A may, in a proper case, grant a mandatory injunction. suit wherein a mandatory injunction may be granted by the State court would have no jurisdiction of such a suit if one were begun therein. Ante § 45. No suit is removable except one of which the State court in which it is begun, as well as the United States Circuit Court to which it is to be removed, has, or may have, jurisdiction. Besides, no suit is removable under the act of 1887-8 except one of which the United States Circuit Courts are given original jurisdiction by § 1 of the act of 1875 as amended by § 1 of the act of 1887-8; and the jurisdiction of such Courts to issue ancillary writs of mandamus is derived from $14 of the judiciary act of 1789, re-enacted as Rev. St., § 716. See further upon this point, post | ch. V. * Ex parte Lennon, 166 U. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct. 658, 41 L. 1110, affirming s. c., 22 U. S. App. 561, 12 C. C. A. 134, 64 Fed. 320. There are many cases in the United States Circuit Courts in which mandatory injunctions have been granted. United States v. Brighton Ranche Co., 26 Fed. 218; Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 730, 7412, 19 L. R. A. 387; Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 746, 750– 1, 19 L. R. A. 395; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 60 Fed. 803, 25 L. R. A. 414 note; Southern California Ry. Co. v. Rutherford, 62 Fed. 796; Chattanooga Terminal R. Co. v. Felton, 69 Fed. 273; Oxley Stave Co. v. Coopers' Int. Union, 72 Fed. 695; Blumenthal v. Southern R. Co., 84 Fed. 920; Pokegema S.-P. L. Co. v. Klamath R. L. & I. Co., 86 Fed. 528. Nearly all these decisions have been bitterly criticised. Several of them are reversed or overruled by Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Denver & N. O. R. Co., 110 U. S. 667, 4 Sup. Ct. 185, 28 L. 291; and the Express Cases, 117 U. S. 1, 6 Sup. Ct. 542, 628, 29 L. 791. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Coe v. Louisville & N. R. Co., Northern Pac. R. Co., supra, is re3 Fed. 775; Southern Express Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 10 Fed. 210, 869, 3 McCr. 147; Denver & N. O. R. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 15 Fed. 650, 4 McCr. 338; versed by Arthur v. Oakes, 24 U. S. App. 239, 11 C. C. A. 209, 63 Fed. 310, 25 L. R. A. 414 Oxley Stave Co. v. Coopers' Int. Union, supra, is affirmed by Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 49 U. S. App. 709, 28 C. C. A. 99, 83 Fed. Wells v. Oregon Ry. & N. Co., 912; but there is a vigorous dis15 Fed. 561, 8 Sawy. 600; senting opinion by Judge Caldwell Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Adams who seems to have the best of the United States Circuit Court may be removed thereto if begun in a State court.9 v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 31 U. S. | Fed. Cas. 1179, 9 Wkly. Notes Cas. App. 252, 14 C. C. A. 290, 67 Fed. 35; Shinkle, Wilson & Kreis Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 62 Fed. 690; Davenport v. Cloverport, 72 Fed. 689; McCauley v. Kellogg, 15 Fed. Cas. 1261, 2 Woods 13, 1 Cent. Law J. 164. A mandatory injunction should not be granted in any case where the plaintiff has a plain, adequate and efficient remedy at law. Black v. Jackson, 177 U. S. 349, 20 Sup. Ct. 648, 44 L. 801, reversing 8. C., 6 Okla. 751, 52 Pac. 406, and approving Laughlin v. Fariss, 7 Okla. 1, 50 Pac. 254; Potts v. Hollon, 177 U. S. 365, 20 Sup. Ct. 654, 44 L. 808, reversing s. c., 6 Okla. 696, 52 Pac. 917. As to when a mandatory injunction may properly be granted, reference may be made, in addition to these cases and the decisions therein cited, to Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. 24 Fed. 516; Cole Silver Min. Co. v. Virginia & G. H. Water Co., 6 Fed. Cas. 67, 1 Sawy. 470; s. c., 6 Fed. Cas. 72, 1 Sawy. 685, 7 Morr. Min. Rep. 516; Lathrop v. Junction R. Co., 14 277; Boland v. St. John Schools, 163 Mass. 229, 39 N. E. 1035; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Long, 46 Kan. 701, 27 Pac. 182, 26 Am. St. R. 165 and note; Central Trust Co. v. Moran, 56 Minn. 188, 57 N. W. 471, 29 L. R. A. 212; Boyd v. Woolwine, 40 W. Va. 282, 21 S. E. 1020; Sproat v. Durland, 2 Okl. 24, 35 Pac. 682, 886; Woodruff v. Wallace, 3 Okl. 355, 41 Pac. 357; Hunt v. Sain, 181 Ill. 372, 54 N. E. 970; Xenia Real Estate Co. v. Macy, 147 Ind. 568, 47 N. E. 147; Graves v. Key City Gas Co., 83 Iowa 714, 50 N. W. 283; Whitman v. Fayette Fuel-Gas Co., 139 Pa. St. 492, 20 Atl. 1062; Allport v. Security Co., 13 Reports 420; High on Injunctions (3 Ed.), §§ 2, 708, 860; 10 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, pp. 789791; Mandatory Injunctions, by Jacob Klein, 12 Harvard Law Review 95. Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 24 Fed. 516. CHAPTER IV. SUITS AT LAW OR IN EQUITY. § 52. To be removable, a suit must be one “at law or in equity."—It is not every suit of a civil nature that may be removed from a State court to a Circuit Court of the United States. Not only must the suit be "of a civil nature" to be removable, as already explained, but it must belong to one of the classes of suits of a civil nature known as suits "at law or in equity." The terms "at law" and "in equity," in the present judiciary act,2 mean the same whether used in reference to original jurisdiction, or to jurisdiction by removal. This is clear; and it was so decided in reference to prior acts, where there was some room for doubt. If the suit is one that would be "at law," if brought in the United States Circuit Court, it will be "at law," for the purpose of removal, if brought in a State court. If it would be "in equity," if brought in a United States Circuit Court, it will be "in equity," for the purpose of removal, if brought in a State court.4 It is the purpose of this chapter to discuss what suits belong to these classes. § 53. A suit is one "at law," if it be brought to enforce a common-law right or a similar statutory right.Civil actions at common law are classified as real, personal and mixed. The principal real and mixed actions are the writ of right, formedon, dower and quare impedit. The principal personal actions are the writ of debt, covenant, detinue, trespass (including ejectment), trespass on the case (including assumpsit, trover and libel), and replevin.1 If a right is Note 3 to this section; succeed- old common-law actions is to be ing section, note 5. found in Com. Dig., Action D. one of a class that was enforceable by a suit at law at the time of the adoption of the United States Constitution, a suit to enforce it will be treated as a suit at law for the purpose of removal, whatever form it may assume, to conform to State legislation.2 The jurisdiction of the United States Circuit Courts is not limited to cases at common law as distinguished from cases arising out of statute law. The statute defining the original jurisdiction of the United States Circuit Courts uses the term "at common law."3 The phrase in the removal section is "at law." 4 But these are synonymous expressions.5 The United States Courts are competent to enforce rights and remedies of a legal nature (as well as rights in equity or in admiralty) depending wholly upon State statutes. Suits to enforce such rights and remedies at law may be begun in a United States Circuit Court or removed thereto from a State court.7 The Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit (Judges Woods and Jenkins concurring, and Judge Showal 2 Compare ante §§ 42, 50. 8 Ante § 6. 4 Ante § 7. "The phrase common law,' found in this clause, is used in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence. . . . By 'common law' they meant what the Constitution denominated in the third Article 'law;' not merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered.” Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 7 L. 732. This language was used in that case in commenting upon the Amendment to the Constitution, ante § 4, guaranteeing the right of trial by jury in suits at common law; but it is applied to the judiciary acts by Judge Simonton in Brisenden v. Chamberlain, 53 Fed. 307; by Judge Choate in Quantity of Manufactured Tobacco, 20 Fed. Cas. 121, 10 Ben. 447; and by Judge Drummond in United States v. Block 121, 24 Fed. Cas. 1176, 3 Biss. 208, 5 Chi. Leg. News 302. Or in equity, post § 55. 7 Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 236, 20 L. 624; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270, 20 L. 571; Keith v. Rockingham, 2 Fed. 834, 18 Blatchf. 246; Holmes v. Oregon & C. R. Co., 5 Fed. 75, 6 Sawy. 262; Borland v. Haven, 37 Fed. 394, 13 Sawy. 551; Bigelow v. Nickerson, 34 U. S. ter dissenting), has carried this doctrine to the extent of holding that a State cannot so confer a right by statute as to compel the plaintiff to bring a suit to enforce such right in a State court only. A condition in a statute limiting suits to the State courts will be void; and such suits may be brought in any United States Court having jurisdiction.8 A right given by a State statute to the administrator of an App. 261, 17 C. C. A. 1, 70 Fed. 113, | recover against his employer for 30 L. R. A. 336; personal injuries, in Illinois Central R. Co. v. Ihlenberg, 43 U. S. App. 726, 21 C. C. A. 546, 75 Fed. 873, 34 L. R. A. 393; Wheeler v. Bates, 29 Fed. Cas. 880, 6 Biss. 88, 6 Chi. Leg. News 413. Ex parte McNiel, supra, involved the right of a pilot to recover in admiralty half pilotage under a statute of New York, when he had tendered his services to a vessel and they had been refused. The Court said: Illinois Central R. Co. v. Ihlenberg, supra ; a statutory right to recover damages from a town for failure to keep a highway or bridge in repair, in Keith v. Rockingham, supra; a statutory liability of a stockholder for debts of the corporation, in Borland v. Haven, supra; a statutory right to recover lands in an action of forcible entry and "A State law cannot give juris-detainer, in diction to any Federal Court; but Wheeler v. Bates, supra; that is not a question in this case. in A State law may give a substantial right of such a character that where there is no impediment arising from the residence of the parties, the right may be enforced in the proper Federal tribunal whether it be a court of equity, of admiralty, or of common law. The statute in such cases does not confer the jurisdiction. That exists already, and it is invoked to give effect to the right by applying the appropriate remedy." Iron Mountain & Helena R. Co. v. Johnson, 119 U. S. 608, 7 Sup. Ct. 339, 30 L. 504, jurisdiction of an action of forcible entry and detainer, under a statute of Arkansas, was taken without objection; and A statutory right to recover damages for a death by wrongful act was involved in Lehnen v. Dickson, 148 U. S. 71, 13 Sup. Ct. 481, 37 L. 373, affirming Dickson v. Lehnen, 37 Fed. 319, was an action of unlawful detainer, under a statute of Missouri, commenced in a State court, removed to a United States Circuit Court, tried, appealed, and affirmed, no question as to jurisdiction having Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Whit- been raised. ton, supra; 8 Bigelow v. Nickerson, 34 U. S. Holmes v. Oregon & C. R. Co., App. 261, 17 C. C. A. 1, 70 Fed. 113, supra ; 30 L. R. A. 336. Bigelow v. Nickerson, supra; That was an action for damages a statutory right of an employé to | under a statute of Wisconsin for a |