When a political question is involved in a suit, the decision of such question by the legislative or executive authority of the State or nation having jurisdiction of it will be accepted by the Courts.2 The Courts of the United States cannot control or direct the exercise of their political powers by the executive officers of the United States,3 or of the several States.1 2 Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L. 581. are all in one direction. New York | form, for the judgment of the v. Connecticut, 4 Dall. 3, 1 L. 715; Court." Nabob of Carnatic v. East India Co., 1 Ves. Jr. 371; s. c., 2 Ves. Jr. 56; Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sr. 444; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet 1, 8 L. 25.. "But, according to the course of proceeding under this head in equity [i. e. to grant an injunction to restrain a party from a wrong or injury to the rights of another], in order to entitle the party to the remedy, a case must be presented appropriate for the exercise of judicial power; the rights in danger, as we have seen, must be rights of persons or property, not merely political rights, which do not belong to the jurisdiction of a court, either in law or equity. . 3 Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475, 18 L. 437; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 170, 2 L. 60, 71. 4 Louisiana v. Jumel, and Elliott v. Wiltz, 107 U. S. 711, 2 Sup. Ct. 128, 27 L. 448; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 504, 33 L. 842 (affirming same case, 24 Fed. 55); Green v. Mills, 25 U. S. App. 383, 16 C. C. A. 516, 69 Fed. 852, 30 L. R. A. 90. "The first of these cases [Louisiana v. Jumel], arose upon a petition filed in the third district court, Parish of Orleans, Louisiana, Jan. 26, 1880, by the plaintiffs in error, as relators, against the defendants in error, holding various State offices and constituting the Board of Liquidation, for a mandamus, requiring them to appropriate certain funds on hand, amounting to some $300,000, to the payment of the interest due and payable upon the "That these matters, both as stated in the body of the bill, and in the prayers for relief, call for the judgment of the Court upon political questions, and upon rights, not of persons or property, but of a political character, will hardly be denied. For the rights, for the protection of which our authority is invoked, are the rights of sover-consolidated bonds of the State of eignty, of political jurisdiction, of government, of corporate existence as a State, with all its constitutional powers and privileges. No case of private rights or private property infringed, or in danger of actual or threatened infringement, is presented by the bill, in a judicial Louisiana, and to collect certain taxes and apply the proceeds on the interest and principal of said bonds. "The cause was subsequently removed into the Court below on a petition of the relators. "Upon the final hearing, the Court below found for the defend § 29. "The right of removal from the State courts to the United States Courts is statutory." Causes can be removed from the State courts to the Circuit Courts of the United States in those cases, and those only, that are prescribed by the statutes of the United States.2 No one has a Constitutional right to remove a cause from a State court to a Court of the United States.3 Congress may confer a right to ants, and entered a judgment dismissing the petition; whereupon, the relators sued out this writ of error. 2" A suit commenced in a State court must remain there until cause is shown under some act of Congress for its transfer." Little York Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 24 L. 656. "In the second case [Elliott v. Wiltz], the bill was filed in the Court below Jan. 16, 1880, by the "This right of removal is statsaid relators, against the same de- utory. Before a party can avail fendants, for an injunction to pre- himself of it, he must show upon vent the diversion of said funds the record that his is a case which from the payment of the interest comes within the provisions of the on said bonds. statute. His petition for removal, "Upon the final hearing, the when filed, becomes a part of the Court below found for the defend-record in the cause. It should ants, and entered a decree dismiss- state facts, which, taken in connecing the bill; whereupon, the com- tion with such as already appear, plainants appealed to this Court." entitle him to the transfer. If he fails in this, he has not, in law, shown to the court that it cannot proceed further with the cause.' Having once acquired jurisdiction, the court may proceed until it is judicially informed that its power over the case has been suspended." Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Pechner, 95 The two cases were decided together by the Supreme Court in an elaborate opinion, in which the conclusion is reached that a United States Court cannot "set up its jurisdiction over the officers in charge of the public moneys, so as to control them as against the political power in their administra-U. S. 183, 24 L. 427. tion of the finances of the State," So say other cases: and that "to grant the relief asked for in either of these cases would be to exercise such a power." Louisiana v. Jumel, and Elliott v. Wiltz, supra. $ 29. 1 Little York Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 24 L. 656. "The right of removal is purely statutory." Winnemans v. Edgington, 27 Fed. 324, 326. Babbitt v. Clark, 103 U. S. 606, 26 L. 507; Martin v. Carter, 48 Fed. 596; Gurnee v. Brunswick, 11 Fed. Cas. 117, 1 Hughes 270, 1 Va. Law J. 301. remove such causes as it sees fit within the limits to which the right of removal might be extended under the judicial power of the Constitution.4 of different States arises under the Constitution of the United States, and the inference is drawn that the right of a non-resident to have his case tried by a Federal Court is a Constitutional one, and that Congress, while it might regulate, could not altogether take it away. If the premises were sound, the conclusion would very likely follow; but they are involved in a mistake. It is true, that the primary source of jurisdiction in these Courts is found in the Constitution, but it is directly conferred through the medium of Congress by grant thereof, and is conferred with such limitations and exceptions as the Congress shall prescribe, when creating the Courts and defining their authority. Many cases in the Supreme Court reports have explained this, and the doctrine was restated at the Circuit in Harrison v. Hadley, 2 Dill. 229, 11 Fed. Cas. 649. Congress may, therefore, grant or withhold altogether jurisdiction over removal cases. The jurisdiction which it has power to grant it has power to withdraw. If the right of removal was a vested right of property, quite different considerations would apply. But it is not So. It is simply a privilege of having the case tried in some other than the State tribunals. There is no property in it." Manley v. Olney, 32 Fed. 708. 4" Circuit Courts do not derive their judicial power immediately from the Constitution, as appears with sufficient explicitness from the Constitution itself, as the 1st section of the 3d Article provides that 'the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such Inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.' Consequently, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in every case must depend upon some act of Congress, as it is clear that Congress, inasmuch as it possesses the power to ordain and establish all Courts inferior to the Supreme Court, may also define their jurisdiction. Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction in controversies between party and party but such as the statute confers. Turner v. Bank, 4 Dall. 8, 10, 1 L. 718, 719; Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441, 448, 12 L. 1147, 1150; McIntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch 504, 506, 3 L. 420, 421; Kendall v. U. S., 12 Pet. 524, 616, 9 L. 1181, 1217. 66 Congress, it may be conceded, may confer such jurisdiction upon the Circuit Courts as it may see fit, within the scope of the judicial power of the Constitution, not vested in the Supreme Court, but as such tribunals are neither created by the Constitution nor is their jurisdiction defined by that instrument, it follows that, inasmuch as they are created by an act of Congress, it is necessary, in every attempt to define their power, to look to that source as the means of accomplishing that end. Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 245, 11 L. 576, 581. Federal judicial power, beyond all doubt, has its origin in the Constitution; but the organization of the system and the distribution of the subjects of jurisdiction among § 30. A statute of a State cannot directly restrict the right to remove a cause from a State court to a Circuit Court of the United States.-When it is said that the right to remove a cause from a State court to a Circuit Court of the United States is statutory, it is to be understood that such right is dependent upon some statute of the United States and not upon any State legislation. Several States have attempted by statutes to prevent the removal of causes by foreign corporations from the courts of such States to the Circuit Courts of the United States.2 Such statutes have such Inferior Courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish, within the scope of the judicial power, always have been, and of right must be the work of the Congress." Grover & Baker Sewing-Mach. Co. v. Florence Sewing-Mach. Co. (Case of the Sewing Machine Companies), 18 Wall. 553, 21 L. 914. § 30. 1 Ante § 29. 2 A statute of Wisconsin, Laws, 1870, ch. 56, § 22, required every foreign fire insurance company, association, or partnership, as a condition of admission to do business in that State, to stipulate in writing filed with the secretary of state that no suit begun against it in the courts of such State should be removed for trial to a Circuit Court of the United States. The supreme court of Wisconsin held in Morse v. Home Ins. Co., 30 Wis. 496, 11 Am. R. 580, that the making of such a stipulation was a waiver of the right of a foreign insurance company to remove a suit against it to the United States Circuit Court, that had been brought in a State court. But that decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States, Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, 22 L. 365, that Court holding both the stipulation and the statute in pursuance to which it was given to be void. A similar statute of Michigan, 1 Laws, 1869, p. 230, 243, § 23, had been upheld by the supreme court of Michigan in Michigan ex rel. Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Judge of Jackson Circuit Court, 21 Mich. 577, 4 Am. R. 504, and that case was relied on in the Morse case. The Glens Falls Ins. Co. case was followed in Home Ins. Co. v. Davis, 29 Mich. 238. A similar statute of Ohio was upheld in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Best, 23 Ohio St. 105. A later statute of Wisconsin, Laws, 1872, p. 67, supplemental to the statute above cited, was enacted which required the secretary of state to revoke and recall the license of such company to do business in the State, in case of a violation of the former statute, and enacted that after such revocation, no new license should be granted for the period of three years to such company, and that from that time it should be excluded and prohibited from transacting any business in the State until again duly licensed. This supplemental statute was adjudged not been upheld by the United States Courts, with a single invalid by the Circuit Court of the | value as a precedent is further conUnited States for the Western Dis- sidered, post § 31. trict of Wisconsin, in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Doyle, 11 Fed. Cas. 702, 6 Biss. 461, 5 Ins. Law J. 37, 3 Cent. Law J. 41, and in a similar case brought by the Continental Ins. Co., which seems to be unreported; but its decision in the Continental Ins. Company case was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States, in A statute of Iowa, set forth in full in Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186, 7 Sup. Ct. 931, 30 L. 915, was adjudged invalid by the Supreme Court of the United States, reversing Barron v. Burnside, 70 Iowa 362, 30 N. W. 872. The principle decided in Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, supra, Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 was reaffirmed, and applied to a U. S. 535, 24 L. 148, railroad company, in which held the statute valid, three Justices dissenting. The supreme court of Wisconsin had already sustained the law in Wisconsin ex rel. Drake v. Doyle, 40 Wis. 175, 22 Am. R. 692; Wisconsin ex rel. Continental Ins. Co. v. Doyle, 40 Wis. 220. Many of the States enacted laws modeled after those of Wisconsin involved in the Doyle cases. These were effective for several years in restraining removals. Later cases in the Supreme Court of the United States, however, have well nigh, if not completely, overthrown the decisions of that Court and the supreme court of Wisconsin in the Doyle cases. By the later decisions, these State statutes assuming to abridge the right of removal have become little more than scarecrows. There is little room to doubt that Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., supra, would be directly overruled by the Supreme Court, as now constituted, if the question involved should be again presented to the Court. Whether that case still has any Southern Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202, 13 Sup. Ct. 44, 36 L. 942, thus invalidating a statute of Texas and an agreement made pursuant thereto. The same general doctrine is asserted and applied in Hollingsworth v. Southern R. Co., 86 Fed. 353, 355; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Becker, 32 Fed. 849; Moore v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 21 Fed. 817; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Harper, 17 Fed. Cas. 218, 3 Hughes 260, 5 Reporter 490; Rowland v. Empire State Life Ins. Co., 20 Fed. Cas. 1293, 2 Cin. Law Bul. 56; Rece v. Newport News & M. V. Co., 32 W. Va. 164, 9 S. E. 212, 3 L. R. A. 572; Kentucky v. East Tennessee Coal Co., 97 Ky. 238, 30 S. W. 608; Kentucky v. Jellico Coal Min. Co., 97 Ky. 246, 30 S. W. 611; Passenger Railway Ins. Co. v. Pierce, 27 Ohio St. 155 (overruling New York Life Ins. Co. v. Best, 23 Ohio St. 105). The principle which forbids a |