why can't we deal with an insignificant little country in Southeast Asia that represents no threat to the U.S.? If we can get a settlement, even if every clause is not precisely worked out, then that will start a real political process and change the situation. If not, the war will continue, and perhaps intensify and at this point continued military operations are to their disadvantage.

If an agreement is reached soon, we are prepared to implement it faithfully. We are also prepared, if you want, to give you assurances which they insist we give to them. So we would risk not only our relations with them but also with you.

These are the basic issues and I can give you the details. I am sorry I have talked so long.

Mr. Brezhnev: When you say withdrawal three months after a settlement, what do you mean?

Dr. Kissinger: A signed agreement. All forces would be withdrawn, including air forces. I shall give your Ambassador on Monday the text of my statement and the text of my proposal, so you can judge personally whether we have acted in good faith and openly as we have done once before.

Mr. Brezhnev: That is all, Dr. Kissinger?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but I am prepared to answer any question on the details.

Mr. Brezhnev: I can ask, have asked, and should ask quite a few questions to which it is difficult to find answers. You made a statement justifying the United States position, yet the war is going on with people being killed along with United States soldiers. That in itself shows that there can't be any justification for what is going on.

I would not like to delve into the substance of the various proposals or the responsibility on the Vietnamese side. Obviously both sides have certain deficiencies in their proposal. That is not the overriding consideration. The main thing is to solve the problem of ending the war, and this we feel the United States is in a position to do, and we can't understand why the United States does not want to. What interest is the United States protecting by its military actions? Does the U.S. understand that war is abhorrent to the entire world? What goals does the United States have?

Those are the basic issues. Otherwise, it's a long, weary process and you ask me questions and I ask you questions and we make a legal analysis of the negotiations in Paris. That's not the issue. It is on the United States and not Vietnam that ending of the war depends. It does not depend on long speeches and various formulas.

What the Vietnamese demand foremost is the withdrawal of United States forces and the United States must reply. It is not a ques

tion of how many months. I think the Vietnamese would readily agree if you said by October 15th you would completely withdraw. At the same time, of course, there would be a ceasefire. That's how the Vietnamese themselves pose the problem. Then, of course, a coalition government is to be established. If the United States were to accept these three principles, then there would be no more bloodshed in Vietnam and no more bombing.

You say the Vietnamese refuse to make concessions. They say you refuse. The crux is that you should withdraw and there should be a ceasefire and a coalition government, a coalition government in which the North Vietnamese would have no part. That is the quickest way to end the war.

The Vietnamese may have certain shortcomings in the way they negotiate, but a country like the United States could perhaps help the Vietnamese in negotiations.

There is no risk for the United States to lose face. Rather it is the contrary. There are no complexities for the United States. It is hardly right to justify the war by the fact that a greater percentage of United States population supports the policy in Vietnam. A few more months may pass and all that may change as it has in the past. It is not a basis for policy.

I do not wish to indulge in sharply worded statements. Our position remains unchanged and it is our earnest desire to see the U.S. Government and President take steps to really put an end to the war. It should also be clearly understood that Vietnam affects our own relations and cannot fail to have a certain influence upon them.

I see three basic elements in order to reach a settlement. First, your complete withdrawal of forces; second, a ceasefire; third, the creation of a coalition government naturally involving the resignation of Thieu and some agreed period for release of prisoners of war.

There is another consideration. Even if you withdraw your forces from Vietnam, it is still a fact that an enormous number of troops and naval ships are stationed in countries neighboring Vietnam. That, too, has a bearing on the situation in Vietnam. What I want to do is to wish you success in the talks in Paris. I would hope our wishes could be taken into account. These are the same wishes I expressed in May at a meeting when Dr. Kissinger said measures would be taken to end the war, and these have not yet happened. As for information about the talks, we would appreciate whatever you provide through Ambassador Dobrynin.

Dr. Kissinger: I appreciate the farsighted way in which the General Secretary has posed the issue. Let me say without prolonged discussion, I would like to comment on the three principles the General Secretary has mentioned. We agree to withdrawal. We agree to ceasefire.

These are not in dispute. If you have information to the contrary, it is not correct. There is no dispute about this.

Regarding a coalition government, it is not quite correct to say that North Vietnam does not want to participate. At the last meeting they said the entire North Vietnamese army is under South Vietnamese command and must remain in South Vietnam after a settlement. And that can hardly be considered new [non] participation in the political life of the country. The specific proposal on Friday which we will make to the other side will enable members of the NLF to participate in the Government of South Vietnam in a particular formula. I will transmit it to the General Secretary and he can judge our proposals.

I appreciate the General Secretary's remarks and they will be transmitted precisely to the President and will be taken extremely seriously.

One other point I want to tell the General Secretary personally— we can't make it part of the negotiations-that after a settlement there will be a substantial reduction of our naval forces and a gradual reduction of the forces stationed in neighboring countries. I can give this as a personal promise of President Nixon, though for obvious reasons we cannot make the deployment of forces outside of Vietnam part of a settlement with the DRV. But I can give this as an absolute assurance of the President which we will honor.

Mr. Brezhnev: The Vietnamese also say that they are not empowered to decide things affecting neighboring countries because after all, the Geneva Accords related to Vietnam and not to other countries.

Dr. Kissinger: Then it would help if they got their troops out of there. [The other countries of Indochina]. I can also tell the General Secretary that, if he wishes we would not object to his telling the DRV about our assurances regarding deployments of our forces outside Indochina. It is up to him but he is authorized to tell them as far as we are concerned. We haven't told them [interpreter asks question]. I think they are talking about Thailand.

Mr. Brezhnev: It is my own personal impression that at the forthcoming meeting the Vietnamese intend to reach either final agreement about ending the war and a subsequent political set-up or once again, they will reaffirm their will to resist more resolutely and to fight more staunchly. If you consider it useful to take this into account, I would be pleased. It is not for us to get involved in the negotiations. It is for you and for you [them?] to draw the consequences. My impression is that they take into account both your electoral situation and possible post-election developments, and our talks here.

Dr. Kissinger: I can assure you that I will go with an attitude of making a maximum effort to settle the war at the next meeting or shortly afterwards. If that is their attitude, they will find us meeting them in a very forthcoming spirit.

Mr. Brezhnev: Let us end on that.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

Mr. Brezhnev: Well, do you think we should now take up the question of the Middle East because that is a subject which leaves an imprint on our relations and sometimes complicates them. This was also an issue we discussed at our last meeting. There is nothing new in the channel lately and if you have anything new to say, I would be happy to have your opinions because the situation there remains very acute and is becoming more and more tense.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Secretary-General, of course, there are a number of developments in the Middle East since we met, and not all of them have been favorable; in fact, none have been favorable to a settlement. I agree with you, the situation is not improving. I also must say on behalf of the President that some of the charges made by the Egyptian leaders against you reflect the serious and responsible role you have played in the Middle East and the careful way you have carried out your discussions with us. It has been carefully noted and appreciated by President Nixon and puts on us a certain responsibility to deal towards you in the same spirit.

Mr. Brezhnev: That is a logically correct analysis. It is a logical and absolutely correct analysis by the United States.

Dr. Kissinger: That does not mean that the people we are dealing with are always logical. [Brezhnev makes off-record remark.] Regarding our general attitude towards the Middle East, we have established and communicated to you the principle that this area is a good test of our relations and that it will always be an area of the world where one side or another has an opportunity to make tactical gains.

For the sake of the principles you described and the fact that with two great countries neither should be put at a permanent disadvantage, we have adopted the policy that we will take no major initiative in this area except in full consultation and discussion with you. Now we have, as I told your Ambassador, restrained some of the more impatient members of our government from making immediate moves in the Middle East. We are confronted constantly with overtures through various channels to the point that we cannot tell who speaks for whom or whether some of these people are just speaking for their own fevered imaginations. In any event, before we act on any information we receive we will discuss it with you and do it in concert with you in a spirit consistent with the principles we have established. We are not now in receipt of any information. But in any event, we will not act on the sly, which was one comment you made.

Mr. Brezhnev: What then are we to do nonetheless?

Mr. Kissinger: First... I don't know what your information is from the Middle East, how you receive it. We receive such floods of informa

tion which are contradictory. We should check with each other to see whether there's any basis for the information received. We'll inform you and you decide whether to inform us and decide what to do. Second, we are prepared to continue to elaborate the principles which the Foreign Minister and I worked out. I have developed, as I mentioned to you, Ambassador, some ideas about the nature of security zones which he asked for.10 Perhaps we could submit them to the Foreign Minister when he comes to Washington on October 2, in some detail plus discuss other principles that we develop here.

Mr. Brezhnev: There's such a flood of information, you never get to the bottom of knowing who's to blame for what.

Dr. Kissinger: And who represents whom. I read in the papers something saying I was supposed to meet Heykal in Munich.11 It was not true, but over the years at least five people have tried to set up a meeting with Heykal, and I don't know if they even represent him. I don't even know who Heykal is. Of course, I know his title, but I don't know what he stands for.

Mr. Brezhnev: You didn't meet him in the elevator?

Dr. Kissinger: That was our cover, and now you know.

Mr. Brezhnev: I agree. I would just then ask you in all seriousness to think over possible ways to act in this problem. We stated our position very well at the last meeting and have not changed. We should not freeze ourselves in the present position. Indeed Foreign Minister Gromyko is coming to your country soon and we expect then you will give us some formulations, ideas on what to do.

Dr. Kissinger: We believe after the election we will be much freer to act than we are now. [Pointing to some photographs of the meeting just handed to Brezhnev by an aide.] If these are pictures, can you sign

them?

Mr. Brezhnev: Not before the end of the Vietnam war. You will get nothing from me until the end of the Vietnam war, not even photographs. I will sell them to the Times. [There is further banter about selling the pictures.] So you agree to discuss with Gromyko some new formulations? Of course I will sign them. [Brezhnev autographs photos.]

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, along the lines we told your Ambassador in Washington about security zones.

Mr. Brezhnev: Just to return to one of the points, not for any discussion, I just want to observe the war in Vietnam places us in a very

10 See Document 34.

11 See footnote 13, Document 30.