C. Botswana's Objectives Vis-à-Vis the United States U.S. assistance in: 1. Developing a prosperous economy, with maximum benefits for all the population. 2. Achieving a modern democratic and efficient government (national and local) and a modern social structure which will also preserve important traditional values and characteristics. 3. Rapid development of technical and academic education and a substantial rise in the general educational level of the population. U.S. support for: 4. Obtaining as much political and economic independence from South Africa as possible. 5. Achievement of racial equality throughout southern Africa. 6. Securing the respect of black African states for Botswana's independence and their appreciation of the unique problems it faces with respect to South Africa. D. Recommended Courses of Action 1. Provide U.S. loan assistance for the construction phase of the Botswana-Zambia road and attempt to obtain the participation of other donors. 2. Study, in conjunction with the IBRD, possible multi-donor assistance to Botswana's ranching/livestock scheme and the plan to build a northern abbatoir. 3. Encourage other donors or private sources to investigate ways to provide direct air services among the BLS countries and other nearby countries. 4. Continue the Peace Corps program. 5. Assist the GOB in implementing its population planning program as appropriate. 6. Send GOB police officials for training in the United States under the Africa Regional Project for Public Safety Training. 7. Identify key younger government officials and politicians and expand leader grants to them. 8. Increase assistance to the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland to include support for new campuses in Botswana and Swaziland. 9. Encourage U.S. business interest in Botswana, making maximum use of OPIC. 10. Utilize other African country facilities for specialized training for Botswana manpower requirements. 11. Maintain a small information and cultural program. 54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in South Africa and the United Kingdom and the Mission to the United Nations1 Washington, September 22, 1971, 1952Z. 174301. Subj: South West Africa. 1. Clifford J. Hynning, Washington attorney for South African Government initiated meeting on South West Africa with Asst. Secty Newsom September 20. Hynning explained he had, after some delay received authority from SAG to discuss subject with Department. 2. Stating SAG wished find way out this issue he said he sought determine what kind approach might be acceptable to USG. He indicated SAG willing consider “over time”: A) withdrawal application to SWA Terrorism Act and possibly other similar legislation; B) independence for Ovambaland; C) new codification laws and regulations under international commission; D) resumption of reporting to UN. He noted that UK and France less ready than U.S. accept ICJ decision;2 he felt such decision held real dangers for U.S. and our position should be similarly cautious. SAG prepared endeavor meet legal concerns of Western nations if this likely to be helpful in reducing pressures to more dramatic solutions. 3. In response Newsom said he welcomed chance discuss issue. U.S. interested in seeing acceptable solution if this possible. Obviously matter complex one and even definition of issues involved sometimes difficult. He suggested session be devoted seeking define existing concerns of various parties involved, after which it might be easier determine whether meaningful steps possible. Further meeting might take place after Secretary had seen Foreign Minister Muller. Hynning agreed. 4. In response Newsom suggested would be useful see if U.S. clearly understood SAG concerns this issue which he presumed to be: A) security of its own territory; B) continued control economic resources, including uranium; and C) desire prevent development social or political system in SWA incompatible with that in Republic. Hynning agreed, but said security is less of consideration than economics. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 SW AFR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Newsom; cleared in L and IO; and approved by Newsom. 2 On June 21, the International Court of Justice delivered its advisory opinion that the Mandate was terminated and South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1971, pp. 581–586. 5. Newsom then said to understand U.S. position it was essential recognize four areas of our concern: A) our domestic opinion which, while not fully crystallized on this issue, reacted against what it considered repression, injustice or discrimination elsewhere, particularly in racial matters; B) our responsibilities to UN; C) our concern over international law and support for ICJ; and D) our relations with Africa. Hynning asked how (D) differed from (C). Newsom explained our bilateral relations with Africa, as distinct from our relations in UN context, are affected by our stand on Southern African issues. Commenting on Hynning's initial presentation, Newsom said in his opinion actions which embraced only Europeans and South Africans would not be helpful; UN and African participation in ultimate resolution essential. 6. In subsequent discussion: A) Hynning described South Africa's thinking on plebiscite3 as providing a choice between: 1) continued administration by South Africa; 2) administration by UN; 3) independence. SAG was prepared have international observers and to open plebiscite to all persons of SWA origin, including those banned and in exile. Hynning added that present SAG Ambassador to Washington Botha had made survey of SWA for SAG before SAG brief to ICJ and had concluded SAG would win plebiscite. SAG would require two years to prepare for plebiscite since not all peoples of territory ready now. B) Hynning said SWAPO not banned organization and participation SWAPO in plebiscite not ruled out. C) According Hynning, SAG would be willing invite SYG visit SA for discussion SWA issue; he had been previously invited but had declined come. Any discussion with an OAU mission as such, however, would be politically impossible. But he did not rule out possibility Africans accompanying SYG. D) Hynning emphasized any solution must start with premise SA still has mandate authority. SAG has not ceased consider SWA international territory. Newsom pointed out this would be difficult after UNGA and ICJ actions. Majority of nations in UN would probably take position only issue to be discussed would be transfer of authority— over whatever period-on assumption mandate ended. E) Hynning expressed difficulty in understanding why U.S. failed give greater weight to SA's role as ally in two world wars, anti-Communist state, and significant Western presence in strategic area, particularly when we appeared take more tolerant view Communist states. Newsom said USG not unaware those elements and desired friendly relations with SA, but great significance of factor of race in international as well as domestic arena could not be ignored.* End. 4 The telegram is unsigned. 55. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1 New York, September 24, 1971, 2138Z. 2843. Dept pass SecState for Rogers, White House for President and Kissinger, Senate for Sen. McGee, House of Rep. for Congressman Diggs off. For Butcher from Diggs. 1. Strongly associate myself with statement of Senator McGee that the Byrd Amendment passed yesterday by the Senate if finally adopted into law would represent "formal US defiance" of the UN embargo on the importation of chrome ore from Rhodesia and would impair US relations "with virtually all African countries".? 2. Being here in NY as a US UN delegate I can attest that news re: the aforementioned vote was ill received and will be costly to US interest on all questions. 3. USG can recover however if you issue a strong statement against this removal of your authority to ban import of chrome ore from Rhodesia and that the rest of your administration will exert every effort in support of the State Dept's opposition to the Byrd Amendment. 4. Declaration by Office of Emergency Planning [Preparedness] that US chrome stockpile is far in excess of foreseeable strategic needs, among other reasons, would fully justify such a statement. Bush 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, INCO-CHROME 17 US-RHOD. Unclassified. 2 Gale W. McGee (D-WY). For implications of the Byrd Amendment, see Congress and the Nation, Vol. III, 1969-1972, p. 892. 56. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Washington, September 28, 1971. SUBJECT Your Meeting with Mauritanian President Ould Daddah, September 28, 3:00 p.m. Ould Daddah has informed the press that at his meeting with you today he will make known the Organization of African Unity's position on "the American debate on Rhodesian chrome purchases". This is a reference to the Byrd Bill which passed the Senate last week. Senator Byrd's amendment is a rider on the Military Procurement Authorization Bill. It amends the UN Participation Act of 1945 so as to preclude any action thereunder to prohibit imports of strategic commodities from any free world country so long as the importation of such commodities from Communist countries are not also prohibited. The effect of the bill is to remove the embargo on Rhodesian chrome. The argument for the bill is that it is dangerous for the United States to be dependent on the Soviet Union for chrome, and that U.S. manufacturers are at a competitive disadvantage because the price of Russian chrome (the only major producer other than Rhodesia) has almost tripled since the embargo went into effect.2 The ultimate prospects for the Byrd Amendment are now unclear. Despite vigorous opposition by the State Department, it passed the Senate by a 36 to 46 vote. Senator Fulbright now plans to amend the amendment so that you might keep it from going into effect on national security grounds or on the grounds that it violates a treaty obligation. Apparently, some of Byrd's earlier supporters are attracted to that formula. Both Senators Stennis and Byrd, however, are said to be adamant that the amendment be retained in its present form. Suggested Response: -If finally passed, the Byrd Amendment would leave the embargo in effect except for chrome. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 740, Country Files, Africa, Mauritania, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: "The President has seen." Nixon wrote in the margin: “K—I agree with Byrd Amendment. No public statement should be made by the W.H. Let State continue to take the position it needs to for African purposes." Haig wrote below Nixon's note: "Wright informed." 2 Nixon underlined most of this sentence. |
