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makes uncertain at best the continuation of Waldheim's talks with Pretoria; renewal of his mandate would depend largely on whether the Africans could be persuaded that the South African position at least provides a basis for further talks.

The Waldheim Mandate. Last year the Security Council authorized Waldheim to explore the South African position on Namibia, with a view to bringing it into conformity with the UN position or laying the groundwork for future UN action. Waldheim and his special representative, Alfred Escher, made separate visits to Namibia in 1972. Although the African group was critical of Escher's report on his contacts with Pretoria, it agreed to extend Waldheim's mandate until April 30.

Signs of Change. During April Waldheim met with South African Foreign Minister Muller in Geneva. Waldheim's report on these talks, released May 1, suggests that there has been a real, although modest, advance over Pretoria's earlier policies. For example, the South Africans now state that:

"... desiring to enable the population of South-West Africa to exercise their right to self-determination and independence ... [they] will fully respect the wishes of the whole population of the territory.... South Africa will not impose upon the population of South-West Africa any given system contrary to the wishes of the latter or ... the Charter of the United Nations."

The reference to “the whole population" of the territory, and other undertakings with regard to freedom of speech, travel, and political activity by the inhabitants, are surprising gains over previous South African policies.

The Other Side of the Coin. At the same time, the Waldheim-Muller exchanges have made Pretoria's real intentions highly uncertain, since the assurances given to Waldheim are not compatible with other South African statements and actions. The new South African position, for example, sets no timetable beyond the vague statement that “... it might not take longer than ten years for the population ... to reach the stage where it will be ready to exercise its right to self-determination." Furthermore, the South African Government has introduced legislation in Parliament which would further develop the system of “homelands" for separate tribal groupings in Namibia and has issued proclamations conferring self-government on two such areas this month. It has also set up a government-dominated Advisory Council for the territory.

African Reactions and Their Implications for the US. However forthcoming the South Africans have been in their own terms, African governments are unlikely to find Pretoria's position satisfactory. The Africans will want to postpone UN consideration of Waldheim's report, however, until their foreign ministers and heads of state have had an opportunity to pronounce on it at the forthcoming OAU Summit in Addis Ababa (May 17-28). Thereafter, they will probably press for a Security Council meeting in June, at which they are expected to oppose continuation of the Secretary General's mandate. Instead, the African group may seek international sanctions against South Africa for defying the UN on the Namibia issue. For the US, the immediate problem is whether there are any possibilities for keeping the UN-South African dialogue alive, and if so, whether it can produce any useful results. If not, we may face strong pressures for international enforcement measures against South Africa which would pose serious dilemmas for American policy.

2 Waldheim submitted his report April 30. For action taken in response to Waldheim's report, including the South African response, and other issues relating to Namibia, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1973, pp. 721-729.


Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President's Special
Assistant (Flanigan)'

Washington, July 14, 1973.


US Economic Policy Toward South Africa

US economic policy toward South Africa, the subject of your memorandum to me of June 14, 1973,2 has most recently been addressed in an interagency policy planning paper on that country of March, 1972.3

As stated in the paper, our principal objective is "continued profitable trade with South Africa and maintenance of US investments and access to key resources." Under this objective, our courses of action include neither encouraging nor discouraging any US investment in



Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 744, Country Files, Africa, South Africa, Vol. II. Secret; Noforn.

2 In a June 14 memorandum to Kissinger, Flanigan wrote that Ambassdor Botha was concerned about U.S. economic policy toward South Africa. Flanigan noted the policies enunciated by Newsom before the Diggs Committee on March 27, and added that the policy appeared to have been formulated in 1964. He asked: “Has a recent study of our economic policies concerning South Africa been made, and if so, may I see the conclusions reached?" (Ibid.)

3 Document 71.

South Africa, while making sure US companies are fully aware of the political, social and economic problems associated with South Africa's racial policies and of the public relations problem resulting from investment in South Africa. The paper calls for providing low-profile facilitative services to US exporters and, while continuing present Ex-Im Bank policy with respect to South Africa, remaining alert to possible needs for liberalizing the policy to enable US exporters to meet terms offered by third-country competitors.

These elements of our policy toward South Africa, which reflect the complex strategic, international and domestic considerations involved in US-South African relations are considered currently valid. I have attached for your information a copy of the March, 1972 guidelines pertaining to economic relations with South Africa.

Not attached.


Message From Secretary of State Kissinger to the President's
Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)?

Moscow, October 24, 1974, 1631Z.

Hakto 4. 1. The Department has asked me to send a memo to the White House on the South African question at the UN (Tosec 43).? For obvious reasons, this is a matter best handled orally. I have discussed it with the President and he has agreed with my recommendation that we veto the expulsion of South Africa, if necessary."

2. Warm regards.


Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Trip Files, Box 4, November 1974, Hakto (1). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Immediate. Kissinger was in Moscow for meetings with Brezhnev, Gromyko, and other Soviet officials.

2 Dated October 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D740303–0048)

The Security Council debated the issue of South Africa's expulsion October 18–30. A draft resolution recommending immediate expulsion was not adopted (the United States, United Kingdom, and France voted against the resolution), however, the General Assembly suspended South Africa from the twenty-ninth session on November 12. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1974, pp. 106–117)



Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense
(Clements) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Scowcroft)?

Washington, September 9, 1975.


Assistance for South Africa (C)

(TS) Early last month the Acting Chief of the South African Defense Staff approached Admiral Holloway to request US assistance in the design and construction of an improved maritime command and control system for South Africa. The program proposed would be a phased one involving technical assistance from US commercial contractors, purchase of equipment from US commercial sources and system operation by a new, non-military South African agency. Our involvement would be facilitative only (i.e., to assure issuance of export licenses for commercial equipment and technical advice). No US military participation is contemplated.

(TS) We have examined the proposal (attached) and believe it offers real advantages for US national security at a modest political cost. South Africa's strategic position astride one of the world's key shipping lanes is well known to us all. In a crisis or war situation, access to information generated by such a system could be highly valuable. Further, such cooperation would be certain to enhance US-South African political-military relations and our ability to influence attitudes within the South African military leadership.

(TS) I therefore request your agreement in principle to the initiation of a cooperative surveillance program with South Africa as an exception to our present arms supply policy. If you and State agree, I plan to discuss the proposed program with CIA (less than 1 line not declassified] before informing the South Africans of our willingness to help them acquire the equipment needed to upgrade their maritime surveillance system.

1 Source: National Archives, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-218, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 81. Top Secret.

2 The attached letter from Armstrong to Holloway, June 12, sought U.S. assistance in upgrading South Africa's maritime defenses. The United States would provide technical and material support, [text not declassified] coastal surveillance radars, long-range acoustic sensors, and sensor correlation and analysis centers.

(U) I am also writing to Secretary Kissinger along the foregoing lines. 3


W.P. Clements, Jr.

3 Not found.


Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President

Washington, November 8, 1975.


Cooperation with South Africa on Ocean Surveillance

The purpose of this memorandum is to elicit your decision on our response to a South African initiative for a cooperative agreement in the area of ocean surveillance. The initiative is contained in a letter from the Acting Chief of the South African Defense Staff to Chief of Naval Operations Holloway proposing a bilateral US-South African agreement designed to upgrade South Africa's ocean surveillance capabilities. The letter to Holloway is at Tab A.2

Under the proposed agreement, the United States would agree to issuance of export licenses for the equipment needed to establish an improved ocean surveillance system (e.g., [1 line not declassified) coastal surveillance radars, long range acoustic sensors and data analysis centers). In return, South Africa would provide us with information developed by their improved system. The South Africans reportedly have assured Admiral Holloway that their surveillance system would be operated by a new, non-military South African agency, but its military/ intelligence functions are clear and acknowledged.

Concerning the intelligence benefits of the proposed agreement, the intelligence community as a whole has not addressed the issue, but CIA believes that ocean surveillance information provided by South Africa would be of marginal intelligence value. Soviet naval move

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-218, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 81. Top Secret. Sent for action. This memorandum is on White House stationery.

2 For Tab A, see footnote 2, Document 78.

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