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ledge of these facts, though it was probable | concluded, he should say a few words as that, if the Allies had thought proper to continue their attack upon him, they might have succeeded, yet the struggle would have been formidable, and its result doubtful. It was, therefore, matter of serious consideration, whether they should not accede to an arrangement which would at once end the struggle which would bring all the marshals into obedience to the provisional government stop the effusion of blood, which was always so desirable to avoid-secure the great objects for which the Allies had entered France; and, above all things, preventa civil war from arising in that country. Under those circumstances was the Treaty of Fontainbleau agreed to by the two Sovereigns then at Paris. When his noble friend who was then in France (viscount Castlereagh) knew that the Allies had entered Paris, he proceeded to that capital, and learnt that the Treaty of Fontainbleau had been entered into with Buonaparté, and expressed his strong disapprobation of it. But having been convinced by the representations of the Sovereigns who had concluded that Treaty, that it had been the only means open to them for putting an end to the contest, and to avoid a civil war in France; and being of opinion that the words of the allied Sovereigns being pledged, they had no alternative but to abide by that Treaty; he consented to accede conditionally to that engagement. That accession could not be unconditional, as we had never acknowledged Napoleon as the Emperor of the French. We,therefore, did not accede to such part of the Treaty as continued his title of Emperor, nor such part as regarded the pecuniary arrangement; but to the part which guaranteed the sovereignty of Elba to Napoleon, and the dochies of Parma and Placentia to the daughter of the Emperor of Austria. The peculiar circumstances under which the Treaty of Fontainbleau was entered into, not only afforded justification to the allied Powers who concluded it on one part, but were most material in the view of another subject before the House. That Treaty was concluded with a person with arms in his hand, which gave him an option to conclude it or to continue the contest:-as he had chosen to agree to that Treaty, having embraced the alternative, he was bound in all the principles of good faith to adhere to it.

Having stated thus much as to the circumstances under which the treaty was

to the manner in which it had been exe-
cuted. It had been asked, why precau-
tions had not been taken to prevent the
escape of Buonaparté from Elba. It was
to be recollected, that the individual in
question was not to be considered in any
degree as a prisoner in Elba: the sove-
reignty of the island had been conferred
on him; and to look on him in any other
light, would be in contravention of the
Treaty which had been concluded with
him. He should not enter into the merits
of that part of the arrangement. It had
been said that Elba was an improper
place for Buonaparté: but in what view
was it stated to be improper? Not as
connected with any thing relating to
France, but on account of the superior
means of escape which it afforded. He
did not know whether it did afford such
means in a superior degree; but if
they adverted to the circumstance, that
in whatever situation he was placed, he
must, according to the treaty, be at liberty,
they would see, that in whatever place he
was put, he might have escaped from it.
As to the precautions which had been
taken, he should merely observe, that the
whole of the British fleet could not have
effectually blockaded the island so as to
have prevented an escape; but so far as
was consistent with the spirit of the
Treaty, the object had not been neglected,
and an understanding existed (as had
been explained by a noble friend of his
in another place) that the commanders of
the vessels should prevent any attempt to
escape as far as was possible. With
respect to the character of the British
officer attached to Buonaparté at Elba
(sir Neil Campbell), and who was absent
at the time of his escape, it was but just
to say that there was nothing improper
in a temporary absence from the island;
neither could it be said, even had he con.
tinued in Elba, while the military power
and the police of the island was in the
hands of the man who had made an
escape, that he would have been able to
have prevented it. Indeed, the case of
other individuals who were in the island
when the plan of escape was put into
execution, proved the contrary.
bargo was laid on all vessels the day be-
fore the escape took place, and some in-
dividuals, who were suspected, were put
under restraint until the plan had been
put into execution. As to the supposition
that any breach of the treaty had been

An em

committed by the king of France, he could positively deny that any such breach had taken place on the part of that monarch. The pecuniary article of the Treaty, taken in its literal sense, could not have been violated, because, as the annual payment of a certain sum was stipulated for, it was clear that the first payment could not yet have become due. Neither could it be said that any breach had taken place of the Treaty, unless a representation had first been made to the Allied Powers, and they had refused to compel the fulfilment of it. But it was not necessary to argue at length, that no breach had taken place in the Treaty. The proclamations of Buonaparté proved, that it was not on account of any violation of the Treary of Fontainbleau that he had made his attempt; but he professed that he meant to violate, on the first opportunity, this Treaty, and to resume his power, which he had sacrificed when he had no other alternative but to do so, with the intention of recovering it. On the first proposition, therefore, there could be no ground for doubt, that the spirit and effect of the Treaty of Fontainbleau, of the Treaty of Paris, and the preamble on which it had been founded, had been violated. Those treaties had been concluded on the condition of the absolute renunciation of the crown of France by Napoleon, for himself and his descendants. The resumption of the authority in that country was, therefore, a distinct, positive, and undeniable violation of the Treaty of Paris, and the agreements on which it was founded. If the French nation had recalled Buonaparté, they also would have been a party to that violation-the nation, however, had not recalled him, and he had not that ground to rest on; he had acted in defiance of all the legal authorities in that country.

It was to be remarked, that in all the former revolutions which had taken place in France, during the last twenty-five years, although in reality they were often effected by military force, or by mobs directed by individuals or clubs, yet there had generally been some pretence of a legitimate authority, either a convention, or a national assembly, or a senate; but now the whole transaction had been purely a military act, not referable to any legitimate organ of the public will, but a direct assumption of power by the military force. On the first article of the Message it was not, therefore, necessary for him

to trouble the House farther: it was evident that this country had a just cause of war against Buonaparté wielding the power of France. But he was far from wishing to say, that because a war was just, it should therefore be entered upon. The justice was but one part of the question; another part was, whether the war would be wise, prudent and politic, under the present circumstances of the country. It was impossible to conceal from themselves the dangers with which the recent event threatened this country; it was impossible to conceal from themselves the conduct and character of the person now at the head of the French government, and the events which, during the last eighteen years, that character and conduct had produced. It was impossible to forget. the invasion of so many independent countries-of Spain, of Austria, of Prussia, and of Russia, and the impossibility which seemed to have existed formerly of preserving relations of peace with the individual in question. They could not turn their eyes from the peculiar circumstances under which he had returned to France: he had returned under the protection of the military power, and had professed his object to be to restore the tarnished glory of the French arms. All these considerations were grounds for the most serious apprehensions. He did not, however, wish to pledge the House to any rash, hasty, and inconsiderate declaration, but to place fairly before their minds the alternatives-armed preparation and defence, or active war. Between those alternatives, he requested their lordships not to decide at present, and he requested it for these reasons-because it was a question that involved many circumstances which they could not then have before them. It was not a British question merely, but an European question. It was necessary that the most perfect concert should exist between the British Government and his Majesty's Allies, before any just decision could be formed. It would be therefore an act of imprudence, if at that time he called for any other decision than that which the subject of the Message required. The first point was one on which there could be no difference, viz. that it was expedient that there should be the most intimate concert between this Country and the allied Powers on the Continent. Consistently with this principle it would be necessary to weigh well the interests of the other

powers of Europe, as well as the interests of this country. What his own sentiments were, as far as he was acquainted with those interests, he should think it inconsistent with his duty to state. Whatever that opinion was, he could confidently state that there was no disposition on the part of this Government to drive the Allies into a more extensive war policy than might be consistent with their own sentiments and feelings. After remarking that the House could feel no difficulty in agreeing to the opinion of the Message, that armed preparation was necessary, and that concert with the Allies was desirable, and would be beneficial to the general interest of Europe; his lordship concluded by moving the Address, which was an echo of the Message.

Lord Grenville said, he knew not whether he should have troubled their lordships on the subject of the Address moved by the noble earl, had it not been to remark on the impropriety of any prema ture allusion to points not included in the Message or the Address. If at that time he was to have entered on the considera tion of the policy of that treaty, by which it was hoped the contest in which this country had been engaged was finally terminated-if he had then to examine the loose and negligent stipulations which had produced that dreadful alternative which lay before them-he should have had much to remark; and should have inquired how far any circumstances could have justified the bringing that struggle to a conclusion, by a treaty which, as it now appeared, though he had long strove to hide it from himself, afforded no security whatever against its instant and immediate renewal. If that had been the proper moment, he should have inquired what new plan was it, under which the conduct of gallant officers, in matters affecting their own honour and the interests of the country, was to be regulated, not by instructions-but to rest on an under. standing, loose and undefined, between them and some of the superior officers of the state; whence an accident had hap. pened, which placed before them the alternative of armed and insecure peace, or fierce and doubtful war. But at the present moment, those considerations were foreign to the question before them; and he knew not why the noble earl had called up the remembrance of that negligence of that neglect of the vital interests of the country-which the circum

stances he had referred to betrayed. But being placed as they were in a perilous situation, it was the conduct of men, of Englishmen, to consider, not how we had come into such a state, but what line was to be adopted to extricate ourselves. The Message which had been communicated to the House, and the directions which the Prince Regent declared he had given, he fully approved of-both the measures of concert which had been taken, and that armed and formidable preparation by which the interests of the country had been saved. He had eagerly cherished the hope that the struggle had been brought to a final termination, and had anxiously anticipated the moment when we were to reduce our naval and military establishments; which reduction he thought was due to the past exertions of the country, to the state of our finances, but above all things to the principles of the constitution. It was without reluctance, that at the present moment he gave up all idea of reduction for the present; and he should cheerfully assent to measures which, instead of reducing establishments, would increase the burthens under which the country laboured, but which were, at the same time, indispensably necessary. As to the concert between the Allied Powers, he was persuaded that there was no possible issue by which we could hope for success, but through the road which the Message pointed out to the House and the country-a close, intimate, and cordial connection between this country and the allied powers of the Continent. He hoped, therefore, that every effort would be made to maintain peace and harmony between the different Powers, if it existed; to reestablish it, if it had been unhappily interrupted; and as the most cordial union was to be hoped for among the Allies, as the best security for Europe, so the unanimous feeling of the country was to be encouraged. If he could hope that the voice of an individual could be heard beyond those walls, or even beyond this country, he was most anxious to impress on the House, and he hoped that it would be impressed on foreign powers also, that, now we had again been plunged into that dreadful situation, every state should give up the idea of separate interests. It was to be recollected by all, that they had not to consider whether this or that separate interest might be pursued with hope of success, but that all hope of general safety, as well as the particular interest of

called on to examine the subject, he hoped all the grounds which could with propriety would be laid before them; well assured that as unanimity in Europe was the only hope for the general safety, so the unanimous spirit and opinion of the people of this country was to be regarded as the most effectual security for this country, and the most animating prospect of success in whatever line we sought to pursue.

each state, entirely depended upon the abandonment of every private and particular interest. If he were asked, what for the last twenty-five years had been the general cause that had subjected nearly all the states of Europe to calamities and ruin, and which had enabled the French to carry their triumphant arms from one capital to another,that no government was undisturbed, no country secure, no people safe, the cause, he should answer was, that no arguments, no force of reason, not even the dreadful force of calamitous experience, could inculcate the idea, that not merely a nominal federation, but an intimate union of feeling and purpose among the governments and people could afford safety to any part of Europe from those calamities. No separate interest, therefore, should at such a time be suffered to intrude on the mind of any man, or into the counsels of any state. Having heard the Address which had been proposed by the noble earl, he could not but state, that it met with his entire and cordial concurrence, because it was strictly limited to what circumstances required. It would have been most improper that Parliament should have been called on to decide on the ultimate course to be pursued, till the circumstances by which that course could be properly determined, were communicated to them by the constitutional authority from which they were entitled to receive it. Whenever a perfect concert was established, which might justify such a Message as would put Parliament in possession of the policy which the Powers might think proper to pursue, then would it be for them to decide on the great and difficult question between two dreadful alter, natives. He trusted he should not then be found wanting in duty to his country: his judgment might be erroneous, but it should be founded on the best lights which Parliament might be in possession of; but he should be sorry if any thing had escaped him at present which might be misconstrued (for it could only be misconstrued, if so interpreted,) to convey an opinion on a matter which Parliament had not yet to decide. It had been said, that the question was an European as well as an English question. It was an Eng-ject, it was evident that there were two lish, because it was an European question. He should cheerfully await the decision of the Powers who had deliberated on the common safety of Europe, and each particular state; and when Parliament was

The Marquis Wellesley said, that whatever was the ultimate result of the present calamitous crisis, it could not fail to be animating, amidst the danger which threatened this country and Europe, that the spirit of our people, the valour of our arms, the extent of our resources, had been carried to their utmost pitch; and while we had afforded an example to others, we had saved ourselves, and risen to a height beyond our hopes both in security and glory. He rejoiced also, that in stead of being hurried precipitately into violent acts of war, which would have be trayed real timidity, the more dangerous, because it assumed the garb of courage, they had merely been called on to give credit to his Majesty's ministers for those measures of prudence and precaution which would enable the country to resist the danger in whatever shape it appeared. With these sentiments he should have terminated his observations, but for certain remarks of his noble friend (the earl of Liverpool), which were such that he could not remain silent. The observation to which he particularly alluded was, that we could not expect Europe to subside into a state of peace without some further convulsions. It had been long his opinion, and it was known to be so, that the conduct of Congress had led to the events which we had now to regret; that system (if indeed that could be called a system, which was nothing but an undigested mass of mutilated materials) which the Powers at Vienna had established, had been in his judgment the true cause of the dethronement of the august family of Bour bon. The noble lord had said, that in framing the Treaty of Paris, care had been taken to consult the character and honour of France. In viewing this sub

systems of policy that might be pursued. In the first place, that France should be required to withdraw within her ancient limits; if this principle were adopted, then it ought to be applied equally

ing the duchess of Parma and Placentia, and her son? What steps had been taken to carry them into execution, or had they not been entirely neglected? The Powers of Europe might, perhaps, deem themselves secure; but under any circumstances could it be held wise or prudent not to keep up at least the semblance of justice with regard to those distinguished persons in whose fate France was so deeply inte rested? Was it wise or prudent to afford such a powerful weapon to Buonaparté ? The noble earl had asserted, that the Treaty was made when Buonaparté was at the head of a large force; if so, all who still adhered to his cause must be considered, in some sort, parties to the engage

to all the other governments of Europe: | had been done on the stipulations regard-in the second place, if general changes and distributions of territory were resolved upon, that the same rule should be applied to France that regulated other powers. Had either of these lines of policy been pursued? No: no general system had been acted upon; the mere will and pleasure of the parties was consulted, and the Sovereigns at Vienna had punished one Power because it first entered into the contest with them, and another because it had last quitted the cause which it had espoused. The result had been, that instead of fixing a system of permanent tranquillity and happiness, the labours of Congress had been devoted to establish a system of gross injustice and absolute discordance. The misfortunement; and what could be thought of the with regard to France was, that neither of the two principles he had noticed had been observed: she had been compelled, with a very slight deviation, to retire within her ancient frontiers; she had been severely punished, while other Powers had been aggrandized to an immense extent, and great accessions of territory and strength had been given to those who had, from various causes, become objects of peculiar favour. This it was that had produced so strong a feeling in France against the Bourbons; for the people considered them merely as agents in the hands of foreign Powers, who had made them the instruments of degradation and injustice to the French nation. One of the chief advantages obtained by Buonaparté, and of which he had made such ample use in his declarations, was, that France had been degraded and lowered in the eyes of all Europe, by means of those whom foreigners had placed upon her throne. With respect to what the noble earl had said upon the Treaty of Fontain bleau, he had no difficulty in admitting, that there had been such a contravention of its articles as would justify this country in going to war: we had the right of commencing hostilities; but that was only half our case, since before war was declared, it would be fit to know whether such a measure were prudent and politic. He was, however, by no means disposed to admit all that the noble 'earl had stated upon the subject of the Treaty of Fontainbleau, especially that part in which he had argued that the terms had not been infringed, because the sum agreed to be paid had not yet become due. But even for a moment allowing that assertion, what

combined wisdom of those who not only neglected the proper custody of the person of the individual, but were so careless in the observation of the articles as to enable him to return with a strong semblance of justice on his side? He hoped that the noble earl would, on an early day, fulfil his promise of bringing down a full explanation of all the circumstances of this arrangement, and then the House would have an opportunity of more satisfactorily investigating this point. In the mean time he should express his sincere hope, that any dreadful consequences resulting from a breach of this Treaty, on either side, might be averted, and that it might be attended with the beneficial result of enabling Congress to review the arrange. ments they had made, and without any views of individual aggrandizement to act upon the broad principle of general advantage. As his noble friend who spoke last had well observed, all private and personal interests must be sacrificed to the general welfare; and it was in vain to hope for harmony and union among the Powers of Europe until they consented to look at Europe as a whole, and to legislate for the happiness and tranquillity of that whole. The noble marquis ardently hoped that the aggravated calamities of a new war would be averted, and that the state of peace which we had only contemplated might be realised, for our own welfare, and for the welfare of the rest of Europe; but if it were necessary to recommence hostilities, if its policy were proved, he would say in conclusion, that no man in the country would be found more ready than himself to give every support to the executive government, for the vigorous

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