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-An examination of the question of majority rule in Rhodesia, including an assessment of the likelihood and consequences of violent change, the role of major political groups and leadership in black Rhodesia, and the likely role of neighboring states, the USSR, Cuba and the People's Republic of China. The study should also examine possible roles for the OAU and the UN.

-A description of possible scenarios for a settlement of the Namibian problem, including an analysis of the likelihood of increased insurgency and of the internal political groups and leaders in Namibia. The study should also include an examination of: attitudes toward Namibian independence on the part of South Africa and other neighboring African states; the likely Soviet/Cuban role; and the possibilities for increased UN actions to achieve Namibia's independence.

-An analysis of the impact that majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia is likely to have on South Africa, with specific emphasis on its internal policies, and on United States interests in South Africa.

Based upon the foregoing, the study should propose United States goals with regard to Southern Africa and alternative policy optionsboth immediate and longer term-for achieving these goals. The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa and should be submitted to the NSC Senior Review Group by May 21, 1976.2

Brent Scowcroft

2

The study was not completed.

85.

National Security Decision Memorandum 330

Washington, May 6, 1976.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Acting Executive Director, Council on International Economic Policy

SUBJECT

United States Policy on Export-Import Bank Loans for South Africa

The President has reviewed the response to NSSM 236,2 and has approved the recommendation that there be no change in Export-Import Bank policy on loans to South Africa.

Brent Scowcroft

Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 65, NSDM 330. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank.

2 See footnote 3, Document 83.

86.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, August 26, 1976, 1558Z.

212140. Subject: Message from the Secretary to Foreign Secretary Crosland.

1. Please deliver the following message from Secretary Kissinger to Foreign Secretary Crosland:

2. Quote. Dear Tony: I want to express to you our deep concern in the United States that South Africa might be suspended from membership in the IAEA or have its credentials denied at the forthcoming 20th

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Keogh; cleared in AF, EUR, OES, and 10; and approved by Kissinger.

General Conference in Rio, or at the related Board of Governors' meetings.? Such a development would be a serious setback to our continuing efforts to halt further proliferation of nuclear weapons. South African suspension would, in effect, deal a serious blow to our efforts to bring all South African nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. We are planning a strong démarche to IAEA member nations emphasizing the serious consequences which could follow the suspension of South Africa from the IAEA.

We look for parallel action on your part, given the gravity of the problem. I know this will be a tough fight, but it is certainly worth making. Warm regards, Henry A. Kissinger. Unquote.

Kissinger

2 At the September meeting in Rio de Janeiro, the Group of 77 requested a review of South Africa's designation as the member of the Board of Governors from Africa. The South African delegation's credentials were not rejected until September 1979, at the General Conference in New Delhi. (David Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency, p. 93)

3 In telegram 13941 from London, September 3, the Embassy informed the Department of British agreement to join the U.S. lobbying effort against suspension of South Africa from the IAEA. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

Portuguese Africa

87.

Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 28, 1969.

SUBJECT

Call by Portuguese Ambassador on Ambassador Johnson

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Vasco Vieira Garin, Ambassador of Portugal
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary
Mr. Stephen G. Gebelt, Country Officer for Portugal

Ambassador Garin said he wished to welcome Ambassador Johnson back to Washington and had come to pay his respects.

The Under Secretary expressed his condolences on the occasion of the earthquake which occurred in Portugal during the night. The Ambassador said that fortunately there did not appear to have been any fatal injuries in Portugal although there reportedly were some in Morocco. He commented that it was fortunate that this quake had not been as disastrous as the one of 1774 when some 40,000 persons were killed and the city of Lisbon was almost completely destroyed.

Ambassador Garin said that he had followed relations between the United States and Portugal for many years both here in Washington and while serving at the United Nations in New York and he remarked that there were areas of disagreement between our two countries, particularly in respect to Portugal's overseas territories. Noting that Portugal had its "three little Vietnams" (Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea) which were smaller but, nevertheless, bore some resemblance to the United States problem in Vietnam.

The Ambassador said that enough years had now elapsed since the troubles began in Africa to demonstrate clearly that this was not a spontaneous revolt of the peoples in the areas but rather an externally stimulated insurgent action.

In response to questions by the Under Secretary, the Ambassador said that there was evidence of Chinese involvement, via Tanzania in activities within Mozambique, including some very sophisticated weaponry. He said that in Angola, guerrillas were infiltrating from Congo (K) and Zambia. However, as both those countries need the Ben

1

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 PORT-US. Confidential. Drafted by Gebelt (EUR/SPP) and approved in J on March 5.

guela Railway for the export of minerals, they tend to restrain the terrorists. In Portuguese Guinea which the Ambassador said was the most dangerous, there were arms supplied (primarily Soviet or East European) by the Republics of Guinea and Senegal.

The Ambassador said that he considered Portuguese Guinea a dangerous problem for the entire Western world, because it seemed obvious that the Soviets wanted to gain control of Portuguese Guinea and, subsequently, at least one of the Cape Verde Islands. He commented that if he had mentioned ten years before the fact that the Soviets would be in Syria and Alexandria, nobody would have believed him, but they are there now. In the same way, it might seem farfetched to envisage Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands as Soviet-dominated today, but this could very well happen within a few years.

The Ambassador said that the Portuguese considered that with the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands and Portuguese Guinea, Angola and Mozambique, they were contributing significantly to the defense of the Western world. However, faced with an enemy which was being supplied arms and assistance from the communist countries, the Portuguese were denied by the United States any military equipment to defend themselves.? He said that they were even denied spare parts for equipment acquired earlier and the average Portuguese could not understand this and was bitter at such an attitude by an ally which it had assisted. He concluded that he hoped there would be some change in U.S. policy.

The Under Secretary said that he understood the Portuguese position and asked how Portugal's relations were with the new African states.

The Ambassador said that Portugal's relations with Malawi were excellent as well as with Botswana and the other new states in southern Africa. He said that relations with Zambia were tolerable, despite statements made by President Kaunda and others. He expressed the belief that relations with Congo (K) were better and he understood that the Congolese had even raised the possibility of reestablishing diplomatic relations. He said Portugal would be willing to do so but had laid down certain conditions that had not yet been met. He expressed the belief that there was no possibility of improving relations with Tanzania. He said that he was convinced that the Africans looked on the Portuguese differently, for example, than they did on the South Africans (he added quickly that Portugal's relations with the South Africans were excellent although they disagreed on racial policies). He said that in his years at

2 In 1961 the United States suspended military shipments to Portugal on the grounds that Portugal was using arms intended for NATO in its African territories.

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