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In implementation of these policies we maintain a unilateral embargo on military equipment of U.S. origin for use in the Portuguese Territories either directly from the U.S. or indirectly from our NATO supplies to Portugal. U.S. export controls restrain possible sales of dual-purpose items, such as jet transports and communications equipment to the government of Portugal for uses in Africa.

We cooperate with Portugal on NATO matters and continue to use the Azores facilities. U.S. naval vessels and aircraft also use facilities in the Portuguese African territories for refueling and space support missions. Trade relations with the territories are normal and there are no USG restraints on American investment there apart from the Foreign Direct Investment Program. EXIM Bank facilities are available, subject to review for political implications. Black African States of Southern Africa

The U.S. maintains cordial relations with the five black-ruled states of the area, Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. We have Ambassadors in Malawi and Zambia. Since their independence we have maintained Chargés in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland and these countries are pressing us for the assignment of resident Ambassadors. These countries consider the level of our diplomatic representatives to be an important manifestation of U.S. sympathy and support.

As with all developing countries, an important factor in our relations is the level and kind of aid we can provide. Under current policies AID provides funds for regional and multi-donor projects and for the small Special Self-Help and Development Program. Investment guarantees are available, and the U.S. extends additional help through PL 480 food donations, and Peace Corps programs in four of the five black countries. However, there is a body of opinion which considers that programs of bilateral technical assistance are necessary in these states because of their generally isolated and enclave location. Bilateral assistance has been limited as a matter of policy to 10 concentration countries in Africa, none of which are in the southern region. World-wide AID policy is currently under review. (See Annex 7 for a discussion of considerations involved in bilateral aid to the black states of the region).

A further problem with these countries is the Conte amendment to foreign assistance legislation.” Zambia, fearful of attacks by the white regimes in retaliation for passage of liberation groups through her terri


The Conte-Long amendment to the Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations Act of 1968 directed the President to withhold economic assistance from underdeveloped countries (with some exceptions) in an amount equivalent to the amount spent for the purchase of sophisticated weapons systems.

tory, is purchasing air defense missiles and possibly jet aircraft from the U.K. and Italy. The Conte amendment requires the cancellation of U.S. aid of bilateral and some regional types in the amount of weapons expenditures. We have introduced legislation to change the amendment to provide greater flexibility. Despite our explanations of the intent of Congress, application of the Conte amendment may be seen by the black states as evidence that the U.S. is more sympathetic to the status quo of the white regimes than the aspirations of the blacks. Liberation Groups

The U.S. maintains contact with exile nationalist movements from the white-controlled states. We also assist refugee students from these states through the Southern African Student Program and two secondary schools which are operated for refugee students. The U.S. takes the position that force is not an appropriate means to bring about constructive change in southern Africa.

United Nations

On southern African issues in the UN the relationship between the U.S. position and that of Afro-Asian UN members has altered considerably over the last five years. We played a leading role in the arms embargo against South Africa, the determination that South Africa's mandate over South West Africa had terminated, and on mandatory economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. However, these actions largely exhausted the store of measures we were prepared to take on these issues.

The Afro-Asians have steadily increased pressures to exclude South Africa from the UN, for sanctions against South Africa and Portugal, and for use of force to give effect to UN actions. These demands have moved these states far out in front of the U.S. and some other Free World countries. We have consistently resisted efforts to exclude South Africa from international bodies and to extend mandatory sanctions or use force on southern African issues. Thus the U.S. has made it clear that we have gone as far as we can in the direction of greater UN pressures on the white regimes. (The U.K. and France have adopted an even more restrained position on southern African issues, in their abstentions on the UN General Assembly resolution determining that South Africa's mandate over South West Africa had terminated on which we voted in favor, and the U.K.'s somewhat more permissive policy on the arms embargo against South Africa, which is virtually a dead letter in the case of France.)

III. The Range of Policy Options U.S. Objectives

There are several broad objectives of U.S. policy toward southern Africa. Arranged without intent to imply priority, they are:

-To improve the U.S. standing in black Africa and internationally on the racial issue.

– To protect economic, scientific and strategic interests and opportunities in the region.

-To minimize the likelihood of escalation of violence in the area and the risk of U.S. involvement.

-To minimize the opportunities for the USSR and Communist China to exploit the racial issue in the region for propaganda advantage and to gain political influence with black governments and liberation movements.

-To encourage moderation of the current rigid racial and colonial policies of the white regimes.

These objectives are to a degree contradictory-pursuit of one may make difficult the successful pursuit of one or more of the others. Moreover, views as to the relative priority among these objectives vary widely, depending primarily upon the perception of the nature of the problems in the area and U.S. interests there (see I.B). Range of Choice

The general policy question centers on U.S. posture toward the white regimes—a key element in our relations with the black states in the area and a factor of varying degrees of importance throughout the continent.

But the range of feasible policy options is limited. On one extreme our interests do not justify consideration of U.S. military intervention in the area. On the other extreme we cannot accept or endorse either the racial or colonial policies of the white regimes. Nor can we identify ourselves with violent or repressive solutions to the area's problems on either side of the confrontation. The essential choice is among:

(a) Movement towards normal relations with the white regimes to protect and enhance our economic, strategic and scientific interests (Option 1).

(b) Broader association with both black and white states in an effort to encourage moderation in the white states, to enlist cooperation of the black states in reducing tensions and the likelihood of increasing cross-border violence, and to encourage improved relations among states in area (Option 2).

(c) Increased identification with and support for the black states of the region, as a pre-condition to pursuit of our minimum necessary economic, strategic and scientific interests in the white states (Option 3).

(d) Limited association with the white states and closer association with the blacks in an effort to retain some economic, scientific and strategic interests in the white states while maintaining a posture on the racial issue which the blacks will accept, though opposing violent solutions to the problems of the region (Option 4).

(e) Dissociation from the white regimes with closer relations with the black states in an effort to enhance our standing on the racial issue in Africa and internationally (Option 5).

(f) Increased U.S. measures of coercion, short of armed force, bilaterally and on an international basis, to induce constructive change in white-regime race policies (Option 6).

Each option represents a range of actions, with some flexibility of choice among specific means without altering the premise or general strategy of the option. The purpose of this paper is to afford the NSC a choice on basic posture toward southern Africa. It is not intended to be a specific scenario for operational action, and the examples in each option are the types of action which would be consistent with the option's thrust but are neither comprehensive nor necessarily in each case the specific action which would be selected.

A satisfactory arrangement regarding South Africa's handling of gold can continue to be sought under any of the options, but it would probably be more difficult to achieve under Option 5, and particularly under Option 6.

Option 1


Our disagreements with the internal policies of governments in power in the region should not govern our relations with either the black or white states. We should follow a policy of pursuing our tangible interests throughout the region. In seeking to induce change, we have erroneously supported UN actions on Rhodesia and South West Africa based on questionable premises. While we cannot reverse our participation in these actions overnight, we can begin to withdraw from implementation of them. The political costs of closer relations with the white states will not be excessive. General Posture

We would move to normalize our relations with all governments of the area, recognizing that reversal of our support for international actions already taken on Rhodesia and South West Africa will require some time. While we would make limited declarations of moral disapproval of the racial and colonial policies of the white governments, we would take no concrete measures to induce change and place no restrictions on the pursuit of our tangible interests. We would assume the risks of reaction against us in the black areas of the region and the rest of Africa. Operational Examples

-Gradually terminate arms embargo against South Africa, beginning with liberal treatment of equipment which could serve either military or civilian purposes or the common defense, e.g., anti-submarine warfare equipment.

-Authorize routine U.S. naval visits and use of airfields.
-Retain tracking station in South Africa as long as needed.

-Promote U.S. exports and facilitate investment (within the framework of U.S. Foreign Direct Investment Program) in South Africa, South West Africa, the Portuguese Territories and eventually Rhodesia; afford unrestricted EXIM Bank facilities.

- Continue sugar quota for South Africa.

-Recognize South African authorities in South West Africa and place no limitations on dealing with them.

-Cease enforcement of sanctions against Rhodesia; retain Consulate; if Republic is declared consider recognition.

-Quietly terminate unilateral U.S. arms embargo on Portuguese Territories, beginning with authorization of export of dual-purpose equipment.

-Economic assistance to the black states on the same basis as elsewhere in Africa; no special assistance and no arms supply; possible minority participation in development consortium with South Africa and Rhodesia.

-Public discouragement of insurgent movements and no assistance to political refugees.

- Limited information and exchange programs in both black and white areas.


1. Would reduce danger that U.S. international commitments on problems of the region may involve us in possible future conflict.

2. Would preserve and expand U.S. scientific, strategic and economic interests in white-controlled areas.

3. Would remove irritant in U.S. relations with Portugal.


1. Would require repudiation of previous U.S. actions in UN and, in the case of Rhodesia, violation of mandatory provisions of the UN Charter.

2. Would tend to encourage the white regimes in their intransigence.

3. Would provoke strong black African reaction with possible adverse effects on U.S. interests in those countries.

4. Would risk forfeiting to communist powers primary influence with black states of region, the insurgent movements and to degree elsewhere in Africa.

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