It is not always necessary to the joinder of plaintiffs that they have a common interest in the whole recovery sought. It is the rule in equity that several creditors may unite in a suit where a part of the relief prayed is common to all, and this rule has been broadened by the codes of some States. When the amount in controversy becomes material to determine Federal jurisdiction, the amount of each separate claim of the different plaintiffs joined for convenience, and not the aggregate amount of them all, is taken as the test of jurisdiction.12 This rule applies alike in the United States Circuit Court, and upon appeal or writ of error.1

tioned. The same may be said of questions arising under the revenue laws, such as the tariff and the excise laws, and which are the subject of litigation in the courts almost daily. Large classes of persons, other than the parties to the suit, are interested in the questions involved and determined. To allow them to be made parties to the suit would confound the established order of judicial proceedings, and lead to endless perplexity and confusion."

13

McIntosh v. Zaring, 150 Ind. 301, 49 N. E. 164.

A much more liberal rule as to the joinder of parties for convenience and economy prevails in admiralty than in either law or equity. Oliver v. Alexander, 6 Pet. 143, 8 L. 349;

Rich v. Lambert, 12 How. 347, 13 L. 1017;

Ex parte Baltimore & O. R. Co., 106 U. S. 5, 1 Sup. Ct. 35, 27 L. 78.

12 First case cited in note 11 and cases cited in succeeding notes to this section.

"The theory is, that, although the proceeding is in form but one suit, its legal effect is the same as though separate suits had been

causes of action." Schwed V. Smith, 106 U. S. 188, 1 Sup. Ct. 221, 27 L. 156.

A joint suit in equity cannot ordinarily be maintained by several creditors of a corporation against shareholders therein upon a statute (Laws Col. 1885, p. 264) making shareholders in banks, savings begun on each of the separate banks, trust, deposit, and security associations individually responsible for debts, contracts, and engagements of said associations in double the amount of the par value of the stock owned by them respectively. A separate action at law should be brought by each creditor, and the debt owing to him, as well as the liability of the defendant, must exceed $2,000.

Auer v. Lombard, 33 U. S. App. 438, 19 C. C. A. 72, 72 Fed. 209. " Holt v. Bergevin, 60 Fed. 1;

13 It is well settled in this Court that when two or more plaintiffs, having several interests, unite for the convenience of litigation in a single suit, it can only be sustained in the Court of original jurisdiction or on appeal to this Court as to those whose claims exceed the jurisdictional amount.' Walter v. Northeastern R. Co., 147 U. S. 370, 13 Sup. Ct. 348, 37 L. 206,

Where different creditors of defendant join in a suit to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance or mortgage, a United States Circuit Court can acquire no jurisdiction of any plaintiff's cause of action which does not exceed $2,000.14 Where the several holders of different liens against real estate join in a suit to enforce their liens, the several sums due the plaintiffs will not be aggregated to make the sum in dispute exceed $2,000. Each separate claim must exceed that sum to authorize a Circuit Court of the United States to take jurisdiction thereof.15

§ 94. Where one person sues as plaintiff on behalf of many similarly situated, the plaintiff's interest in the controversy must exceed $2,000, if the causes of action are several; but the aggregate sum of the interests of all the parties for whom plaintiff sues is the test of jurisdiction, where the suit is based upon a joint, or quasi-joint, cause of action. In some cases, where numerous persons have a common interest in the subject-matter of litigation so

quoted and followed in

14 Putney v. Whitmire, 66 Fed.

Putney v. Whitmire, 66 Fed. 385, 385. 387;

Nor will the claims of different

Smithson v. Hubbell, 81 Fed. 593. creditors in such case be aggregated

An earlier case is

Henderson v. Carbondale Coal & Coke Co., 140 U. S. 25, 11 Sup. Ct. 691, 35 L. 332.

"The same principle governs in cases where the jurisdiction depends upon the amount in controversy, whether the question is as to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of a Circuit Court." Smithson v. Hubbell, supra, at p. 594.

The governing principle of this class of cases received very careful consideration in

to give appellate jurisdiction.

Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 27, 7 Sup. Ct. 1066, 30 L. 1083; Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U. S. 61, 5 Sup. Ct. 1163, 29 L. 329; Seaver v. Bigelow, 5 Wall. 208, 18 L. 595;

Field v. Bigelow, 5 Wall. 211 note, 18 L. 604;

Myers v. Fenn, 5 Wall. 205, 18 L. 604.

15 This is illustrated by

Holt v. Bergevin, 60 Fed. 1, where several holders of mechanic's liens, no one of which amounted to $2,000, but all of which together exceeded that sum,-brought a suit, in joint form, in a State court Hawley v. Fairbanks, 108 U. S. to enforce their liens. The suit 543, 2 Sup. Ct. 846, 27 L. 820, was removed to the United States

Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Waterman, 106 U. S. 265, 1 Sup. Ct. 131, 27 L. 115;

And other cases cited in Walter v. Circuit Court, Northern District of Northeastern R. Co., supra. Idaho, and was there remanded to

that they might properly join as plaintiffs, one or more of such persons may sue on behalf of the whole number. Where a plaintiff brings a suit for himself, and on behalf of all others who may join with him in the suit, and no one else joins, the amount in dispute is determined in the same manner as if plaintiff did not offer to represent others who have not seen fit to accept the invitation.2 When a suit is brought by one plaintiff on behalf of many persons, it is often difficult to determine whether the amount in dispute is the sum alone of the plaintiff's interest in the controversy, or the total value of the right in dispute between the defendant and the whole number of persons in whose behalf the plaintiff sues.3 As a general rule, if the interests of the parties are several, so that the interest of each plaintiff must exceed $2,000, to warrant his joinder as such, the interest in the recovery sought held by the plaintiff of record is the sum in dispute ; *

the State court on the ground that p
no separate claim was large enough
to authorize that Court to take
jurisdiction.
$ 94.

1 Brown v. Trousdale, 138 U. S. 389, 11 Sup. Ct. 308, 34 L. 987;

Pillsbury-Washburn Flour Mills Co. v. Eagle, 58 U. S. App. 490, 30 C. C. A. 386, 86 Fed. 608, 41 L. R. A. 162;

Cutting v. Gilbert, 6 Fed. Cas. 1079, 5 Blatchf. 259, 2 Int. Rev. Rec. 94;

Cutting v. Gilbert, 6 Fed. Cas. 1079, 5 Blatchf. 259, 2 Int. Rev. Rec. 94.

2 Chatfield v. Boyle, 105 U. S. 231, 26 L. 944;

Bruce v. Manchester & Keene Railroad, 117 U. S. 514, 6 Sup. Ct. 849, 29 L. 990;

Massa v. Cutting, 30 Fed. 1, 24 Blatchf. 239;

Smithson v. Hubbell, 81 Fed. 593,

594.

3 The same difficulty arises when all the parties in interest are joined

Knopf v. First Nat. Bank, 173 as plaintiffs. Ill. 331, 50 N. E. 660.

A common interest of many persons merely in the questions of law involved in a suit will not authorize one or more to sue on behalf of all. Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 107, 17 Sup. Ct. 262, 41 L. 648;

Baker v. Portland, 2 Fed. Cas. 472, 5 Sawy. 566, 20 Alb. Law J. 206, 8 Reporter 392, 4 Cin. Law Bul. 620, 11 Chi. Leg. News 375, 25 Int. Rev. Rec. 321, 3 Pac. Coast Law J. 469;

Ante § 93, note 1.
4 In

Smithson v. Hubbell, 81 Fed. 593, the Court (Hanford, Judge) said, p. 594:

"I am constrained, however, by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States to hold that the amount of indebtedness to the complainant, which is less than $2,000, must be taken as the amount involved, for the purpose of determining the question of

but where the interests of the several parties on whose behalf plaintiff sues, are joint, or so nearly joint that their interests would be aggregated to make the sum or value in dispute if they all should become plaintiffs, the total sum or value of their interests is the matter in dispute.5

In a suit to abate a nuisance, the amount in controversy is the same whether the suit be brought by one person in behalf of all or by a hundred persons affected thereby. In a suit by a property owner or owners of a county to cancel county bonds, it can not affect the amount in dispute,-the sum of the bonds sought to be canceled,-whether every property owner in the county joins in the suit or one single owner as plaintiff brings the suit on behalf of all. Where a suit is brought by a stockholder of a corporation to restrain the waste of corporate assets, the plaintiff acts on behalf of all the stockholders, as would the corporation if it were plaintiff, and the value in dispute is held to be the sum of the assets about to be wasted, and not the plaintiff's pro

jurisdiction. In suing as a repre- | ralty, and have a common and unsentative of a class of persons sim- divided interest, though separable ilarly situated, and having similar as between themselves, the amount rights, the complainant brings into of their joint claim or liability will the case only the questions to be be the test of jurisdiction; but determined; and he is not to be where their interests are distinct, considered as bringing into the and they are joined for the sake of case the separate claims and de- convenience only, and because they mands of other creditors. The form a class of parties whose rights law does not confer upon him the or liabilities arose out of the same authority of an agent of other cred- transaction, or have relation to a itors for that purpose, nor author-common fund or mass of property ize him to augment his own distinct claim for the purpose of making a claim within the jurisdiction of the United States Circuit Court."

The Court said in Smithson v. Hubbell, supra, that the case was governed by the principles stated in Clay v. Field, 138 U. S. 464, 11 Sup. Ct. 419, 34 L. 1044, as follows:

"The general principle observed in all is that if several persons be joined in a suit in equity or admi

sought to be administered, such distinct demands or liabilities cannot be aggregated together for the purpose of giving this Court jurisdiction by appeal, but each must stand or fall by itself alone." Consult, also, ante § 93.

5 Cases cited in succeeding notes to this section.

Auth. cited ante § 93, note 8. 7 Brown v. Trousdale, 138 U. S. 389, 11 Sup. Ct. 308, 34 L. 987, quoted post § 96, note 2.

portion thereof. It has been held-but another case on better reason holds the contrary-that in a suit by a stockholder to have a receiver appointed to wind up the affairs of an insolvent corporation, not the value of the plaintiff's stock, but the value of the entire corporate assets is the value in dispute. Where a suit in equity is brought by one creditor or more, on behalf of all, against an insolvent corporation and its stockholders to collect and administer a trust fund for the payment of the debts of the corporation, the question whether the amount of the fund to be administered determines the jurisdiction, or the amount of the debt or debts to the plaintiff or plaintiffs of record, seems to be uncertain; perhaps the latter is the true criterion.10 If the petitioner

8 Hill v. Glasgow R. Co., 41 Fed., interpretation opens a wide door to 610. abuse. It is a matter of no difficulty to place stock in the hands of a citizen of some State other than that of the corporation, and thus

This rule has been applied in a suit by a stockholder of a corporation on its behalf, to annul, on the ground of fraud, a foreclosure pro-create the element of diverse citiceeding by which all its corporate property was lost, and to recover the property.

zenship. Under this arrangement, every controversy in which a stockholder has a right to complain of the conduct of the corporation could be brought within the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts." Towle v. American Bldg., Loan & Inv. Co., 60 Fed. 131, 134.

Jurisdiction of a similar case was held to be very doubtful in

Colston v. Southern H. B. & L. Ass'n, 99 Fed. 305.

Jurisdiction was denied, where plaintiff's stock was not in excess

Harvey v. Raleigh & G. R. Co., of $2,000, in 89 Fed. 115;

Robinson v. West Virginia Loan

Cowell v. City Water-Supply Co., Co., 90 Fed. 770. 96 Fed. 769.

9"In this case the entire assets of the society are brought into Court for administration, and are, therefore, the matters in dispute or controversy." Towle v. American Bldg., Loan & Inv. Soc., 60 Fed. 131, 134.

"It is apparent, however, that this

10 There are expressions in different parts of the opinion in

Handley v. Stutz, 137 U. S. 366, 11 Sup. Ct. 117, 34 L. 706, which may be construed to favor both theories.

The more positive statement seems to favor the latter theory:

"The sums alleged to be due