To the claim that the carrier may run the risk of overcrowding its cars, by the unlimited sale of commutation tickets, it may be answered that it may doubtless make a reasonable limitation in the time within which it may be used, and exclude the holder, even if the number of miles stipulated for within the time limit, have not been traveled.' So even negligently permitting another to use such a ticket, where it is non-assignable will forfeit it.' But not so if no limit is stated to the person.' But it is not unlawful discrimination to refuse to refund money paid by a person who had forgotten his commutation ticket, after the carrier had discontinued a former practice of refunding in such cases, and had given proper notice to that effect, although the passenger supposed the custom was in vogue when he purchased his ticket. One who purchased a quarterly commutation ticket thirteen days after the quarter began is not entitled to recover any portion of the purchase price on account of the fact that a portion of the term had expired. One who holds such ticket may be required to exhibit it and may be removed on refusal to show it, or to pay the fare, although the conductor has knowledge that he has been accustomed to travel upon it, and is informed that it has been accidently forgotten. But he can subsequently require the sale to him of another ticket. And the right to examine is true as to commutation tickets.' But a reasonable time must be given the commutor to search for his ticket, and the removal should be at a regular station. 'Barker v. Coflin, 31 Barb. 556; Wentz v. Erie R. Co. 3 Hun, 241; Hill v. Hudson v. Kansas Pac. R. Co. 3 McCrary, 249. Sidman v. Richmond & D. R. Co. 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 766. Cresson v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 11 Phila. 597; Cooper v. London, B. & S. C. R. Co. L. R. 4 Exch. Div. 88. 'Atwater v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 48 N. J. L. 55. Ripley v. New Jersey R. & Transp. Co. 31 N. J. L. 388; Downs v. New York &N. H. R. Co. 36 Conn. 287; Maples v. New York & N. H. R. Co. 38 Conn. 557. Maples v. New York & N. H. R. Co. 38 Conn. 557. § 143. Mileage Ticket. If a railroad offers mileage tickets for sale, they must be equally available to all the public who apply for them. They cannot be sold to a particular class at lower rates than are charged to others. A sale of mileage tickets to commercial travelers at a rate lower than to other passengers is an unjust discrimination. A release of liability by commercial travelers is not a good consideration for such discrimination. It has been held that twenty-five dollars per 1,000 miles is not unreasonable rate for mileage ticket. And the rate at which excursion or commutation tickets are sold does not entitle mileage ticket purchaser to complain of unjust discrimination if charged a higher rate.' § 144. Excursion Tickets. Excursion, mileage, or commutation passenger tickets must be offered impartially to all who accept the conditions on which they are issued, and the rates at which they are sold must be published. The general requirements of the Act to Regulate Commerce as amended are as applicable to these classes of tickets as to any others. Passenger excursion rates are required to be published according to the provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce, $6. An excursion ticket marked "good going on any train" on a certain day, has reference only to trains used to carry passengers, and gives no right to ride upon a through freight train on which by rule of the company passengers are not allowed to ride without a special permit.' Where the plaintiff purchased an excursion ticket with the printed condition, "Good this day only on all trains, except the Boston express trains," and was expelled from the Boston express train for nonpayment of fare, it was held that he had no cause of 'Associated Wholesale Grocers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 321, 393; and see Larrison v. Chicago & G. T. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 369. Pittsburgh, O. & St. L. R. Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 729. Thomas ▼. Chicago & G. T. R. Co. 72 Mich. 355. action. But a rule of a railway company, restricting to special trains the holders of a class of tickets which nevertheless purport to entitle them to passage on any regular train, must be brought to the notice of the holder. The words "good on passenger trains only," contained on a ticket, do not amount to a contract that all of its passenger trains will stop at the stations designated on the ticket. A railroad company whose regular ticket agent sells a special or limited return ticket, good only on a special excursion train in charge of one by whom it is chartered, is bound by the contract to transport the purchaser over the round trip, although the ticket was signed by the charterer, of whose contract with the company the purchaser has no knowledge. A round trip excursion ticket used by the purchaser in going to the station named therein, and then sold and transferred, no restrictions appearing, is valid in the hands of the holder, and entitles him to a return passage, subject to the prescribed limitations as to time, etc. Where a conductor of a train refuses to recognize an excursion ticket in the hands of the holder, who is thereby entitled to ride thereon, and demands of him the regular fare, and attempts to eject him by force for nonpayment thereof, the railway company is liable in damages for the assault, and the jury in assessing the damages may consider in connection therewith the annoyance, vexation, and indignity suffered by him. If an excursion passenger desires to return on regular train and provides himself with a proper ticket his exclusion will subject the carrier to damages. A condition on a return excursion ticket sold at a reduced rate, that it shall not be good for the return trip unless stamped by the ticket agent at the other end of the route, and again signed by the purchaser as the original purchaser, is both reasonable and material; and a purchaser failing to comply therewith cannot recover against the company on account of being ejected by the 'Nolan v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 9 Jones & S. 511; Terry v. Flushing, N. S. & C. R. Co. 13 Hun, 359. *Maroney v. Old Colony & N. R. Co. 106 Mass. 153. Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Swarthout, 67 Ind. 567. Eddy v. Harris, 78 Tex. 661; Eddy v. Searcy (Tex.) Nov. 25, 1890. Carsten v. Northern Pac. R. Co. 9 L. R. A. 688, 44 Minn. 454; see Hoffman v. Northern Pac. R. Co. 45 Minn. 53. 'Brassfield v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 19 Mo. App. 651. See St. Louis, ▲. & T. R. Co. v. Mackie, 1 L. R. A. 667, 71 Tex. 491. conductor, although he could, and offered to, otherwise identify himself as the original purchaser, or the conductor had certain knowledge of that fact.' Where, by the express conditions of the plaintiff's contract, he had no right to a return passage under his ticket, unless it bore the signature and stamp of the company's agent at the end of the route, no agent or employé of the company was authorized to alter or waive any condition of the contract, and therefore the action of the baggagemaster in punching the ticket and checking plaintiff's baggage, and that of the gateman in admitting him to the return train, could not bind the company to carry him, or estop it to deny his right to be carried." A stipulation in a railroad ticket at reduced rates, that it shall not be good for a return trip unless it is stamped by the agent at the terminus after the holder identifies himself to the satisfaction of such agent, is not unreasonable or contrary to the policy of the law. The agent's refusal to stamp the ticket, on the ground that he is not satisfied of the identity of its holder, is conclusive. A cause of action for failure to carry a passenger on his ticket does not arise if he does not offer to surrender his ticket, but voluntarily pays his fare.' A railway company which issues a return ticket which is required to be countersigned and stamped at the other end of the route is liable in damages where, owing to its agent's wrongful refusal to countersign and stamp the ticket, the conductor refuses to accept it, and is harsh and abusive towards the passenger, threatening to eject her unless she pays or gives security. Where a passenger accepts an excursion ticket containing a condition that it cannot be used on a return passage unless the manner of identification specified therein has been complied with, and has opportunity to know its conditions, and uses it, and the carrier has resorted to no unfair means of deception, the passenger's assent to the condition will be conclusively presumed, it not being indispensable to bind him that it should be signed by him. Where the conductor, when the ticket 'Edwards v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 81 Miss. 364. 'Boylan v. Hot Springs R. Co. 132 U. S. 146, 33 L. ed. 290. Bethea v. Northeastern R. Co. 26 S. C. 91; Abram v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Alram v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. (Tex.) 11 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 158. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Martino (Tex.) 11 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 270. was presented, saw no stamp upon it, and the plaintiff had not been identified, the rules of the company, binding upon him as a conductor, required him to remove the party unless he paid his fare.' But a contract requiring a passenger to identify himself and have the ticket stamped by an agent at a particular place may be waived by parol. The failure to provide for the return of an excursion party according to contract will of course render the carrier liable, and if the action be in case and the breach be willful exemplary damages may be recovered, but if the action be on the contract only actual damages are recoverable." 1Mosher v. St. Louis, 1. M. & S. R. Co. 23 Fed. Rep. 326. 'Taylor v. Seaboard & R. R. Co. 99 N. C. 185, 6 Am. Rep. 509. 3 Walsh v. Chicago & C. R. Co. 42 Wis. 23. See Mississippi Cent. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 41 Miss. 671. 33 |