Dobrynin said he appreciated this and handed me a letter [Tab A]1 which in effect stated that this Soviet move was a unilateral step in the direction of the proposition they had made to us last year and that now it was up to us to take some reciprocal action. I said we would study the letter and no doubt there would be some formal response. SALT Secondly, I told Dobrynin that we accepted the Soviet changes in the SALT interpretive statement [Tab B]5 and that we should get it signed at an early occasion. I asked him whether he thought Smith or I should sign it. He said the Soviet side would prefer it if I signed it so that we could avoid getting it in all the newspapers. Vietnam Thirdly, I told Dobrynin about my meeting with the North Vietnamese in Paris." I said the meeting up to now was quite inconclusive. The tone of the North Vietnamese was more acceptable than it had ever been in the past and the discussions left open the possibility that there might be a settlement. The North Vietnamese side did not make any very concrete proposals, and frankly neither did we. We only presented the military side of the proposals we had discussed in Moscow. Dobrynin asked why we had not presented the part that had been discussed with Brezhnev. I said because we did not want to get it refused and produce a deadlock. Dobrynin said, "How stupid of me. I should have recognized this and it was a correct tactic. You are a good chess player. My leaders will fully understand." I said I hoped that if there were a settlement the Soviet Union would exercise restraint in the shipment of supplies. He said, well, right now there was a problem about getting supplies in altogether, so it was not the most acute issue. We then turned to other matters. We discussed my trip to the Soviet Union. I suggested arriving on September 10 and staying for something like three days. Dobrynin said he would check in Moscow and let me know. Dobrynin also mentioned that there was a chance that he might be called back to Moscow for three or four weeks. In that event he would be back in Washington around August 25. In any event he would be in Moscow when I was there. We then parted on an extremely cordial note, with Dobrynin expressing profuse thanks for everything that had been done for him on his visit to the West Coast. 6 Kissinger met with Le Duc Tho on July 19. The record of the meeting is printed ibid., volume VIII, Vietnam, January 1972-October 1972, Document 207. 17. Memorandum of Conversation1 Washington, July 21, 1972, 12:40-1:10 p.m. PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin Dr. Henry A. Kissinger Dobrynin saw me at his request with a message that I would be welcome to arrive on September 10, that Brezhnev would conduct the conversations with me himself, and that the Soviet side would prefer to make the announcement only after I had left, just as we had done last time. I said that under present circumstances, with the election campaign, this would be a very difficult thing to do and would raise needless issues of secrecy. I, therefore, proposed making the announcement on the Monday or Tuesday of the week preceding my departure. Dobrynin said he would check with Moscow and let me know. Nuclear Understanding Dobrynin then handed me a letter from Brezhnev [Tab A]2 and the draft treaty [Tab B]3 on renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. The draft had been adjusted so that now NATO allies would be covered but third countries would not be. Dobrynin asked what I thought of it. I said, "Let me understand: Under Article 3 of this treaty, if you attack NATO we attack the Warsaw Pact; Article 1 renouncing the use of nuclear weapons does not apply." He said, "That is correct." I asked him, "Are you prepared to express this in some agreed understandings that could be published?" He said yes. I then said, "Let me ask another case: Supposing we attack a country that is not allied with you but whose independence you value, such as India, would you then be prohibited from using nuclear weapons by this treaty?" Dobrynin said, “Yes, by this treaty." In other words an attack on China would bar us from using nuclear weapons. Middle East Dobrynin then asked a number of questions about what approaches we had made to Egypt, and I assured him that we had not made any. But he seemed very uncertain. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the White House Map Room. 2 Printed as Document 15. All brackets are in the original. 3 Attached but not printed. This conversation, like the one the day before, ended on an extremely cordial note with profuse thanks by Dobrynin for everything that had been done on the West Coast. 18. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Peterson Backchannels on Cuban Shipping Restrictions and Soviet Maritime Secretary Peterson (and Sonnenfeldt) have sent you several messages requesting guidance on issues arising out of NSAM 2202 restrictions on use of Soviet ships for US trade that have previously been engaged in Cuban trade. -He has today proceeded on his instructions in NSDM 179,3 that require him to make a determined effort to conclude the maritime agreement without violating or relaxing NSAM 220. -This instruction allows him the fallback position of making a one-time exception for CCC grain sales, with provision that this be carefully explained to OAS members. -He, Peterson, notes that he has an implicit second fallback which arises from a loophole of the NSAM-that is, that exception for Soviet ships could be made provided there is an assurance that those particular ships will not be used in Cuban trade in the future. In a private meeting with Patolichev1 he raised the broad question of our Cuban shipping restrictions, and, while the Soviets generally 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 953, VIP Visits, Pete Peterson's Moscow Visit (Commerce), 17 Jul-3 Aug 72 [1 of 2]. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for action. 2 See footnote 2, Document 9. Sonnenfeldt reported on Peterson's meeting with Patolichev in attached backchannel message 2746 to Kissinger, July 25 (Tab B). Peterson also reported on the meeting in telegram 7226 from Moscow, July 25. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Matenals, NSC Files, Box 953, VIP Visits, Pete Peterson's Moscow Visit (Commerce), 17 Jul-Aug 72 [2 of 2]) said this was our problem, they did ask enough questions to suggest that they might be willing to find some middle ground. Specifically, they caught on to Peterson's distinction between ships that had traded with Cuba and ships calling on Cuba in the future. He thus has laid some groundwork for the alternative to the one time exception: i.e., a Soviet assurance that ships in US trade will not henceforth be involved in Cuban trade (Tab B). He raises several broader issues which he believes must be addressed at the highest level now (Tab C).5 1. If a one-time exception is made for CCC grain, how do we deal with other contingencies, namely, that Soviet ships calling at Cuba ports can also come to US ports to load regular cash cargoes. In practice Soviet ships have never done so. Once the exception is made for the CCC grain shipments, then we may have to expect the Soviets to make port calls for cash transactions and these are permissible under NSAM 220. one. -He asks your advice as to whether this is a political issue or a legal -If it is only legal, then Peterson can simply tell them that the Cuba restriction only applies to government financed cargo, and they are free to use ships for other cargoes as they choose. -If it is a political problem, then such ships may be the first to appear and begin eroding our Cuban policy of restrictions. 2. Peterson suggests the following scenario: -To make a determined effort to exclude Cuba tainted ships. -Second, to persuade the Soviets to exclude these Cuban tainted ships for a period of six months while we review the situation. -Third, get the Soviets to exclude for six months, and ask them to consider setting up a special Soviet-American shipping company with assurance that ships they use will not henceforth be used in Cuban trade; this means expanding Cuban restrictions to all types of cargo. -Fourth, suggest that the Soviets forthwith set up a special shipping company with the same assurance; this means Cuban tainted vessels might call at US ports within a few weeks of agreement. Sonnenfeldt has sent in his version of options, cleared with Peterson (Tab D). He seems to be favoring establishing a Soviet shipping company immediately, with Soviet assurances against future use. 5 Attached but not printed is backchannel message 2739 from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, July 24, which contained a message from Peterson to Kissinger. Paragraph 6 of Petersen's message set forth his proposed negotiating scenario, which Haig summarizes here. 6 Attached but not printed is backchannel message 2740 from Sonnenfeldt to Haig, July 24. In sum, there are these questions to answer: 1. Should Peterson continue to explore the possibility of obtaining Soviet assurance against using their Cuban-tainted ships henceforth for US-Soviet trade; if so, and he makes any progress, this would probably obviate fallback to the one-time exception for CCC grain. 2. If this does not pan out and he moves to the one-time exception, how should he deal with other types of Soviet shipping-those involving cash sales and commercially (non-governmental) financed sales? Should he encourage the Soviets to begin making calls for such cargo by ships coming from Cuba, as is legally possible now, or discourage them from drawing the conclusion that we would welcome this? Recommendation Obtaining a Soviet assurance against future use of ships on Cuba trade would be a highly desirable solution and there is no reason for Peterson not to pursue it, especially since he has already implanted the seed with Patolichev. If this peters out, as is probable, or becomes too complicated with qualifications and bargains, then he can go to the one-time exception as authorized. However, he should hold the line on other Soviet shipping, even though NSAM 220 does not prohibit it. This still should be decided in September if at all possible, after some study and bureaucratic massaging. If you agree with this, a message to Peterson is at Tab A.7 7 Kissinger did not check any of the options. The attached July 25 routing memorandum from Jon Howe of the NSC Staff to Haig noted that Kissinger had approved the backchannel message and "it was dispatched this evening at 9:00 p.m." The approved backchannel message from Kissinger to Peterson, July 25, at Tab A, reads: "You are correct in concluding that Cuban aspect of maritime talks is primarily a political one. For now, you should proceed along lines you suggest in your 2739, paragraph 6. You may explore for possible Soviet assurances against future use of Cuba-tainted ships. If such exploration seems to be fruitless, then you can proceed to fall back on one-time exception as authorized by President (TOPET 11). As for related question of non-CCC grain cargoes, you should not encourage Soviets to believe that one-time exception means we would look with favor on their using U.S. ports from or to Cuba, even though this is permissible under NSAM 220. This should be part of broader policy determination in September." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 953, VIP Visits, Pete Peterson's Moscow Visit (Commerce), 17 Jul-3 Aug 72 [1 of 2 ]) |
