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Clements: It's a calculated risk. You're including what's in the budget process now?
Kissinger: Our only concern is that we do what is necessary to win. It is a mistake to consistently try to see how we can get by with the minimum expenditure.
Colby: If we use (dollar amount not declassified) now, then in the next few months we will need another (dollar amount not declassified) and we will end up with nothing in the Reserve. We can't get a supplemental.
Clements: (1 line not declassified]
Kissinger: I'll talk to the President tonight. If the decision is to approve (dollar amount not declassified) now, can you put the armored vehicles on the ship?
Kissinger: I'll tell the President that there is no use to ante (dollar amount not declassified) unless we go get another (dollar amount not declassified) for Angola.
Clements: Bill, have you talked to your Congressional contacts about this?
Colby: Yes, I've briefed them.
Kissinger: (To Colby) Can you get together a white paperớ to show what funds have been dispersed by the Soviets and Yugoslavs for the MPLA?
Colby: Yes, that might be helpful to show Congress.
Kissinger: People in my Department worry because there's not much of a coalition. If a coalition bothers them, there's the MPLA.
Colby: Talk federation—they can work that out.
4 See Document 126. 5 Not further identified. 6 Not found.
Hyland: We can't do much until Roberto/Savimbi stop the MPLA.
Sisco: The Portuguese Communists will try to work something out with Neto.
Kissinger: That's why we must back a coalition.
126. Memorandum for the Record
Washington, August 21, 1975.
40 Committee Actions
Following the discussion at a 40 Committee meeting on 20 August 19752 the Chairman of The 40 Committee raised the question of additional funding of Angola operations with higher authority. The latter approved an additional expenditure of [less than 1 line not declassified] and authority for the Director of Central Intelligence to initiate action to obtain an appropriation of (less than 1 line not declassified) in anticipation of continuing operational requirements.
Rob Roy Ratliff Executive Secretary The 40 Committee 127. Memorandum for the Record
1 Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Distributed to Clements, Sisco, General Brown, and Colby.
2 See Document 125.
Washington, September 13, 1975, 9 a.m.
40 Committee Meeting, 13 September 1975, 9:00 a.m.
Members Present: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco; Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby.
Substitute Members Present: Lt. General H. M. Fish, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Assistance, vice Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements; Lt. General W. Y. Smith, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vice JCS Chairman General Brown.
Also Present: Director of INR William Hyland; Deputy Director of
Kissinger (to Colby): Will you give us a briefing?
Kissinger: I notice in your paper that you say the effect of our arms shipments has not been fully felt.Considering that the ship only arrived yesterday, that sounds like a cautious statement.
Colby: Well, there have been air shipments.
Colby: (Referring to chart) This shows where Soviets are sending in more.
Kissinger: Where does it say that?
Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only.
2 Briefing is not attached.
Horan: We've had reports recently about the Soviets sending tanks, and that may be confused with armored cars.
Potts: This information is from our own reports.
Kissinger: Is that because the MPLA can't read? What do the colors mean?
Scowcroft: Henry, in case you didn't know, those are all different colors.
Colby: We have several policy questions.
Kissinger: Before we get to those, let me ask: Will our arms shipments make any
difference? Colby: The main function is to replace arms that Mobutu has already issued.
Potts: Yes. Some of it will go directly to Angola.
Fish: But American arms are not to be transferred into Angola. The shipment will really be to help Mobutu.
Kissinger: Let's not delay.
Fish: Your paper says you will not send American arms into Angola.
Nelson: Let's make a distinction there. We have sent some American arms into Angola. We are drawing a line between recent stuff and World War II-type items.
Kissinger: What are we saying—that the Soviets can send arms in, but we can't?
Colby: We have a problem with Congress and the public.
Colby: Publicly—if it became public knowledge that we were sending American arms in.
Kissinger: And what would that do?
Colby: There would be a great uproar about CIA getting involved in a war.
Kissinger: There could be an uproar about CIA not doing anything to block the Communist takeover of an African nation.
Colby: What we'd like to do is to send arms.
Smith: But the question is, can they use them?
Colby: We've got to give them training. We'll get money in there so they can get the necessary training. (less than 1 line not declassified)
Kissinger: American training-that's what bothers me. Can't we get other nationalities?
Colby: Savimbi doesn't want Portuguese, but he would accept Americans.
Kissinger: Can't we get other Europeans?
Kissinger: I'm worried about U.S. training involvement, what with the specter of Vietnam. I am not worried about American arms.
Potts: [1 line not declassified]
Kissinger: I think we can get away with American weapons. That doesn't bother me. I fail to see the rationale that Soviets can but we can't—that we have no moral right to respond to the Soviet intrusion in Angola.
Cutler: Well, this could adversely affect our other programs we are trying to get through the Congress, including the aid package.
Fish: If someone raises hell, they could argue that we should stop all aid to Zaire because they transshipped American arms.
Scowcroft: Well, this isn't MAP material.
Sisco: There's a very simple issue here. We are supporting Mobutu who is intervening in a war, publicly. As our role becomes more exposed, how far are we going to go? I'd like to hear from Bill (Colby) what's going to happen next-in the next three or four weeks.
Colby: There's no good news. Zaire is going to become more involved ...
Kissinger: The Americans' masochism is beyond all help. The Soviets gave maximum aid and turned a minor movement into a dominant one. Angola's neighbors see this and see that the Soviets can do this, but the U.S. can't. Then to say that Mobutu is intervening ...
Colby: I think the major force with which we have to work is the UNITA.