for all persons who applied, in the order in which the goods were received at the particular station, and that their charges for transportation should be reasonable. It was even doubted whether they were bound to make the same charge to all persons for the same service; though the weight of authority in this country is in favor of an equality of charge to all persons for similar services. In several of the states acts had been passed with the design of securing the public against unreasonable and unjust discriminations; but, the inefficacy of these laws beyond the lines of the state, the impossibility of securing concerted action between the legislatures toward the regulation of traffic between the several states, and the evils which grew up under a policy of unrestricted competition, suggested the necessity of legislation by Congress under its constitutional power to regulate commerce among the several states. These evils ordinarily took the shape of inequality of charges made, or of facilities furnished, and were dictated by or tolerated for the promotion of the interests of the officers of the corporation or of the corporation itself, or for the benefit of some favored persons at the expense of others, or of some particular locality or community, or of some local trade or commercial connection, or for the destruction or crippling of some rival or hostile line.

The principal objects of the Interstate Commerce Act were, to secure just and reasonable charges for transportation; to prohibit unjust discriminations in the rendition of like services under similar circumstances and conditions; to prevent undue and unreasonable preferences to persons, corporations or localities; to inhibit further compensation for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line; and to abolish combinations for the pooling of freights. It was not designed however, to prevent competition between different roads, or to interfere with the customary arrangements made by railway companies for reduced fares in consideration of increased mileage, where such reduction did not operate as an unjust discrimination against other persons who travel over the

'Fitchburg R. Co. v. Gage, 12 Gray, 393; Baxendale v. Eastern Counties R. Co. 4 C. B. N. S. 63; Great Western R. Co. v. Sutton, L. R. 4 H. L. 226, 237: Ex parte Benson, 18 S. C. 38; Johnson v. Pensacola & P. R. Co. 16 Fla. 623.

road. In other words, it was not intended to ignore the principle, that one can sell at wholesale cheaper than at retail. It is not all discriminations or preferences which fall within the inhi bition of the statute; only such as are unjust or unreasonable. For instance, it would be obviously unjust to charge A a greater sum than B, for a single trip from Washington to Pittsburg; but, if A agrees not only to go, but to return by the same route, it is no injustice to B to permit him to do so for a reduced fare, since the services are not alike, nor the circumstances and conditions substantially similar, as required by section 2 to make an unjust discrimination. Indeed, the possibility of such discriminations and reasonable preferences is recognized by these sections, in declaring what shall be deemed unjust. A charge may be perfectly reasonable under section 1, and yet may create an unjust discrimination or an unreasonable preference under sections 2 and 3. Justice Blackburn' said: "When it is sought to show that the charge is extortionate as being contrary to the statutable obligation to charge equally, it is immaterial whether the charge is reasonable or not; it is enough to show that the company carried for some other person or class of persons at a lower charge, during the period throughout which the party complaining was charged more under the like circumstances.""

The statute as to interstate carriers, which is simply an enactment of the common law as to all carriers, requires a reasonable rate. This is one that will make just and fair return to the car. rier when it is charged to all who are served without unjust discrimination against any, and when the revenue it yields is subject to no improper reductions. If a railroad stood alone, it

would be entitled to such a result from its rate. But railroads do not stand singly. What one does or has done for it, may determine what another is to do or receive. That a railroad favorably situated receives this reasonable return from a certain tariff, does not establish that another road, perhaps unnecessarily constructed, at vast expense, can secure returns from such a rate. The latter road must regulate its charges by the rate that is a reasonable one

'Great Western R. Co. v. Sutton, L. R. 4 H. L. 226. 239.

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 145 U. S. 263, 36 L. ed. 699, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 92.

to its rival or lose the transportation. In fact the railroad interest is not made up of units, in the sense that each unit, constituting one road, can be considered independently of another, and its peculiar situation and circumstances regarded as the only elements to determine the reasonableness of its rates. But the entire railroad interest must be considered in fixing rates and determining their reasonableness. Rates will not under the first section of the Interstate Commerce Act be declared unlawful or unreasonable simply upon the evidence afforded by comparison.' When the reasonableness of rates is in question, the ticket rate on long through lines does not furnish a just basis for comparison with local rates for relatively shorter distances."

The question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for transportation by a railroad company is eminently a question for judicial investigation, requiring due process of law for its determination. But the power to regulate a carrier's rates is not a power to destroy, and limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation." The railway company may classify freights and passengers and charge different rates for the different classes, if there are reasonable grounds for such discrimination in the difference of the cost of service, risk of carriage or in the accommodations furnished, or the like; but the rates must be the same for all persons and goods of the same class. Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the charges made for any service for the transportation of passengers or property or receiving, delivering, loading, or unloading of property, must be reasonable and no discrimination can be made in rates, charges or facilities."

At common law the rule is that carriers shall not exercise any unjust discrimination in rates of toll. They are held to do exact and even handed justice to everybody doing business with them."

'Raymond v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 627. Crews v. Richmond & D. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 703; La Crosse Mfg. & J. Union v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 9. 'Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 209, 134 U. S. 418, 33 L. ed. 970, 42 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 285.

Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Parks, 18 Ill. 460; Hays v. Pennsylvania Co. 12 Fed. Rep. 310; Hersh v. Northern Cent. R. Co. 74 Pa. 181; Com. v. Power, 7 Met. 596, 41 Am. Dec. 465.

'Cutting v. Florida R. & Nav. Co. 30 Fed. Rep. 663.

Scofield v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 1 West. Rep. 825, 43 Ohio St. 571; Indianapolis, D. & S. R. Co. v. Ervin, 6 West. Rep. 103, 118 Ill. 250.

Discrimination must consist in allowing one party what is denied another. The rule controlling passenger transportation exacts absolute equality of rates to all enjoying equal accommodations.' Common carriers cannot make unreasonable discriminations or give undue preferences between persons applying to them for carriage either of passengers or goods, either in granting carriage to some and not to others, or in carrying for some for less rates than for others. A passenger rate war in which rates are repeatedly reduced by several competing lines to an exceedingly low basis to particular places without any filing of tariffs, is contrary to the requirements of law, as well as against the true interest of each party thereto.

Charges for freights and passengers must be uniform. Transportation by a common carrier is open to the public upon equal and reasonable terms. An exclusive right granted to a common carrier only is inconsistent with the rights of all others. If by reason of bribes or other improper motives, railway employés give preference to one person over another, the company may be held liable for damages thereby sustained.'

A charter provision of a railroad, granting the power to take "tolls from all persons, property, merchandise and other commodities transported on their road, provided only the net profits of the road shall never exceed 25 per cent per annum,” does not relieve the company from the obligation imposed upon a common carrier under the common law, as applied to common carriers by rail. The charter does not give the carrier an option to discriminate at will, provided only the net profits of the road do not exceed a certain limit. Discrimination in rates charged passengers who enjoy like accommodations, cannot

'Crews v. Richmond & D. I. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 703. 2Smith v. Northern Pac. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 611.

Cook v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. (Iowa), 9 L. R. A. 764; McDuffee v. Portland & R. R. Co. 52 N. H. 480; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Parks, 18 Ill. 460; Indianapolis, P. & C. R. Co. v. Rinard, 46 Ind. 293; Messenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co 36 N. J. L. 407; Hays v. Pennsylvania Co. 12 Fed. Rep. 311; Com. v. Power, 7 Met. 596, 41 Am. Dec. 484.

Re Passenger Tariffs & Rate Wars, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 340.
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Parks, 18 Ill. 460.

Audenried v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 68 Pa. 370.

Galena &C. U. R. Co. v. Rae, 18 Ill. 488.

Samuels v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 31 Fed. Rep. 57.

be sustained upon the theory that the present or future business of the carrier will be thereby increased, or the settlement of the -country advanced, or that those favored are persons of limited means and are thus enabled to locate permanently in localities where their presence is of special advantage to the business of the carrier.'

The Interstate Commerce Commission has no power to make rates generally, but only to determine whether rates imposed by railroads are in conflict with the statute.' But the commission has power to regulate fares and freights for transportation between different states." It has no authority to interfere with the regulations of a state board of commissioners of immigration whose control of immigrant transportation has been sanctioned by the Federal government, and having no authority to control commissioners of immigration it cannot do so indirectly by inhibiting railroad companies from carrying out arrangements made by them with the commissioners."

While the Act authorizes the Commission to permit exceptions it does not authorize it to require exceptions. A railroad company may make a special rate for immigrants as a class, and decline to give the same rate to others for whom different accommodations are furnished. A carrier may make special rates with individuals, to enable the latter to make proposals to the Interior Department for transportation of Indian supplies, such transportation being for the United States.' Land explorers and settlers are not entitled to lower rates than the general public." Rates may be reduced for religious teachers and as an act of charity." So also for destitute and homeless persons transported free of charge by charitable societies; indigent persons transported at the

'Smith v. Northern Pac. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 611.

Thatcher v. Fitchburg R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 356; Re Theatrical Rates, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 18.

Philadelphia & S. M. SS. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 308, 122 U. S. 326, 30 L. ed. 1200.

Savery v. New York, C. & H. R. R. Co. 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 210.

Thatcher v. Fitchburg R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 356.

Savery v. New York, C. & H. R. R. Co. 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 210.

'Re Indian Supplies, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 22.

Smith v. Northern Pac. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 611.

*Re Religious Teachers, 1 Inters. Com. Rep .21.