In Maine, the action is in the name of the state.' In Maryland the action is for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, and is brought in the name of the state for the use of the person entitled to damages.' 3 4 Massachusetts provides by Public Stat. 1882, p. 421, § 63; chap. 112, §§ 212, 213. It has been held that the action would not lie where the death was instantaneous. But if one survives a brief time, more than nominal damages may be recovered. The same rule as to instantaneous death obtains in some other states. In Michigan, by 1 How. Stat. 1882, §§ 3391, 3392; 2 How. Stat. § 8313; Minnesota, by Stat. 1878, p. 225, § 2. In Minnesota the administrator may sue for damages for death of decedent, caused by negligence." In Mississippi, the widow or husband or parent or child. An administrator may sue by virtue of § 2078 of the Code, and his right is distinguished from and independent of the right given by § 1510 of the Code." Under the Mississippi statute, the administrator may sue, but the mother cannot sustain an action. The widow may maintain the action under the Missouri statute; but, the suit by parent can only be maintained when the child is a minor." A non-resident has a standing in the court. 11 7 9 In Missouri, husband or wife, children, natural born or adopted, natural parents or those who have legally assumed the relation 'Rev. Stat. § 68, p. 482. Md. Rev. Code 1878, p. 724, art. 67, § 2. Kearney v. Boston & W. R. Corp. 9 Cush. 108; Kennedy v. Standard Sugar Refinery, 125 Mass. 90; Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14; Mulchey v. Washburn Car Wheel Co. 5 New Eng. Rep. 287, 145 Mass. 281; Tully v. Fitchburg R. Co. 134 Mass. 499. 4Nourse v. Packard, 138 Mass. 307. 'Womack v. Central R. & Bkg. Co. 80 Ga. 132; Edgar v. Castello, 14 S. C. 20. 6 Scheffler v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. 32 Minn. 125. 'Code of 1880, § 1510. 8 Vicksburg & M. R. Co. v. Phillips, 64 Miss. 693. 9 Vicksburg & M. R. Co. v. Phillips, 64 Miss. 693; Amos v. Mobile & O. R. Co. 63 Miss. 509. 10 Parker v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 91 Mo. 86; Parsons v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 94 Mo. 286. 11 Philpott v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 85 Mo. 164. towards the deceased may sue. If the widow fails to sue within six months the children may sue; but if her suit be brought within six months and is dismissed by her, it defeats the right of the children to sue.' Nebraska, by Stat. 1885, p. 284. In Nebraska the administrator of decedent may sue for his death caused by negligence.' Nevada, under Comp. Laws, 1873, pp. 39, etc., §§ 115, 116; in New Hampshire, Act 1879, chap. 35, § 1; Laws 1885, p. 233, an action for negligence resulting in death survives to the administrator.' The modification of the rule in the New Jersey Act of March 3, 1848, Rev. Stat. 1877, p. 294, does not extend to injuries suffered by a husband as the result of the immediate killing of his wife." When deceased leaves a surviving widow but no children, and also parents, the right to recover damages is in Pennsylvania by the Act of April 26, 1885, vested solely in the widow, and the parents are not entitled to any part of the damages which she may recover. An administrator of a deceased person in Tennessee is not debarred from suing for damages on account of the death of the intestate, merely because the widow is living. She has the preference, but may waive it. Under the statute a nonresident widow may recover for injuries inflicted within the state, though the husband was a nonresident and contracted his employment outside of the state." Under the Texas statute, the wife may sue though living separate and apart from her husband," and the posthumous child is entitled to recover as one of the children." The parent cannot 'Stat. 1879, §§ 2121, 2122, 2123, Laws 1885, pp. 153, 154. McNamara v. Slavens, 76 Mo. 329. $ Wilson v. Bumstead, 12 Neb. 1. Corliss v. Worcester, N. & R. R. Co. 1 New Eng. Rep. 163, 63 N. H. 404. Grosso v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 50 N. J. L. 317. "Lehigh Iron Co. v. Rupp, 100 Pa. 95. 9 "Mill. & V. (Tenn.) Code, §§ 3130-3132. Webb v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. 88 Tenn. 119. Chesapeake O. & S. R. Co. v. Higgins, 85 Tenn. 620. 10 Dallas & W. R. Co. v. Spicker, 61 Tex. 427. "Nelson v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. 11 L. R. A. 391, 78 Tex. 621. 2 sue under the statute. Under the Texas constitutional provision for the bringing of an action for exemplary damages by "the surviving husband, widow, or the heirs of his or her body," of one who has been killed by gross negligence, no one else can bring such action. Hence such an action by a parent cannot be maintained.' Where the deceased had begun the action in his lifetime, the wife or children may prosecute, after his death, pending proceedings. As to the right of the administrator to prosecute the action, there have been various decisions explanatory of the statute.' The surviving children in an action against a railroad company for the death of their mother caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant, are not concluded in a judgment rendered in a suit upon the same cause of action brought by their father in his own right, to which they were not made parties. Where the action was brought by one as next friend of a minor, a demurrer on the ground that the injured person was not the plaintiff in the action, was overruled, and it was held to be immaterial that the action was not brought in the name of the minor but her next friend. The essential facts are that the action must be prosecuted for the use and benefit of the minor by some proper representative. Any person who is permitted by the court to prosecute such an action is to be deemed a suitable person and where it appears with certainty that the action is based on the right of the minor, that the relief sought is such as the minor alone would be entitled to on the facts pleaded, and that this is sought for the use and benefit of the minor-then the minor is the real plaintiff whatever may be the formula used.' In Vermont a right to support from the person killed is not necessary to give a right of action under the statute providing for an action in the name of the personal representative of a person 1 Winnt v. International & G. N. R. Co. 5 L. R. A. 172, 74 Tex. 32. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Simpson, 60 Tex. 103; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. 4 Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Kutac, 72 Tex. 643. 'Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Styron, 66 Tex. 421. See also Cannon v. Hemphill, 7 Tex. 199; Moore v. Minerva, 17 Tex. 23; Martin v. Weyman, 26 Tex. 468; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Bradley, 45 Tex. 175; Abrahams v. Vollbaum, 54 Tex. 227. Rev. Laws 1880, § 2138. wrongfully or negligently killed, for the benefit of his wife or next of kin.' In Virginia the action is authorized by Amendment of March 12, 1878 of 8 7 of the Code of 1873. In an action by an administrator for death caused by negligence, the real beneficiaries need not be made parties. ' In West Virginia the action is under the Code 1884, p. 534, § 5. The husband, as administrator, may sue for the death of his wife.” Under the statute a recovery for the death of one caused by the negligence of another, it is not necessary that the plaintiff should aver in his declaration that the decedent left a wife or child or other next of kin. In Wisconsin the widow is the person entitled to all damages recovered by the personal representative of deceased for wrongfully causing his death. In an action by an administrator under Revised Statutes, § 4255, to recover for the death of a widow through the negligence of the defendant, an allegation that the younger children were dependent upon her for support and nurture and education, should be considered to mean that she, while living, furnished them with their support, nurture, and the means of education, which were a loss to them by her death, and the complaint is sufficient. ' The personal representatives, or, if deceased is a minor, the parents, are authorized to sue, in Alabama Code, §§ 2641 et seq., and p. 684, § 2891. The requirement of the statute that damage to person or property for which the railroad is liable should result from its failure to comply with the statutory requirements or other negligence does not mean that this negligence should be neces sarily the sole or immediate cause of the injury, but only that the injury must be the natural or proximate consequence of the negligence. It is sufficient if it is one of two or more concurring 'Howard v. Delaware & H. Canal Co. 6 L. R. A. 75, 40 Fed. Rep. 195. 'Harper v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. 36 Fed. Rep. 102. Dimmey v. Wheeling & E. G. R. Co. 27 W. Va. 32. Madden v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 28 W. Va. 610. 'Stat. 1878, § 4255. Schmidt v. Deegan, 69 Wis. 300; Schadewald v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. R. "McKeigue v. Janesville, 68 Wis. 50; Kelley v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. efficient causes other than plaintiff's fault. If the failure to ring a bell or blow a whistle on a train, as required by statute, reasonably contributed to an injury, the company is liable, unless there was contributory negligence. Except when made so by statute, no particular rate of speed, however rapid, can per se, or as matter of law, be evidence of negligence in running a railroad train. ' § 178. Action out of Jurisdiction where Injury Occurred. It is a general principle that in order to maintain an action of tort founded upon an injury to person and property, the act which is the cause of the injury and the foundation of the action must at least be actionable by the law of the place where it is done, if not also by that of the place in which redress is sought. An action in Pennsylvania for the death of a person in New Jersey must be governed by the laws of the latter state." Statutes are enacted in the several states for the local public good; and as of themselves they have no extraterritorial effect, it is not a legal presumption that the force to be given them by neighboring states has any influence in inducing their enactment. They are not enacted to be enforced, even in comity, outside of the state. It is not strict right, but comity, which enables a person who has been tortiously injured in one state to sue for damages for the injury in another; and of course after the cause of action has become extinct where it accrued, it cannot, as a mere matter of comity, survive elsewhere. Statutes giving the right of action. for injuries are held by many of the courts to be local in their nature, and can have no extraterritorial effect, and rights based upon them give no absolute right of action beyond the jurisdiction of their enactment. 1 Western R. Co. of Alabama v. Sistrunk, 85 Ala. 352. Davis v. New York & N. E. R. Co. 3 New Eng. Rep. 408, 143 Mass. 301; |