2 T both sides of this table, may tend to have different friends in different parts of the world. The fact that each of us may have different friends among the weaker, smaller nations should not in any way be allowed to make each of us less friendly in our bilateral relations. We must always keep [in mind] first and foremost that whatever disagreements we may have in other parts of the world, the key to peace not only between us but in the world lies in the relationship we have with each other, and we must never let events in other parts of the world weaken our relations. One reason this meeting as well as the other two must be designated as a success is that in non-security areas as well as in security areas we have entered into a number of agreements that make continuation of our bilateral relations valuable to both of us. I believe too that we must not be at all discouraged by the fact that we don't settle every issue every time we meet. And I believe work should begin now on exploring new areas where our cooperation may go forward, not only in the security case-which of course we already know requires urgent attention-but in peaceful areas where we have made such progress. And it is interesting how working in these two areas complements one another; working in one area helps us in the other. Where we fear each other and don't trust each other, we won't work together, and where we don't work together we will tend of course to develop old habits of lack of confidence and a policy of fear. Brezhnev: That is right. [Khorosho].3 Podgorny: I believe we can say that this visit has indeed been a very big success. In areas we have not succeeded in resolving, there is agreement on both sides that we should both make efforts; this applies to strategic arms. But much has been achieved and this is of very positive significance. Provided we work vigorously together, bearing in mind our mutual interests and especially the principle of equality in the more complicated ones. But of course a certain time is needed. In short, therefore, this meeting can be assessed as very successful and as a complement to the previous two meetings, which are clearly important not only from the standpoint of our two countries but the world. Kosygin: Mr. President, I am in agreement with the assessment of this meeting by Nikolai Viktorovich [Podgorny] and Leonid Il'ich [Brezhnev] and your own assessment of the significance of this meeting. This meeting has indeed been a more successful one and it can be more successful provided we make additional progress in these areas. 3 Russian translation of "good." I want to say a few additional remarks about the subject you mentioned in your summing remarks. You mentioned the issue of various friends that your side and ours may have in various parts of the world, who might become the causes of conflict between us. That is indeed a very important issue. There are many examples in history which warrant the conclusion that it is indeed an important issue. But I believe we should build our relationships on the basis of previous agreements and whatever future relationships on the complete assurance that whatever we do, none of our actions will be directed against the other side. And in this respect there is a great difference of principle between the present and the past. In the past, various conflicts arising out of actions by third countries flared up because our two countries didn't have the necessary contacts. But we now have the means of keeping in contact. If in the past we only had contact after it broke out, now we have the means to keep in touch before, and this is a great historical achievement. And I therefore feel we have at hand today the means of avoiding conflict, and this is an important development and on this basis peace can be a very durable one. Of course, there will be some in the world who want to see continuing tensions and they will prod us toward continuing tensions, and we will have to avoid it. There are some, I say, who will seek to stir up tension. Brezhnev: Mr. President, we can end on that note. President Nixon: The most important thing about this meeting, Mr. General Secretary, in comparison to the other two meetings, is not just the fact of the signing of agreements, though they are important, but how we follow up on the commitments made in those agreements in the next months. And I am sure we are in agreement on both sides that we don't just take those documents and file them away in a drawer, but in the area we said we would follow up, we do follow up. Whatever this requires in the way of meetings, at various levels, as we discussed with the General Secretary, will be done. Podgorny: And what's very important is that we have agreed that if necessary we have not just these annual meetings but if anything comes up in the interim requiring urgent discussion, we meet briefly to take these up. We need not wait for a whole year. Brezhnev: Therefore, I feel President Podgorny and Prime Minister Kosygin have added to our own assessment of what we have achieved in these last several days. And we all proceed from the assumption that we are succeeding in strengthening good-neighborliness between us, and that means we shall go on cooperating. We have every reason to go on to sign the remaining documents. [The meeting ended and the party went over to St. Vladimir's Hall for a signing ceremony.]+ * In telegram 10984 from Moscow, July 15, Stoessel wrote, "The Soviet leadership's performance during the Summit left some lingering questions. Why was Andropov absent? Why was there more emphasis on collectivity, and a de-emphasis of personal ties? Does Brezhnev have health problems? On the whole, however, their performance demonstrated continued stability and confirmed their concerted policy of pursing better relations with the U.S. Post-Summit Soviet propaganda has sought to put the best face on the results. In part this is a genuine assessment, reflecting the Soviet tendency to focus on atmospherics. Nevertheless, there are signs of second thoughts about the failure to achieve progress on arms limitation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) 199. Editorial Note Seven protocols, treaties, and agreements were signed by representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union at the Moscow Summit June-July 1974. On June 28, three agreements were signed: Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Energy, Agreement on Cooperation in Housing and Other Construction, and Agreement on Cooperation in Artificial Heart Research and Development. The Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Energy called for intensified scientific and technical cooperation for the optimal use of traditional and new sources of energy. The Agreement on Cooperation in Housing and Other Construction called for cooperation in building planning and construction, focusing on the quality of materials, including paying particular attention to improving safety in earthquake prone areas (25 UST 1592; TIAS 7898). The Agreement on Cooperation in Artificial Heart Research and Development called for collaborative efforts in developing an artificial heart (25 UST 331; TIAS 7867). For the texts of these agreements, see Department of State Bulletin, July 29, 1974, pages 219-223. The Long Term Agreement on Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation, signed June 29, called for cooperation between the two countries in these areas for ten years (25 UST 1782; TIAS 7910). For the text of the agreement, see ibid., page 219. On July 3, President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed the Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, and the Treaty and Protocol on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests. The Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems addressed the deployment and destruction of ABMs (27 UST 1645; TIAS 8276). The Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, reiterating the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, outlined limits for weapons tests and for verification and dissemination of data for its five-year duration. The Protocol on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests called for the exchange of information on the location of test sites, the geology of the testing area, and data for calibration purposes. For the texts, see ibid., pages 216-218. The full texts were also printed in The New York Times, July 4, 1974, page 2. Also on July 3, President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed the U.S.-Soviet communiqué and the joint statement on environmental warfare. For the text of the joint communiqué, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1974, pages 567–577. For the joint statement, see Department of State Bulletin, July 29, 1974, page 185. Excerpts from the communiqué and the full text of the joint statement were printed in The New York Times, July 4, 1974, pages 3 and 2, respectively. Secretary of State Kissinger held a news briefing in Moscow on July 3 on the joint communiqué. A summary of his remarks was printed ibid., July 4, 1974, page 1. 200. Memorandum of Conversation1 Washington, July 10, 1974, 8:30 a.m. PARTICIPANTS President Nixon Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for Senator George D. Aiken [R-Vermont] SUBJECT Joint Leadership Meeting on the Summit Trip to Moscow The President: We have a full plate today. I will go over the Brussels meeting2 and highlight Moscow and Henry will follow up on the meetings with the European leaders following the summit.3 They were significant. Those of you who saw the communiqués and heard the public utterances know most of what went on. The stop in Brussels was useful. The Europeans have always been concerned about a US-Soviet condominium. We stopped to consult and sign the NATO declaration. When I went to Europe in 1969, they thought we should do something about China and relations with the Soviet Union. The problem then for them was a possible US-Soviet confrontation. Since then, European attitudes have turned 180°. They have urged a European Security Conference on us; now they are cooling on it and on the idea of having a summit conclusion. Détente is a period of great opportunity and also of danger for the alliance. The Europeans wanted our assurances on security but they have been less than cooperative on economics, the Middle East, etc. They can't have it both ways-they can't keep our forces up and confront us everywhere else. They don't always have to agree but they can't go off on their own and in antagonism. In 1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 4, July 10, 1974. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Brackets are in the original. 2 See Document 185. 3 On leaving Moscow on July 3, Kissinger traveled to Brussels, Paris, Rome, Vatican City, Dusseldorf and Munich, London, and Madrid. He returned to the Washington on July 9. |
