The argument for bipartisan responsibility is completely devastated by the statement of the late, great Senator from Michigan, Mr. Vandenberg, who on April 16, 1947, stated on the floor of the United States Senate:

"What the policy of the State Department is, I am unable to testify. There is a considerable amount of misunderstanding about the so-called bipartisan foreign policy in this country. I have tried to make that plain on several occasions. It is very narrowly channeled within very specific things, namely, the minor peace treaties in Europe and the activities of the United Nations. I have never been consulted about the Chinese policy or the Pan-American policy or many other policies, and I am not in a position to be an expert witness for the Senator from Nebraska. My information probably is a little more intimate than that of other Senators, but speaking generally, the facts are as I have indicated." 16 11. The risk of precipitating world war III through adoption of a positive program for victory in Korea is no greater now than it was before Administration witnesses have contended that we dare not press to victory in Korea lest we precipitate world war III. But the evidence shows that this risk was considered and debated when our troops were originally ordered into Korea." The risk of another world war is no greater now than it was before. Moreover, the decision to fight aggression in Korea was taken in the face of Soviet warnings that implementation of the Atlantic Pact for the defense of Western Europe would be interpreted as "provocative" by the Soviets and their satellites. This theme was repeated recently in the so-called "peace offer" of Mr. Malik.

This Nation has not hesitated to implement the Atlantic Pact, both with troops and supplies.

It is utterly inconsistent for the administration to take the calculated risk of provoking Russia in Europe and to cower at taking a similar risk in Asia. This is only another contradiction in American postwar diplomacy which confuses our own people and the free people throughout the world.

It appears of infinitely greater importance that the United States-with full UN backing-go ahead and crush the aggression in Korea where the Communists began it.18

12. The Korean conflict is improperly labeled a police action

The administration's attempts to label this bloody war as a "police action" is distinctly misleading. hTe statistics of the conflict prove it is a war of major importance by any historical yardstick.

Total casualties on both sides exceeded 1 million in the first year of the war. American casualties, even using the accounting method by which we differentiate between battle and nonbattle casualties, are close to 200,000 in the first year of the war. The Korean campaign has been the fourth largest war in our Nation's history. The casualties in the first 12 months were greater than the combined total of the four wars of the Revolution, 1812, Mexican, and SpanishAmerican.

It is acknowledged that the joint action of the United Nations in resisting aggression in Korea is unprecedented in modern times. Perhaps new terminology will have to be devised, but nevertheless, as Secretary Acheson was ultimately forced to state, " * * in the usual sense of the word, there is a war.' 99 19 In addition to the suffering, sacrifices, and loss of life, this war, computed on the basis of increased Federal spending in the United States, has cost $10 billion.20

16 Congressional Record, April 16, 1947, p. 3474.

17 The secret agreement between the Soviet and Red China is contrary to the UN Charter and in theory could outlaw Soviet Union. In addition, the provisions of article 103 of the UN Charter state: "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."

To admit that any action that the United Nations takes might provoke Russia to attack the forces of the United Nations is tantamount to admitting that the United Nations, as such, has ceased to be an effective political instrument.

The arguments that our actions will precipitate world war III are not accepted even by Secretary Acheson. He stated before the Foreign Relations Committee upon his return from the Brussels Conference that if a third world war came either in Europe or the Far East it would be started by the Russians. Nothing we could do, he added, would in any way alter the Russian timetable. The whole world looked to

18 Former Secretary of Defense Johnson said: "*

the majesty of strength of the United States to see what we were going to do about this picture" (Hearings, p. 2585).

19 Ibid., p. 2014.

20 Assistant Defense Secretary W. J. McNeil under pressure admitted that the present cost might total this amount (Washington Post, July 8, 1951).

13. Political considerations have prevented full exploitation of American air and naval superiority in the Korean War

We lay no claim to being military experts. However, it appears a matter of common sense that in any kind of warfare, one seeks to bring his maximum power to bear against his enemies' weaknesses.

In Korea, we find an almost exactly contrary strategy has prevailed. Our enemy had the advantage over us in manpower. Our advantage was in the air and on the sea. Yet in this situation our air power was shackled by a political decision against strategic strikes in Manchuria while our sea power was denied, through other political considerations, the opportunity of exploiting its superiority through the imposition of a blockade against the coast of Red China. As Maj. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell stated in this "bizarre war can learn a lot of bad habits." 21

Further:

* * *

we

"The UN decision to restrict us to areas south of the Yalu definitely puts us under wraps and made us work against an inordinate disadvantage."

11 22

14. The immoral policy of killing more Chinese Communists is unlikely to produce victory in Korea or to enhance the stature of the United States in the family of nations

The policy of the United States in Korea, as outlined in the testimony of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and others is that of destroying the effective core of the Communist Chinese armies by killing that government's trained soldiers, in the hope that someone will negotiate.23 We hold that such a policy is essentially immoral, not likely to produce either victory in Korea or an end to aggression. At the same time such a policy tends to destroy the moral stature of the United States as a leader in the family of nations.

War in any form is abhorrent. War means other humane ways of settling disputes have failed. Only a nation without regard for the sanctity of human life could be committed to a policy of prolonged war with no intent at winning a victory. American policy, in every war in which this Nation has engaged, has been designed to win the conflict at the earliest possible moment with the least possible loss of human life-especially American life, but also the lives of those who oppose us.

15. It is difficult to secure information from an administration which is determined to keep the facts from the Congress and the people

In the course of these hearings, numerous important questions about the conduct of our Far East policy were put to witnesses. Repeatedly the witnesses sought to evade the questions, taking refuge in such phrases as, "I can't remember," "I don't recall," or "I will have to look it up."

The American people are aware of the administration's attitude in the past when efforts have been made to secure evidence of dishonesty or subversive activity in our Government."

One of the worst evasions is the story of the "anonymous telegram."

Appearing in the transcript 25 is an utterly fantastic tale. Chairman Russell

states:

"Mr. Secretary [Acheson], I at one time was one of the most enthusiastic advocates of this Government doing everything they possibly could to assist the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in his struggle with the Chinese Communists. The thing that discouraged me more in that position than any other single thing was a telegram from the United States Chamber of Commerce in one of the largest cities of China."

The chairman continued to say that it was presented in executive session the previous year before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and also to the Armed Services Committee.

Secretary Acheson then testified as follows:

"This is a telegram which was sent to us, received by us on the 16th of March 1949, sent through our establishment, from the chamber of commerce of a city

21 Op. cit., p. 3066.

22 Ibid., p. 3091.

23 "From the military point of view we hope that by inflicting severe casualties on the enemy and proving to them that 'they are not invincible, that they cannot gain anything by aggressive action, that it is too costly a matter, that they have been let down by Russia in getting in it, that they will be willing to negotiate a peace with the UN.'" (Gen. Omar Bradley, Hearings, p. 937.)

24 See item 16 following.

25 Hearings, p. 1971.

in China. I have asked that the name of the city not be used because I am advised that we are not sure that the people involved in this are all in a safe place."

The Secretary clearly states: "This is from the chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce." " and then read the long telegram into the record. It was a bitter indictment of the Nationalist regime, containing such statements as: "Through our support of a decadent and ineffectual Nationalist Government, we have, not without a measure of truth, been accused of being party to the rape and eventual abandonment of the large part of China, and the people therein, to communism.'

128

Senator Knowland immediately raised objection to the reading of an anonymous telegram into the record and requested that the signatures be presented." Senator Wiley asked whether the signatures were Englishmen, Americans, or Chinese, to which Secretary Acheson replied, "This was sent from the American Chamber of Commerce in a city," but continued to say, "I do not know whether individuals' names were on it." Yet, when Senator Knowland pursued by asking, "Then it is an anonymous telegram?" the Secretary replied, "Well, no, this is a telegram from the consul saying that the American Chamber of Commerce asked him. * * *" To this, Senator Brewster replied, "You mean there is no name at all?" and the Secretary responded, "I do not know." 30

Senator Knowland pointed out that the telegram might have been sent by a fellow traveler or even a Communist, and it was later disclosed that the city from which the telegram originated was, at the time the telegram was sent, in Communist hands.30

When asked by Chairman Russell the present location of the consul, the Secretary responded, "I will have to find that out, sir." 31

Senator Smith of New Jersey inquired if the source of the telegram was investigated by the State Department in order to establish the reliability of the individuals or the group, and Secretary Acheson replied: "Well, I cannot tell you whether the investigation was made in China."

These rather embarrassing developments led Senator Russell to again explain that the State Department had presented the telegram in executive session of the Armed Services Committee a year or a year and a half ago; that it had "quite an impact on me at the time *** and it made a very vivid impression

Now, we have here the State Department of the United States submitting a telegram which they claim came from the chairman of an American chamber of commerce in an undisclosed city which bitterly attacks our ally, Chiang Kai-shek.

Without knowing whether the communication is signed or whether indeed it had originated from any chamber of commerce and without conducting any investigation to determine the reliability of the informant, the Secretary of State of his own volition, at the time when our ally needed our support introduced this anonymous communication into the executive testimony, creating such an impact that, as Chairman Russell stated:

"The thing that discouraged me more in that position [support of Chiang Kaishek] than any other single thing was a telegram from the United States Chamber of Commerce in one of the largest cities of China."

The only conclusion that we can draw from this story is that the Secretary of State abandoned the use of his critical faculties and judgment when it came to evaluating any evidence which supported the Communist viewpoint. 16. The problem of Communist infiltration in our Government is still unresolved It is common knowledge that efforts toward Communist infiltration of the State Department have been persistent over the years. This is no idle charge. After long continued congressional pressure, some few convictions have been secured. Today Carl Marzani is serving a penitentiary sentence for concealing the fact that he had been a Communist organizer. The confessions of Julian Wadleigh were made under oath. Alger Hiss, one of President Roosevelt's confidential advisers, was convicted of perjury, involving his contacts with a Communist espionage ring operating within the Federal Government, and is now in prison.

26 Ibid., p. 1971. 27 Ibid., p. 1972. 28 Ibid., p. 1973. 29 Ibid., p. 1973. 20 Ibid., p. 1974. 21 Ibid., p. 1974. 32 Ibid., p. 1975.

This Communist infiltration has been a critical problem since 1933. At some stage, not yet clear to this committee, Communist influence began to affect our Far East policy. We have had the policy under review during these hearings. Witnesses discussed the activities of the State Department group who favored the Chinese Communists. We are satisfied that the truth about the pro-Communist State Department group has not yet been revealed. It should be noted that since the conclusion of these hearings the State Department has reluctantly admitted that it has numerous major loyalty cases under review.

The Executive has done nothing to assist Congress in its efforts to get at the truth about this infiltration. His consistent tactic is to refuse access to the full records when Congress asks for it. His consistent rejoinder to charges is the phrase "red herring."

There can be no confidence, no unity of purpose until this administration makes available to the public the facts; until the Executive demonstrates the desire to remove from our national institutions those who seek to destroy America. In the light of the continuous disclosures as to the substantial number of security risks discharged by the State Department, it is obvious that a serious situation of Communist infiltration has existed and still endangers our national security.

33

17. The advice and information of our ablest and most experienced officials has been ignored

The inquiry revealed that it has become the habitual practice of the Executive to make decisions without thorough consultation with the ablest and most competent officials on the scene of action.

The testimony is replete with examples of this practice. A few are cited: (a) The failure to consult MacArthur relative to the Yalta Conference." (b) The failure to inform Ambassador Hurley about the Yalta agreement at the time when he was actively representing this Government in China. (c) The granting of the Polish loan to the Communist satellite government over the vigorous protests of Arthur Bliss Lane, our Ambassador to Poland at the time.

(d) Failure to consult MacArthur before decision to fight in Korea. (e) Failure of Marshall, on his way to China, to consult MacArthur on the Far East situation.

(f) Failure to adopt General Wedemeyer's recommendations on China and Korea as well as the suppression of his report."

(g) Failure to follow Admiral Leahy's advice regarding the necessity for Russian entry into the Pacific War.

(h) Failure to follow the recommendations of Angus Ward and his subsequent exile to an obscure post in Africa.

(i) Failure to accept the advice of Admiral Badger relative to military assistance to the Republic of China.

This method of operation by our State Department has had devastating effects upon our Foreign Service officers. It has apparently resulted in a frustration and inertia, which has reacted unfavorably to our national security. The confidence and harmonious operation of our foreign relations demands that this tendency be reversed and that those who are entrusted with the responsibility of representing our Government abroad be kept informed and allowed to exercise their authority in conformance with our democratic traditions.

18. The Constitution of the United States provides that the Congress has the sole power to declare war

Although these hearings commenced as an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the recall of the General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur, it was soon apparent that there was an underlying question of great constitutional significance; namely, the right of the Executive to involve this Nation in a war without consent of the Congress of the United States. In buttressing the position of the administration, citations have been made in the public record of over

33 To support this contention, it must be noted that on July 9, 1951, Senator McCarran (Democrat, Nevada), chairman of the recently created Senate Committee on Internal Security, announced after an executive session that "Facts have been developed which show definite Communist slanting of the Voice of America broadcasts, publications, and moving pictures sent abroad which are supposed to give the American viewpoint in the fight against communism."

34 Op. cit., p. 128.

35 Ibid., p. 2836.

36 Ibid., p. 2293, supra.

150 instances where the Executive, utilizing his authority as Commander in Chief, has used the Armed Forces of the United States without the consent of Congress.

37

House Document No. 127 shows that whenever the President has used the Armed Forces without the consent of Congress he has done it "as a result of direct aggression upon those forces or in protection of American lives or property."

In the Korean case, the Executive authorized large-scale military operations without the consent of the Congress. Since the President could make a personal decision of this character again, the constitutional question must be resolved. The use of military forces to the extent of the Korean conflict falls squarely within the constitutional provisions of the war-making power of Congress, therefore, the action on the part of the Executive to intervene without the prior consent of Congress or immediate subsequent approval was ill-advised and should not be allowed to remain as a precedent in our constitutional history.

PART VI. CONCLUSIONS

An inquiry of the type of the MacArthur hearings would accomplish little for the public good unless those who participated arrived at some firm conclusions the implementation of which will strengthen our country.

We have examined all of the facts and in good faith submit to the public the following conclusions:

1. The inquiry was in the public interest

The inquiry into the military situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General MacArthur has been very productive. As a result of the extensive testimony the public and the Members of Congress have for the first time in a decade been informed as to our policies in the Far East.

The hearings have revealed glaring mistakes, evasions, contradictions, and significant admissions which will enable the American people to more properly evaluate our future course of action.

We are satisfied that this investigation was in the public interest.

2. The removal of General MacArthur was within the constitutional power of the President, but the circumstances were a shock to the national pride Without debating the right of the President to remove any military leader it must be pointed out that the reasons assigned for the removal of General MacArthur were utterly inadequate to justify the act.

The "justification" for removal seems to have been built up after the removal rather than before.

The removal came 8 months after the victorious landing at Inchon, a military operation of an extremely hazardous character so brilliantly carried out as to rouse the outspoken admiration of all professional soldiers and our people generally.

Far more serious were the effects in the Far East of his curt and precipitate dismissal. There, perhaps more than anywhere else in the world, prestige is associated with dignity and a due regard for decorum. General MacArthur was our senior general, a former Chief of Staff, and a distinguished commander in two World Wars.

His position in the Far East was unparalleled. He not only held the highest United States command, but he was also the general of the United States forces in Korea and supreme commander of the combined forces of the United Nations. He held these positions while still in command of and responsible for occupied Japan. As the executive, in carrying out the reconstruction of that defeated empire, he acted with extraordinary success. His energetic, intrepid, and vigorous prosecution of the conflict in Korea had deepened the regard in which he was justly held. That such an officer should be discarded overnight, as though he was merely a disgruntled subordinate, is deplorable. The unseeming haste of the dismissal further compromised the position of the United States, a position already badly shaken as a result of the unhappy events of the past 6 years.

Furthermore, there were still other serious repercussions. General MacArthur, testifying before the joint committee, said that "I have never known it in the American Army, and I know of no precedents any place. Being summarily relieved in that way made it impossible to carry out directives that I was working

Op. cit., H. Rept. No. 127, as quoted in detail under item 12, Agreements.