tons of U.S. grain remains to be shipped under existing authorizations. The total import need will be about 175,000 tons a month.

The time frame for further decisions is set by the fact that Pakistan's six-month moratorium on repaying debts to aid donors runs out in October. Pakistan's foreign exchange position now appears likely to hold until then. But at that point Pakistan will, through the aid consortium, seek relief either via formal acquiescence in the moratorium or via an IMF drawing which would require supporting aid from donor governments. Such aid would require some development framework, and the Pakistanis are aiming to present an interim development framework concentrating on rehabilitation in East Pakistan. That may well not satisfy either the World Bank/IMF or the other aid donors. The US may well be alone in proposing support unless the situation in East Pakistan shows improvement.

Military Supply

Because military supply procedures are intricate, it helps in understanding where the present situation stands to understand the three avenues through which Pakistan has procured military equipment

here:

1. Under our Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, Pakistan has been able to buy some equipment directly from US military depots. In these cases, Defense maintains control over the equipment until it is turned over to a Pakistani shipping agent at the depot gate.

2. Also under the FMS program, where equipment is not immediately available in US stocks, Defense has put a private US supplier under contract to furnish equipment directly to Pakistani shipping agents. In these cases, Defense control over the equipment is limited once the supplier accepts the contract.

3. Apart from the FMS program, the Pakistani procurement mission here can make its own contracts directly with the supplier. Defense is not involved at all.

In addition, it is important to understand the two controls that have been used to limit shipments since the outbreak of fighting in East Pakistan:

1. All Munitions List equipment-regardless of the channel through which it is procured-requires an export license issued by the State Department.

2. In addition, equipment in the first category above equipment supplied under the FMS program from US depots—is subject to administrative controls within the Defense Department.

When fighting broke out in East Pakistan on March 25, the first tentative decision was to establish an administrative hold on equipment still within US Government jurisdiction but not to touch equipment

which had already been turned over to a Pakistani shipping agent or was being handled directly between a US supplier and the Pakistani government.

This meant: (a) no new export licenses would be issued, but valid ones (good for one year) would be honored until they expired; (b) equipment in US depots would be administratively held. This left the following equipment moving: any equipment for which a license had been issued and which was under Pakistani jurisdiction, either because a US depot had turned it over to a shipping agent before early April or because the Pakistanis were procuring it directly from a supplier.

The rationale behind this distinction was that administrative actions over equipment within US Government jurisdiction could be explained for a time as bureaucratic delays, but establishing control over equipment within Pakistani jurisdiction would have had conveyed all the political signals of a full embargo. Those were signals we wanted to avoid.

It has been difficult to know exactly what the effect of these partial controls would be on the actual flow of equipment because the accounting is so diversified through the Defense system and out into the commercial market.

What is clear now is that our policy has become more restrictive simply with the passage of time because licenses which were good for one year continue to expire. When Secretary Rogers wrote you on our military supply options in June,2 it was estimated that equipment up to a value of $34 million might legally be shipped under valid licenses but-because some of that was under administrative hold-the value of actual shipments possible would have been less. By mid-July, further refinement of the list which took into account the expiration of licenses set the outside figure at $15 million under valid license, although again the amount free of administrative controls would have been less. The passage of another month is expected to reduce the amount that Pakistan could, by mid-August, still pick up anew from US suppliers to just under $5 million (in addition to $9.5 million in sonar equipment licensed commercially for vessels being built in the UK).

On the other side of the ledger, we do not know how much equipment Pakistani shippers may already have picked up before licenses expired and have in transit. Some shipments could continue to show up from time to time, but the amount is not thought to be large. The results of this policy are twofold:

1. The Pakistanis have played along with the administrative game and have not made an issue of our restrictions. It was clear when I was

2 See Document 78.

in Islamabad that they were grateful that the US had not taken the formal step of imposing an embargo. The loss of military supplies bothers the military, but to Yahya it seems at least as important that the US has not joined others in condemning him.

2. The Indians and the Congress have objected sharply to our not imposing a total embargo. The fact that very little equipment is actually moving now under present policy does not satisfy them. There are widely supported moves in the House and Senate to cut off both military and economic (except relief) assistance to Pakistan until you determine that most of the refugees are able to return home. If we hold out against embargo, we could suffer restriction on the more important economic aid for a small amount of equipment (plus the principle of avoiding embargo).3

As a product of two SRG discussions I would expect to have for you very soon a game plan covering our policy on these two issues as well as on the other elements of the South Asian problem.+

4

Nixon and Kissinger discussed this memorandum in a telephone conversation at 5:25 p.m. on August 3. Kissinger said that they, by which he meant Indians and critics of Pakistan in the Congress, were asking for an embargo on arms and economic assistance to Pakistan. "The extreme people want to cut off everything" he said, and concluded "on relief we have a fighting chance but arms itself is hopeless." In considering how to work around pressure for an embargo on arms shipments to Pakistan, Nixon asked about future export licenses. Kissinger's advice was: "Fudge it;" indicate that no licenses were being authorized "at this time." Nixon concluded: "We will evaluate as it goes along. We will have to take the heat on this." (Transcript of a telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 369, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) There is also a tape recording of the conversation among the White House tapes but it is difficult to understand. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, August 3, 5:25-5:31 p.m., Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 270-14)

4

* Nixon highlighted this paragraph and wrote "OK" in the margin.

114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India1

Washington, August 6, 1971, 1807Z.

143415. Strictly Eyes Only for Ambassador Keating and Chargé Sober from the Secretary.

1. I am increasingly concerned at public and intelligence indications that both Indian and Pakistani governments are beginning to feel war may be inevitable and are tending to act on that assumption. Pak and Indian air forces are on alert. Government of West Bengal has been informed that after August 15 it may not rely on presence of Indian army troops for internal security purposes. Bangla Desh guerrillas appear to hope to mount major offensive in September. Cross-border shelling by both Indians and Pakistanis has increased as has tempo of guerrilla activity which is shifting from sabotage to direct attacks on West Pakistani forces. In addition Indian rejection of UN presence on its side of border and efforts to exclude foreign relief workers from refugee areas suggest greater Indian sensitivity about activities in these

areas.

2. With these indications of rising danger in view you should seek early opportunity to meet with Foreign Minister or Foreign Secretary to express our continued concern at dangers of situation and our hope GOI will continue to act with utmost restraint. Specifically you should ask GOI to take no action which would exacerbate situation and to use its influence with Bengali guerrilla forces to prevent creation of situation in which guerrilla activities could lead to hostilities. We would hope GOI would refrain from public statements which would raise level of tension and would make no military deployment which might seem to be provocative.

3. You may also tell Foreign Minister that we are making equally strong appeal in Islamabad and are well aware that restraint is not merely question for one side alone. We recognize that in cases of border incidents both sides must act with restraint and we are so informing GOP. You should stress in your presentation our view that war is in no one's interests in area.

Rogers

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Quainton (NEA/INC) on August 3; cleared by Peter Constable (NEA/PAF), Van Hollen, Johnson (U), and Haig; and approved by Rogers. Repeated to Islamabad. According to an August 4 memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, Kissinger also cleared the telegram. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 570, Indo-Pak War, South Asia, 1/1/71-9/30/71)

115. Telegram From the Consulate General in Calcutta to the Department of State1

Calcutta, August 7, 1971, 1220Z.

2280. Subject: Meeting With AL Rep. Reference: Calcutta 2230.2

Summary: In discussion with ConGen PolOff, Awami League MNA reiterated points made reftel and reaffirmed that (despite propaganda to the contrary) AL leaders are unanimous in desire for compromise settlement with GOP. He said, in approaching ConGen, he acting under specific instructions of Bangladesh Minister who hopes to convince USG to initiate negotiations with GOP which will lead to a meeting of interested parties and peaceful settlement of current impasse. He said Bangladesh military forces building to strength of two "conventional" divisions (plus guerrillas) when this level is reached they plan to seize and hold territory in East Bengal. End summary.

1. On August 7 PolOff met again with Awami League MNA from Comilla, Qazi Zahirul Qaiyum, who reaffirmed that he had contacted ConGen under specific instructions of Bangladesh Foreign Minister Khandakar Moshtaqyr Ahmed. In reiterating points made reftel, Qaiyum gave special emphasis to two of them: US is only country capable of successfully arranging settlement, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman must be a party to such settlement. He said that if Mujib is tried and executed, prospects for a compromise "will be zero." Other AL leaders including BD Cabinet members have "no authority, no control over the masses," and thus they would be unable to negotiate compromise. On other hand, any compromise negotiated by Mujib would be accepted by the people, even including a return to the status quo ante. He said refugees would go home under any settlement approved by Sheikh Mujib. Qaiyum thought USG was following correct policy in allowing limited arms shipments to Pakistan, as this would make it easier for USG to approach GOP on question of political settlement.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent to New Delhi.

2 Telegram 2230 from Calcutta, July 1, reported on a meeting between Awami League representative Qazi Zahirul Qaiyum and a political officer from the Consulate General. Qaiyum told the officer that Awami League leaders feared the consequences of a war between India and Pakistan and were concerned that extremist elements would take over the Bangladesh movement if guerrilla warfare in East Pakistan was protracted. Consequently, they were interested in a political settlement and were prepared to back away from their demand for total independence. Qaiyum proposed a meeting of representatives of the Awami League, Pakistan, the United States, and India to work out a settlement, but he stipulated that Mujibur Rahman's participation was an essential prerequisite. (Ibid.)