Page images
PDF
EPUB

CHAPTER IV.

Considerations on the Circumstances that appeared favorable, or unfavorable, to the Permanence of Louis the Eighteenth's Government after his first Restoration.-His Personal Character and Habits.-The Mode in which he was restored.-The Interests of the French Marshals to support Louis considered.-The Appointment of the Duke of Wellington to be Ambassador at Paris injudicious in this Point of View.-The great Mass of the Nation interested in the Continuance of Peace.-The Agricultural Class.-The Manufacturing and Commercial Classes.-Dispositions of the Clergy towards Louis.—Effects produced by the Revolution on the State of Religion.

THE situation in which Louis XVIII. was placed, was one of extreme difficulty, requiring not only talents of a superior kind, but also address and delicacy in the management and application of them. Those, therefore, who were well-acquainted with him, and who were not disposed to flatter him, or to conceal his wants and his failings, and who, at the same time, were sincere and zealous friends, not only of the Bourbons but also of the new order of things in France, were not without considerable apprehensions for the permanence and tranquillity of his throne. These apprehensions had their origin and foundation in several circumstances. In the first place, with respect to the personal character of Louis himself, he was allowed, by all parties, to be naturally inactive and indolent, and by no means possessed of that comprehension and firmness of mind which are desirable and useful in a sovereign in all cases, and which were more especially requisite in the case of Louis. These deficiencies might, however, be in a great measure supplied by a choice of wise and prudent ministers. But here again he was exposed to considerable difficulties and dangers; for it was naturally to be imagined, that the emigrants, those who had surrounded him in the time of his adversity, whose sentiments and conduct had been similar to his own, would obtain a very large portion of his countenance, support, and favor. And speaking of the emigrants as a body, they certainly were not distinguished either for talents or prudence; and it might well be doubted, without any great breach of penetration or candour, whether their sufferings had taught them wisdom. They were too apt, also, to rate their own services and sufferings too highly these indeed, except in some particular cases, were not entitled to much merit or reward; for it may be doubted whether, if they had continued in a body in France at the commencement of the revolution, and not have deserted their king, that event would have proceeded and ripened into crime and destruction, as it had done.

1814.

But Louis XVIII. besides being naturally BOOK XII. attached to the emigrants, it was supposed had lent himself too much to the influence of the CHAP. IV. priests. France, indeed, during the revolution, had fallen back into such a state of indifference or disbelief with regard to religion, that a monarch who would, by wise and prudent measures, and by his own example, bave brought them back into the right path, would have proved a great blessing to them and to the world at large; for their love of military glory, and their ambition of conquest, had been greatly fed and strengthened by the looseness of their moral and religious principles. But they were in such a critical state, that it required great caution and circumspection in bringing about this change; and if Louis endeavoured to effect it by morose and severe regulations, it was much to be feared, that he would injure his own influence, and the permanence of his government, without promoting the object which he had in view.

But there were other difficulties and dangers that surrounded the restored monarch, besides those which had their origin and foundation in his personal character and habits, as contrasted with the national character and habits of his subjects. He had been restored by means of the successes and conquests of foreign power; by their successes and conquests over the French people. This reflection could not but be extremely galling to them; even to those who were most weary of the tyranny and oppression of Bonaparte, and most desirous of the restoration of the Bourbons: for it is an extraordinary and undoubted fact, that many of the most loyal of the emigrants rejoiced at and were proud of the victories of their countrymen, even when they were gained over the allies who were fighting their cause, and by Bonaparte, towards whom, as the enemy of the Bourbons and their own enemy, they bore a most deep and deadly hatred. Such is the influence of the love of national glory in the bosoms of Frenchmen, that it overpowers all regard to national benefit, and even smothers for

BOOK XII. a time the feelings of loyalty and personal interest. It was to be feared, therefore, that Louis XVIII., CHAP. IV. having been restored to the throne of his ancestors by the victories of the allies over France, would for a long time recall to the minds of a considerable portion of his subjects, their national defeat and disgrace; and there be regarded by no means in a favorable point of view.

1814.

But these unfavorable impressions towards their restored monarch would also be strengthened by the reflection, that he had been restored principally by the perseverance and bravery of Britain in the conquest; of that country which was the natural enemy of France, which had uniformly set herself up against every attempt of France to obtain the great object of every Frenchman, the preponderancy in Europe, if not the conquest of the continental part of that quarter of the world. Louis, too, had found a refuge in Britain at a period when no other state dared receive and protect him. These considerations could not be pleasing to Frenchmen. It was not to be supposed, that they would give us credit for all that disinterestedness, purity, and benevolence to which we laid claim; and when we declared, that our object was the benefit and prosperity of France, as well as the tranquillity and independence of Europe, they must have recollected the ancient rivalry between the two countries, and ⚫ been incredulous.

On these and several other accounts, the situation of Louis was extremely critical and difficult on his restoration to the throne of his ancestors. He entered a country, a great proportion of the inhabitants of which had either been born or been educated at a period when the Bourbons were considered as pretenders to the throne of France; as a race who had forfeited all claims to it, not only by the fault of Louis XVI. but also by having united themselves with those powers who were opposing the glory and conquests of France. He ascended the throne of his ancestors unknown to military fame, incapable from his infirmities of leading into the field a nation now almost all warriors, and who had long been accustomed to regard as synonymous terms their monarch and a conqueror. If he looked around him, he saw nearly half a million of soldiers attached to Bonaparte, both by the habits of their lives, and by their relation to him as the man who led them to conquest and plunder. These men could not like peace; they could still less like the person who was to rule over them by having deposed their favorite, and who, in ali points that were calculated to excite their esteem and confidence, was so very unlike their favorite.

The military life, notwithstanding all its hardships, by its varied scenes and licentious indulgencies, seldom fails to prove alluring to the

youthful mind in the lower ranks of society; whilst in the higher, a great number are professionally devoted to it; whose sole hopes of future advancement depend upon the subsisting demand for their services. Modern armies are so numerous, that a long war cannot be maintained without rendering the military class entirely disproportioned to the general mass composing a state; and the greater the necessity for keeping up its numbers, the more consequence will be attached to it. If this circumstance coincides with a national spirit naturally martial and unquiet, it may happen, that an aversion to resume the pacific character shall become almost the ruling passion of a people. Now, modern history scarcely affords an instance in which these causes of a fondness for war have concurred more efficaciously than in France, which, from the period of its revolu tion, had almost continually been involved in hostilities, domestic or foreign; and which, during many years, had submitted to the despotic rule of a man of unbounded ambition, and of talents peculiarly adapted to military enterprize. The astonishing success attending his schemes of aggrandisement had raised the power and glory of the nation to a height greatly beyond that of its proudest days; and the armies which he led into the field surpassed in magnitude those of any period in French history. It is true, his gigantic plans had lately wrought their own subversion, and he had been the author of a more extensive and tragical waste of lives to his own troops than can be paralleled in modern times. Still, however, a great mass of past glory adhered to his name, and his admirers could find excuses for his failures, in unforeseen circumstances, and in that desertion by former allies which they denominated perfidy. To this they attributed his final miscarriage; and resentment for his supposed wrongs took place in their feelings of blame for his rashness, or abhorrence for his tyranny. Further, the pride of the nation spurned the idea of being conquered; and to escape from it, they willingly cherished the notion, that if treachery had not prevented Napoleon from executing his plan of operations, he would have compelled the allied armies to retreat with disgrace from the French territory.

On the other hand, if Louis looked at the great bulk of the French nation, he found them exhausted with the pressure of the war, and glad of repose and peace: here, then, he might expect attachment to his person and government, for by his restoration they would obtain what they so much needed and so anxiously desired. But he must have been ignorant, indeed, of the French character, if he expected that, after they had breathed a little, they would not recall to mind the glories and conquests of Bonaparte's reign, and contrast

them unfavorably with the events of the reign of Louis.

But it might have been supposed that the favorable terms granted to France by the allies would have won on the gratitude of that people; and this, indirectly, contributed to the popularity of Louis XVIII. and the permanence of his government, since there could be no doubt, that it was principally on his account that such favor able terms were granted to them. If the French nation had only contrasted the behaviour of the allies with the behaviour of Bonaparte when he was victorious, the impression must have been highly favorable to the former. The allies, after having suffered the greatest degradation from Bonaparte, after they had seen their respective countries desolated by the conqueror, and themselves obliged to bend to his will, become masters of France: the capital of that country is in their power; their soldiers, who feelingly recollect all the misery to which their own country had been exposed from France,-many or most of whom could recall to mind their houses destroyed, and their nearest and dearest relations murdered,-behold Paris before them completely in their power; they pant for vengeance; they expect it from their leaders; it is due not only to their own sufferings, but also, by the laws and usages of war, to the victories and conquests which they have so gloriously achieved. And yet, under all these circumstances, the allies spare Paris! they enter it, not as conquerors, not as avengers of their own wrongs, but as friends! They treat it with as much respect and tenderness as if it had been one of their own capitals. Could such conduct fail to produce its proper impression on the minds of the Parisians, and of Frenchmen in general. The former, in particular, must have dreaded far different conduct; they must have recollected all that the allies had suffered from France, and that the people of Paris were always ready to lend themselves to the most tyrannical acts of Bonaparte's government: they must have recollected these things generally; but a more particular recollection must have dwelt upon their minds, of the recent devastation of a large portion of Russia, and of the conflagration of the ancient capital of that empire, of a capital which was regarded as holy by those soldiers who were now masters of the capital of France. What reason, therefore, had they to expect that Paris would be treated in a different manner from Moscow? Certainly, none. What ought, therefore, to have been their feelings towards the allied powers when Paris was spared; when it was not only spared, but when the allied armies entered it as friends? And what ought to have been their feelings towards Louis XVIII., on whose account principally the allies conducted themselves in such an

1814.

and Louis had great reason to hope, that the in- BOOK XII. habitants of France, and of Paris in particular, would manifest their gratitude in the manner CHAP. IV. which would be most acceptable to the former, by becoming loyal, obedient, and peaceful subjects to the latter. This was not much to expect, since it was only expecting that Frenchmen would discover their gratitude for being restored to peace and tranquillity, for being freed from a tyrant, and, for having their country and capital spared by the conquerors, in that manner which alone could secure to themselves the blessings which they enjoyed.

But those who were intimately acquainted with the French character doubted whether these considerations would have their proper effect upon them. Indeed, in a very short time this volatile and vain nation began to call in questionthe claims of the allies to regard themselves as the conquerors of France; and when once this was doubted, the debt of gratitude was speedily denied. France, they said, had been overrun by treachery; and Paris itself would not have been won, if it had been properly defended. They did not, however, think proper to recollect, that, even allowing all this to be true, they were not the less indebted to the allies for their clemency: they did not recollect, for how many of her victories and conquests France had been indebted to treachery: these things they forgot, and contented themselves with the reflection, that if France had been true to herself she never could have been conquered. As soon as this feeling and belief sprang up, it was evident that attachment to Louis would be weakened.

Notwithstanding, however, all these circumstances contributed to render the foundation of Louis's government rather insecure, there were other circumstances, of a much more powerful and general nature, which greatly counterbalanced the former. In the first place, the French marshals, though several of them were slow and reluctant in sending in their adhesion to the new government, it was natural to suppose would rally round Louis if he showed them proper attention. They had indeed been raised to the rank and fortune which they enjoyed by Bonaparte; and it might have been imagined, that they would have felt a strong attachment to him: but, on the other hand, they knew that the favors which they had received from him were bestowed from consideration of his own personal interests: some of them recollecting whence he had risen, might be induced to think that they were as deserving of the imperial rank as he, while others he had treated with great haughtiness. But the consideration which would weigh most with the French marshals was, that Bonaparte, by the blindness and madness of his ambition, had

BOOK XII. pardy: it is well known, that they did not approve of the Russian campaign, and still less of CHAP. IV. his conduct during the campaign in Germany in the subsequent year.-It had always been sup1814. posed, that one of the principal obstacles to a counter-revolution in France would be the change of property, and the possession of rank by those who would be stript of it in case of that event. With respect to the latter circumstance, as long as Bonaparte's measures secured the possession of rank, or contributed to raise it higher, so long he would be defended by those who were anxious about it: but it was also evident, that he would be deserted as soon as his measures threatened the ruin of those whom he had raised, provided they saw less danger in joining a counter-revolution. This was precisely the case when the allies gained possession of Paris: Bonaparte's attacks were desperate; if the marshals continued to adhere to him, they must share his fate the allies promised them the continuance of their rank and fortune, if they deserted him and joined Louis; and they followed the direction of their own interest.

This was extremely fortunate for Louis; for, while he could secure the marshals and generals of the French army, he had not much to dread from the soldiers themselves; not because they also saw their interest in adhering to the new government, or because the marshals had such influence over them as to lead them to forego their interest; but because without leaders they could do nothing. Louis therefore acted prudently and wisely in endeavouring to attach the marshals and generals still more to himself, by paying them great attention. It may be doubted, however, whether the views of Louis in this respect were wisely seconded by the British government in the appointment of an ambassador at Paris. The Marquis of Wellington, on his return to England, was received with the highest honors. (which we shall notice hereafter more particularly) that could be bestowed on a subject: he was raised to the rank of duke; received, in the most flattering man er possible, the thanks of both houses of parliament, which voted a very large sum for the purchase of an estate to be vested in his family: nor were his prince or his countrymen less anxious to show him how highly they thought of his services. After staying a short time in London, he was appointed ambassador at Paris; and this, as we hinted above, was certainly not an appointment likely to be of service to Louis XVIII. It no doubt was intended as a compliment to him, by sending the person of whom Britain thought most highly, and to whom Louis must have considered himself as most chiefly indebted for his restoration: but this very circumstance must have rendered the appointment of the Duke of Wellington grating to

the people of France, and particularly to the French marshals; for how had he been serviceable to Louis, but by conquering the French armies? and yet he was sent to Louis's court, where he was sure constantly to meet those whom he had defeated, and who must always recollec when they saw Louis paying him particular_attention and honor, that it was because he had defeated them! Setting aside, however, this appointment, there was nothing either in the conduct of Louis, or of the allies, but what was calculated to conciliate and attach the marshals to the new order of things: and the prudence and policy of this conduct soon displayed itself; for though there undoubtedly was great dissatisfaction in the army, and though Paris was often threatened with disturbance, yet nothing serious occurred; and, as far as could be judged, the minds of the soldiery and of the inhabitants of Paris, (by far the most important portion of the population of France,) were gradually yielding themselves up to the new order of things at the close of the year 1814. Connected with this view of the probable stability of Louis's government, as depending on the ideas and dispositions of the military, it may be mentioned, that he took a very wise step by appointing Marshal Soult minister of war: this marshal was undoubtedly the first military character in France, and was besides a great favorite with the soldiers: it was therefore of great importance to hold him up, by placing him in an official situation so intimately connected with the army, as attached to the government of Louis. Besides, his talents and habits, being those of a man of business, and of a vigorous, clear, and comprehensive mind, would (independently of all other considerations) have rendered this appointment judicious and popular.

But we must now advert to some other circumstances, which appeared favorable to the permanence of Louis's government.-It has already been seen that Talleyrand was particularly active in bringing about the counter-revolution; and while the allied monarchs were in Paris, great attention was paid to him by them. Louis also placed him at the head of the government; and intrusted him (as will afterwards be particularly noticed) with the entire management of the negociations at the congress of Vienna. With respect to the political honesty of Talleyrand, great doubts may justly be entertained: he had undoubtedly found no difficulty in accommodating his conscience to the republican form of government at the commencement of the revolutiou, and afterwards to the despotism of Bonaparte. In justice to him, however, it must be stated, that during the latter years of Bonaparte's reign he had not enjoyed the favor of his master, it is said, because he objected to his

1814.

schemes against Spain, though it may be ques- the overgrown preponderance of the capital; BOOK XII tioned whether his objections arose from any con- and these causes were favourable to the permasiderations, or feelings, with respect to the atrocity nence of a mild and peaceable government. CHAP. IV. and injustice of those schemes: they were more Formerly, the great body of the French nation probably derived from the belief, that an attempt were insignificant and of no weight; they were to conquer Spain would end in disappointment entirely under the power of the noblesse, who and disgrace. But, whatever opinion may be generally residing in Paris added to the importformed of the principles of Talleyrand, his ta- ance and preponderance of that city. But the lents are universally acknowledged; and they revolution, dividing the overgrown estates of the are of that order which Louis more particularly noblesse into possessions of a much more morequired. It was of the utmost consequence to derate size; and thus increasing the number of show to the French nation, that they had not those who were desirous of peace, and at the sunk far in the scale of European nations by same time placing the agricultural tenancy of the conquest of their country;-while, at the the kingdom on a more respectable and indesame time, it was indispensably necessary not pendent footing than they had previously been, to alarm or irritate the allies by grasping too soon rendered the inhabitants of the country of much or too eagerly at the recovery of their ancient more weight and importance. Over these also rank and importance. No man was so well cal- the revolution had shed much less of its baneful culated to conduct the affairs of France, in this effects than over the inhabitants of Paris, and critical emergency, as Talleyrand: cool, pene- the other large cities: their manners were less trating, and cautious, he could bring his wonder- frivolous; their morals less corrupt; their unful talents and almost unequalled experience to derstandings and feelings were not so completely bear on the object which he had in view, and turned aside from what was really respectable, yet not excite the suspicion of those with whom dignified, and useful, to what was gaudy, unsubhe had to deal. There were only two circumstantial and evanescent; while, feeling their own stances which operated against the policy of the appointment of Talleyrand to his high situation: in the first place, those of the French nation who still were attached to Bonaparte beheld him with dislike, as they considered him as having betrayed their favorite and his former master: in the second place, there was good reason to apprehend that his attachment to the Bourbons would continue only while their power seemed permanent; and that he would desert them, as he had deserted Bonaparte, in the time of the greatest need. Setting aside, however, the consideration of these two circumstances, there could be no doubt that while he was at the head of affairs in France, he would essentially contribute to heal the wounds inflicted by the revolution and by the tyranny and oppression of Bonaparte, by judicious and wise internal regulations; while, as far as the honor and external relations of the country were concerned, he would contribute to raise her as nearly as possible to her former rank and glory.

But it was to the disposition and feelings of the great bulk of the French nation that Louis was to look for the support and permanence of his government; not because of their loyalty to the house of Bourbon, (for that was in a great measure worn out,) but from the operation of causes more deeply and permanently implanted in bu man nature. It has frequently been remarked, that Paris is more to France than the capital of any other nation is to the nation in which it exists. This was undoubtedly the fact previous to and during the revolution: but that event involved causes which were gradually destroying

importance and weight in the state, they were
not disposed, as formerly, to give place on all
occasions to the inhabitants of the metropolis.-
On this class of people, therefore, Louis might
safely rely for support, provided he secured to
them their possessions, and that portion of re-
spectability and liberty to which they were dis-
posed to look up as their undoubted right.

The agricultural portion of the population of
France on many accounts wished for repose and
peace: even in the midst of the anarchy and
tyranny of the revolution they had advanced in.
the knowledge and practice of their business:
feeling themselves now more their own masters
than they had been while under the old no-
blesse, and that they were now working for
themselves, and not merely for them, they
roused themselves to a degree of activity and
intelligence of which they before were scarcely
thought capable. But they still required peace,
to reap all the fruits of their labour. They knew
that, with the natural advantages in respect
to soil and climate which France enjoyed, if
they had peace, they could raise corn not merely
for their own supply, but also for the supply
of foreign nations; while the same desirable
event would open a way for those commodities:
of higher value and a rarer kind, their wines,.
fruits, &c. On these accounts the agricultural po-
pulation of France, provided no attempts were
made to disturb the existing divisions of pro-
perty, were sure to be the friends of Louis
XVIII.

The manufacturing and commercial portion of the population, also, must have seen their interest.

« PreviousContinue »