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Dr. Kissinger: On some of the proposals you have suggested, we disagree. On others we agree; on others we should discuss.

FM Gromyko: When?

Dr. Kissinger: Early November, after the election. Say the 15th or the 14th or the 13th.

Amb. Dobrynin: You will need one week after the election for celebration!

(At 3:45 the meeting ended. Dr. Kissinger had to return to the White House and would come back to the Embassy at 4:15 to pick up the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador and accompany them to Camp David.]

Tab D

U.S. Draft?1

Washington, October 2, 1972.


Guided by the objectives of strengthening world peace and international security:

Conscious that nuclear war could have devastating consequences for mankind:

Motivated by the desire to bring about conditions in which the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war could be reduced and ultimately eliminated:

Proceeding from the basic principles of relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972:

Proceeding from their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations regarding the maintenance of peace, refraining from the threat or use of force, and the avoidance of war, and in conformity with the various agreements to which either has subscribed:

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have agreed the following:

Article I.

The United States and the Soviet Union solemnly declare that their goal is to create international conditions and obligations that will remove the danger of nuclear war. Accordingly they will work toward the establishment of binding obligations whereby the use of nuclear weapons would be effectively precluded.

21 Secret. The date is handwritten.

Article II.

The United States and the Soviet Union agree that the fulfillment of the undertakings referred to in Article II presupposes effective elimination of the threat or use of force in international relations generally: and, in particular, the effective elimination of the threat or use of force in relations between themselves, by one party against the allies of the other and by either party against third countries.

Article III.

Consistent with Articles I and II, the United States and the Soviet Union will make every effort to ensure that actions by third countries, including military conflicts involving states not parties to this Declaration, will not result in a nuclear war.

Article IV.

Nothing in this Declaration shall affect the obligations undertaken by the parties toward other states, or any obligations assumed under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Nothing in this Declaration shall affect the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as provided in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.


Memorandum for the President's File

Camp David, October 2, 1972.


The President
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The conversation began with social talk comparing Camp David to resorts in the Caucasus, and also on the subject of General-Secretary Brezhnev's forthcoming visit to the United States.

The President opened the conversation by saying we had to lay the groundwork for a successful visit by the General-Secretary in May. On the nuclear-use treaty we could find an agreement. The President wanted the Foreign Minister to tell the General-Secretary that the U.S. side set it as a goal. We also had to work on the Middle East early in the next term and simultaneously with the nuclear-use issue. With respect to the Middle East, the U.S. would like significant progress made before the May meeting. After the election we would have a mandate to move forcefully in this field. We could not leave the problem unsolved. We had to grapple with the problem early. The President was taking personal responsibility in these three areas—in SALT, on the Middle East, and on the nuclear treaty.

Foreign Minister Gromyko then said he wanted to thank the President for setting out his views so clearly. We could say, on the Brezhnev visit, on his behalf, there were real possibilities for this visit, growing out of developments since the summit. The visit of Dr. Kissinger to Moscow had been very helpful. The General Secretary was preoccupied with the conditions that would surround his visit, and the President's statement now meant that an impasse would not be permitted. The Soviet side believed that the obligations of the two powers in the document should be stronger than in the basic document of principles. (The Foreign Minister, in effect, made the Brezhnev visit conditional on the nuclear treaty.)


1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. This meeting took place from 5:32 to 6:32 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) In a letter to Brezhnev, September 21, thanking the Soviet leader for the hospitality shown Kissinger in Moscow and reaffirming plans to invite Brezhnev to the United States, Nixon wrote by hand at the bottom of the letter: “I shall show Foreign Minister Gromyko the accommodations we are preparing at Camp David for you + your party. It should be beautiful there in May.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13)

The Middle East was also significant, the Foreign Minister continued. A solution was in the long-term interest of both the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet side was not guided by momentary considerations. They were not satisfied with the present state of affairs in the Middle East. They would take note of what we could and could not do before November, but we should be guided by the long-term interests of both countries. We should have a practical approach. If there was no progress it would pull our relations back. Here too it had to be found that withdrawal from Arab territories was essential. Both sides had to be prepared to exercise joint efforts.

The conversation then turned to Vietnam. The Foreign Minister said the Soviet side was convinced it was an acute problem in relations between our two countries. It had a great influence on our relations. If the problem was removed, this could improve U.S.-Soviet relations.

The President said he wanted to cover this subject privately. When Dr. Kissinger next went to Paris he would lay on the table a comprehensive proposal to settle the war. If the U.S. were dealing with the Soviet Union, we would be able to settle this next week. This would be our final proposal, the President emphasized. It would be the ultimate, the last offer we could make. If the other side said no, then the negotiation track was closed. We would then have to turn to some other methods, the election having been concluded. It was our final proposal, he repeated.

Foreign Minister Gromyko replied with some laudatory words about Dr. Kissinger's role in the negotiations. The conversation then ended.

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The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
US Position on the Soviet UN Proposals for Non-Use of Force and Prohibition of

the Use of Nuclear Weapons-
The President has directed that a study be prepared on US ap-
proaches in dealing with the Soviet proposal for a General Assembly
Resolution on the renunciation of the use of force and the prohibition of
the use of nuclear weapons. The study should include a brief review of
the background to this issue, including previous Soviet proposals on
this issue in the UN or otherwise, proposals by other countries, perti-
nent UN Resolutions, and past US positions. In addition, the study
should set forth the current US positions for handling this item, the atti-
tude of UN members, and options that the US might adopt for dealing
with the issue in the UN. The study should include a brief analysis of

a Soviet motives and objectives in submitting their proposal and the consequences of its adoption.

This study should be developed by an Ad Hoc Group, chaired by a representative of the Department of State, and comprised of representatives of the addressees of this memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council Staff. The study should be forwarded to the Senior Review Group by October 11.

Henry A. Kissinger

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Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-207, NSSM 151-NSSM 200. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the JCS. Sonnenfeldt forwarded the NSSM to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, September 30, which reads: “As you requested, we have asked for a quick interagency paper on this issue.” (Ibid., Box H-194, NSSM 162)

2 See Document 52.

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