2. Sir Alec reviewed the British assessment of the strategic situation. He noted the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and that the Soviets were active in Aden and in Somalia. The Communist Chinese were involved in construction of a naval base for Tanzania. Given these activities in the area, it was the British view that Simonstown could play an important part in the strategic picture. The UKG had therefore decided that it must carry through the implementation of the Simonstown Agreement. He recognized that there would be "squeals" from African countries and probably difficulties in the UN; nevertheless, the UK was determined to proceed. 3. In response to the Secretary's question, Sir Alec said that HMG was in the process of consulting the Commonwealth. He hoped that none of the governments concerned would leave the Commonwealth, although some were unpredictable, as for example Ceylon under the leadership of Mrs. Bandaranaike. He noted that there might be a particular problem with Kaunda. 4. Sir Alec stated that British arms policy with respect to Portugal would not be changed. 5. The Secretary responded that the UK decision would cause problems for the United States. He noted that our relations with black African states were probably better than they had been for some time. 6. Sir Alec expressed the hope that the US could say that it understood the UK decision and the reasons for it. 7. The Secretary suggested that there be close consultation and said that we would try to work out something mutually acceptable. In response to his question, Sir Alec said that the British Government would be making an announcement of its policy about July 20. It was agreed that there would be consultation in advance on the announcement to be made by the UK and on a statement the US would then make. 8. Department repeat other posts as desired. Rogers 36. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom' Washington, July 22, 1970, 2316Z. 117924. Subj: U.S. Reaction to U.K. Arms Sales to South Africa. Ref: State 116834.2 1. Dept Press Spokesman, in answer standing press inquiries, repeated verbatim statement reftel at noon briefing July 22. 2. In response press questions after statement, spokesman gave replies summarized below: A. Although we informed by UKG in advance, we were not requested associate USG with this proposed UK policy. However U.S. in fact disassociating itself from British move. B. Reference in statement to increase in flow of arms includes any increase whatsoever, even in arms solely for defense sea lanes. C. U.S. is interested in freedom of seas and passage, and understands UK interest in Cape sea routes, but is not able associate with measure resulting in increased arms flow to South Africa. D. Statement is better described as our own policy and attitude than as criticism British policy. E. Our position on resolution on South African arms embargo pending before UNSC still under discussion. F. No comment on similarity U.S. and Black African Governments positions, or on similarity Wilson government disassociation in 1968 from U.S. bombing Hanoi. G. Statement constitutes reaffirmation our stand on arms embargo; it not intended weaken position we have held since 1963. H. Statement means both that we cannot endorse proposed British action, and that we will not take same action. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12–5 S AFR. Unclassified; Priority. Drafted by Barr, cleared in draft in AF/P and AF/S, cleared in substance in S/PRS and EUR/P, cleared in EUR/BMI, and approved by Witman. Repeated to African diplomatic posts, Paris, and USUN. 2 In telegram 116834 to London, July 21, the Department transmitted a statement to be delivered July 22, at the noon press briefing, on the U.S. reaction to U.K. arms sales to South Africa. (Ibid.) I. One aspect of U.S. interest this question stems from U.N. resolution of 1963.3 End Rogers 3 Security Council Resolution 181, adopted August 7, 1963, called on member states to "cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa." (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1963, p. 20) 37. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Washington, July 23, 1970. SUBJECT Rhodesian Sanctions In NSDM 47 (Tab 4)2 you ordered the closing of our Salisbury Consulate, and directed a review of our sanctions against Rhodesia. You expressed interest in minimizing hardships to U.S. firms acting in good faith, particularly chrome importers, while at the same time meeting our obligations under the UN Resolutions. At Tab 1 is a memorandum from the Secretary of State regarding this matter. At Tab 2 is an exhaustive report on this problem from the Under Secretaries Committee. At Tab 3 is a memorandum to you from the Secretary of Commerce taking issue with the Secretary of State's recommendations.3 The options presented in the Under Secretaries Report go beyond your instruction. They range from no revision at all of our current regulations, to revisions which would, in effect, break the embargo and put us in violation of the UN Security Council Resolutions. Neither of these extremes is consistent with your instruction. This memorandum, 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-214, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 47. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. 2 Tab 4 is printed as Document 28. 3 Tabs 1, 2, and 3 are attached but not printed. 4 See footnote 5, Document 8. therefore, addresses itself primarily to steps that we might take without reneging on our international commitments. However, I should call to your attention that the Secretary of State recommends that there be no change whatsoever in our current implementation of the embargo. Secretary Rogers argues that we are legally bound to the letter of the UN Resolution (which makes no provision for relief in hardship cases). He further argues that any relaxation at all of our present procedures would "seriously undermine the genuine good will toward your administration... of many black African leaders." Finally, the Secretary asserts that any change in our procedures might lead to a general collapse of the embargo, and our being charged with the responsibility therefor. The Secretary therefore recommends to you that we make a more vigorous effort in the United Nations to ensure compliance by other countries with the embargo and, pending the result of those efforts, adhere strictly to our present procedures. This, of course, means that we would go in a direction directly opposite to the one decided at the NSC meeting." Secretary Stans, on the other hand, is frankly opposed to the embargo on chrome imports from Rhodesia. He argues that it leaves us excessively dependent on the USSR for chrome, and enables the Soviets to manipulate prices to the disadvantage of U.S. purchasers. Although not pressing at this time for open abrogation of the embargo, he states that the approval of import licenses to both Union Carbide and Foote Mineral are "necessary to relieve our dependence on the Soviet Union for the long term availability of" chrome. In the Carbide case, the money was paid before our embargo went into effect, and with full knowledge of it. A license for Foote would be hard to portray as anything but an open violation of the embargo. In addition, Secretary Stans' arguments lose some of their force from the following facts: (1) even before the embargo, we were buying as much chrome from Russia as from Rhodesia, (2) the Foote import would cover less than 7 percent of one year's U.S. needs. It would therefore hardly affect our dependence on the USSR for about half of our current chrome needs and would have no effect on the "long term" situation. I do not agree with either Secretary's views. Neither does Treasury or Defense. This is an extremely complex and multi-faceted issue, but what follows is an earnest attempt to reduce it to the minimal essentials which you should know before making a decision. 1. The Legal Situation State and Justice disagree. State argues that our compliance with the letter of the Security Council Resolutions is mandatory and permits 5 See Documents 20 and 23. of no discretion in its implementation. State also argues that the intervening three years of enforcement have wiped out whatever justification there might have been for hardship exceptions in the early stages of the embargo. This matter was personally reviewed by the Attorney General and Mr. Kleindienst who find the State Department's legal argument without merit. Mr. Kleindienst points out that the White House announcement of the Rhodesia sanctions said that "provision will be made... to deal with cases of undue hardship arising from transactions commenced before the date of the order." Mr. Kleindienst further points out that the Executive Order itself authorized the issuance of import licenses, and that this authorization would hardly have been granted if it had been the intent to permit no exceptions to the embargo. Finally, Mr. Kleindienst points out that licenses have been issued in hardship cases and that no protest was received from the United Nations or any member countries because they understood, as a practical matter, that the implementation of the Security Council Resolution would necessarily involve some hardship exceptions. Justice holds the State argument on timing to be irrelevant in the case of Union Carbide, which has been pending since the embargo went into effect. 2. Security Aspects An adequate supply of chromite ore is a strategic necessity. However, as of now, our supplies are adequate. All agencies are agreed on that fact. Our current consumption needs are met by imports from Russia, Turkey and South Africa, and sales from the surplus in our chromite stockpile. Should the USSR cut off sales to us of chromite ore or if Rhodesian ore were to continue to be unavailable for a number of years, we might eventually experience a shortage. There is, however, no indication whatever that the Soviet Union is contemplating such a move; and adjustments to the long-range effect of the Rhodesian embargo is something that can be faced, if and when it becomes a problem. We should, however, keep a continuing watch on the chromite supply situation. 3. Economic Aspects The sanctions have helped our tobacco industry by enabling us to replace Rhodesian exports to the UK. However the Rhodesian sanctions do put an economic burden on US chrome purchasers. Chrome prices have risen sharply since 1966. The USSR (a major source of our chromite both before and after sanctions) has been able to tie the purchase of lower grade ore to the high grade ore we require. Finally, US and UK firms are disadvantaged by the fact that France, Italy, West Germany, Switzerland and Japan are less careful than we in scruti |
