of the pupils; but regulations for that purpose have been sustained as not beyond the proper powers of such boards.' On the other hand, it is held equally competent for the governing board of a school to exclude the reading of the Bible therefrom: all sects and denominations of worshipers being equal before the law, none of them can demand as a right to have its sacred book read in the schools supported by the State, against the judgment of the governing board to whose direction the State has entrusted them. It is unfortunate that it ever becomes necessary to make such decisions, or that the schools where those who are to govern their country receive their training should be exposed in any degree to sectarian controversy.'

Rights in the Learned Professions. No one has any right to practice law or medicine except under the regulations the State may prescribe. To practice in the courts or to practice medicine is not a privilege of citizenship, and is therefore neither given nor protected by or under the Civil Rights act of Congress or the new amendments to the Constitution. The privilege

may be *given to one sex and denied to the other, and [*290] other discriminations equally arbitrary may doubtless be established. But with the right to officiate as religious teacher the State has no concern as long as the customary police regulations of the State are observed. It is a part of the religious liberty of the people that their religious teachers shall be chosen in their own mode, without State intervention, and that any one who can obtain hearers may teach in his own way. The mem

'Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 376. In this case pupils were required to read portions of the Scripture against the objection and protest of their parents. To like effect is Spiller v. Woburn, 12 Allen, 127.

* Board of Education v. Minor, 23 Ohio, (N. 8.) 211.

Whatever authority the governing board of a school possess cannot be delegated to others; for example, they cannot empower a teacher to employ his assistant when the law vests the power in the board. State v. Williams, 29 Ohio, (N. s.) 161.

4 See Bradwell v. State, 55 Ill. 535; S. C. 16 Wall. 130; Matter of Goodell, 39 Wis. 232; Ex parte Spinney, 10 Nev. 323. As to State regulation of of the practice of medicine, see Dogge v. State, 17 Neb. 140; State v. Deal, 25 W. Va. 1. The right to practice cannot be refused without giving applicant an opportunity to be heard. State v. State Med. Ex. Board, 32 Minn. 321; Gage v. Anson, 63 N. H. 92. A woman may not practice law. In re Leonard, 12 Oreg. 93; Robinson's Case, 131 Mass. 376; Contra, in re Hall, 50 Conn. 131.

bers of none of the learned professions have any special privileges the violation of which by individuals can well constitute an actionable wrong. The attorney has a certain privilege from arrest while attending court in the discharge of professional duty, but a disregard of this privilege would be remedied, not by suit, but by an application to the court for his discharge. The unnecessary execution of process against a clergyman while he was in the discharge of his duties in the pulpit or in any religious gathering, would be highly censurable, and possibly, in a gross case, subject the officer to an action, either at the suit of the clergymen or of the religious organization whose worship was needlessly disturbed.

Religious Liberty. Having in a previous chapter defined religious liberty,' nothing more seems requisite to indicate what would constitute invasions. Individual wrongs generally consist in disturbance of religious meetings, or in some other act which would be a wrong independent of any question of the liberty of conscience or of worship. If a clergyman is assaulted in the pulpit, this is but an assault, though the time and the place may aggravate the wrong; if a religious meeting is disturbed, the right of citizens to assemble for any lawful purpose is violated, and any civil redress would be the same with that which would be sought had the meeting been for political, business, or social purposes. Voluntary religious organizations are formed at the will of the associates undisturbed by the State; incorporated societies can only be formed at the will of the State and under

its laws. But when formed they must be left to man[*291] age their *own affairs in their own way, without the

interference of the State to control them. The point at which the State may lawfully interfere is where these organizations disregard property rights of their members, or the rights acquired by contract; and when this occurs they become amenable, like all other organizations and individuals, to the ordinary State jurisdiction. And there is a disregard of rights when

'Ante, p. 33.

2 Silsby v. Barlow, 16 Gray, 329; Anderson v. Brock, 3 Me, 243; Meth. Ep. Church v. Sherman, 36 Wis. 404; Ferraria v. Vasconcelles, 23 Ill. 456; Hale o. Everett, 53 N. H. 9; S. C. 16

Am. Rep. 82; Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N. Y. 243; Atwater v. Woodbridge, 6 Conn. 223; Worrell c. First Presb. Ch. 23 N. J. Eq. 96.

3 See Harmon v. Dreher, 1 Speers Eq. 87; Dieffendorf v. Ref. Cal. Ch.,

lawful members are expelled or refused participation in the privileges of the organization, for reasons which the rules or usages to which they have expressly, or by implication given assent would not recognize, or in disregard of forms which the rules or usages have made necessary, or when the purpose of the organization is perverted by radical changes without general con

Equality of Right. Every person is entitled to have his rights tested by the same general laws which govern the rest of the political society. The liberty of a pauper or supposed pauper cannot be entrusted to the discretion of an overseer of the poor or other ministerial or administrative officer; the apprenticing of whites and blacks must be under the same general regulations; and the supposed insane must have the same right to a judicial hearing with all others. And no doubt any legislation which undertakes to regulate or abolish the evil of persons roaming about the country under a false pretence of seeking

employment, must give them the same opportunity for trial as other persons accused of vagrancy are entitled to.

[*292] *Exceptional Burdens. One of the most important of civil rights is the right to require that public burdens shall be impartially distributed, and the right to resist those which touch the individual unequally and unfairly. Of unequal burdens, those of unequal taxation and unequal requirement of military service may furnish suitable illustrations. But on these subjects all that can be required is, that the laws be impartial and be fairly administered; inequality in their operation being unavoidable. An impartial law for military service will be likely to provide that all able-bodied male persons between certain ages shall be liable to be summoned for actual duty, and that from a list of these the number required shall be drawn by lot. Under such a law no one is wronged who has the fortune to be drawn while his neighbor escapes. In Great Britain, until recently, when recruits for the navy were needed, it was allowed by immemorial custom to send out a press-gang with authority to seize upon sailors wherever found, and by force to place them upon ships of war, where they would be compelled to perform military service. Such an authority is invidious and arbitrary, and wholly inadmissible in this country.'

The right to be exempt from unequal taxation is, as between the States, one of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.' It is incompetent, therefore, to assess and tax the property of a non-resident higher than that of residents. It is equally incompetent to discriminate between residents, either by overvaluing the property of the one or by undervaluing the property of the other, or by omitting the one or his property altogether from the roll, or by any other act of omission or commission which produces inequality. The principal in these cases is plain, but the application is sometimes difficult. Where taxation is based upon an assessment of property, the assessors have judicial functions to perform, and it is always presumed, that they have performed them honestly and to the best of their judg ment. It is therefore generally held that they are not liable to a private action at the suit of an aggrieved party who complains

1 Cooley, Const. Lim. 299.

2 Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371, 380; Wiley v. Parmer, 14 Ala.

627; Scott v. Watkins, 22 Ark. 556; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 268.

that he is overtaxed in consequence of their unequal *assessment. A remedy for the injustice in such a case [*293] must be sought in a suit to set aside the tax, or to reduce

it to its proper proportions; and this may be done if it be made. to appear that the assessors have been governed by improper motives, and not by their judgment, in making their valuations." The tax-payer may hold the assessors liable only when they have acted without jurisdiction, or perhaps where, through neglect of duty, they have deprived the tax-payer of some important privilege; such, for instance, as the right to be heard on a review of the assessment. They act without jurisdiction if they assess persons or property not within the territorial limits for which they can act, or if they spread upon the roll a larger sum than has been lawfully voted or ordered. In these cases the tax-payer may either proceed against the officers responsible for the excess of jurisdiction, or, he may pay the tax under compulsion or protest, and then recover it back of the town, county, etc., to which it is subsequently paid over." He may also resist the collection of the tax, and hold the collector responsible as a trespasser if the want of authority appears in the list or warrant which constitutes the collector's authority, but not otherwise.

For any injustice which may be done to citizens through the selection by law of the objects of taxation, there can be no remedy whatever, except the political remedy, to be worked out through a repeal or modification of the law. Every system of taxation must be more or less arbitrary in its selection of methods, and of the objects upon or in respect to which burdens shall be laid, and the judiciary can give no relief from the incidental injus

'Weaver . Devendorf, 3 Denio, 117. The subject will be referred to in another chapter.

Lefferts . Calumet, 21 Wis. 688; Milwaukee Iron Co. v. Hubbard, 29 Wis. 51; Merrill v. Humphrey, 24 Mich. 170; Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Pollak, 75 Ill. 292; Ottawa Glass Co. . McCaleb, 81 Ill. 556; Wright . Railroad Co. 64 Geo. 783.

See Thames Manuf. Co. v. Lathrop, 7 Conn. 550.

4 Mygatto. Washburn, 15 N. Y. 316; Libby v. Burnham, 15 Mass. 144;

Grafton Bank v. Kimball, 20 N. H. 107; Cooley on Taxation, 553, 554.

As to what is a compulsory payment of a tax, see Boston, &c., Glass Co. v. Boston, 4 Met. 181; Atwell v. Zeluff, 26 Mich. 118; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio, (N. 8.) 534; Taylor v. Board of Health, 31 Penn. St. 73; Howard v. Augusta, 74 Me. 79; Ruggles v. Fond du Lac, 53 Wis. 436; Westlake. St. Louis, 77 Mo. 47; Peyser v. Mayor of New York, 70 N. Y. 497.