, 121 U. S. 186, 30 L. ed. 915.