170. Message From the United States Government to the Soviet Government1 Washington, January 12, 1976. We have studied with great care the communication from Moscow concerning Angola which was delivered to us on January 9.2 We do not propose to engage with the Soviet side in further disputations about "fictitious" or "real" foreign interference in Angolan affairs, we will evidently not agree on this matter. Our purpose is to have foreign interference ended, whatever characterization is applied to it. In that regard, we have noted with interest the statements in the Soviet communication concerning the military intervention of South Africa. It appears from these statements that the Soviet side now envisages the termination of all foreign military presence in Angola when the above military intervention has ended. We consider this Soviet position to be significant. For its part the US is willing to use its influence to bring about the cessation of foreign intervention. At the same time, we would appreciate having explicit confirmation from Moscow that the Soviet side will end its own military role as well as seeing to it that the military role of Cuba, with which the Soviet role is inextricably linked, will also end. The Soviet communication states that this problem will "solve itself in a natural way." It will be important to know Moscow's view as to the time frame in which such a solution, that is, the termination of Soviet and Cuban military presence and activity in Angola, would take place after South African withdrawal has been accomplished. We would like to be certain that there is complete understanding in Moscow of our fundamental view of the Angolan issue, as it has evolved in recent months. Angola would never have become a critical issue in American-Soviet relations if there had not been massive infusions of Soviet and Cuban military equipment and forces into the country. We have proceeded from the assumption that the essence of our relationship, if it is to proceed along the lines mapped out in the discussions and understandings of 1972-74, is that neither side will seek to obtain positions of unilateral advantage vis-à-vis the other, that restraint will govern our respective policies, and that nothing will be done that could escalate situations, where there may be turbulence or instability for other reasons, into confrontations between our two countries. 1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 29, General Subject File, USSR—The "D" File. No classification marking. A handwritten notation on the first page reads: "Delivered to the Soviets." 2 Document 169. It has been our view that these principles of mutual relations were not simply a matter of abstract “good will” but that they are at the very heart of how two responsible great powers must conduct their relations in the nuclear era. For it must be clear that where great powers are concerned, when either one succeeds somehow to obtain a special position of influence based on military intervention, in some locale because of certain temporary political opportunities and irrespective of original motives, the other power will sooner or later act to offset this advantage. But this will inevitably lead to a chain of action and reaction that was typical of other historic eras in which great powers maneuvered for advantage only to find themselves sooner or later embroiled in major crises and, indeed, open conflict. But it is precisely this pattern that we sought to break. Whatever justification, be it as a matter of "principle" or in real or alleged requests for assistance, the Soviet side may consider itself to have had in intervening itself and actively supporting the Cuban intervention in Angola, the fact remains that there has never been any historic Soviet, or Russian, interest in that part of the world. It is precisely because the United States respects the position of the Soviet Union as a great power that it was bound to see the Soviet move into Angola, whatever the motivation, as running counter to the crucial principles of restraint, eschewal of unilateral advantage and scrupulous concern for the interests of others which we jointly enunciated in the early seventies. It is not for us to lecture the Soviet side about its own interests. But we cannot help observing that whatever the attitudes of the African states with respect to South African intervention and in regard to the three contending factions in Angola, all the major African states view with utmost dismay the establishment of a Soviet/Cuban military position in the region of southwest Africa. Moreover, the Soviet side must be aware also that the steady trend toward a normalization of American relations with Cuba, which we had initiated not least in order to further the process of normalizing US-Soviet relations, has been most seriously damaged by what has happened in Angola. We believe that this is a wholly unnecessary setback to the constructive trends in our relations to which we jointly committed ourselves and we cannot believe that this is ultimately in the Soviet interest. It is against the background of these very fundamental considerations, going to the very heart of our relations and indeed of a peaceful world order, that Moscow should evaluate our position on Angola. And that is why the speedy clarifications of Soviet policies and intentions for which we are asking in the first part of this message are of such vital importance. We believe there remains time and opportunity for the kind of statesmanship, on both sides, that will avoid our two coun tries once again becoming the victims of the iron laws of great power competition which had such disastrous consequences in the past and which it is our historic task to overcome. 171. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain African Diplomatic Posts1 Washington, January 15, 1976, 0212Z. 10166. Subject: Angola and the OAU Summit.2 For Ambassador from the Secretary. 1. We are encouraged by the leadership and unity demonstrated by moderate African states at the OAU summit, but recognize they will probably be under renewed pressure from pro-MPLA radicals to shift their position in the name of OAU unity. We also anticipate that the radicals will prefer to blame us rather than African states for split at the OAU, thereby keeping door open to moderates to "return to the African fold." Some countries, however, particularly those recently visited by Assistant Secretary Schaufele, may be singled out for abuse as "American lackeys" who split the OAU at Washington's bidding. 2. We will need, therefore, to be as supportive of our African friends as we can in the coming crucial weeks but we will also need to do so discreetly in ways which will not over-identify them with us. Rather than relying on top-level correspondence that may leak, or visits, at least at this time by high US officials, we will look to each of you to maintain a discreet dialogue following up on the OAU summit and developments in Angola. 3. It will clearly be crucial in the coming weeks that the moderate states continue to display the leadership and unity which they demonstrated at Addis. To encourage them to think in these terms, you should seek an early appointment with the highest appropriate official to follow up on the OAU summit and developments in Angola. You 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840096-1674. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Buchanan, cleared in AF, and approved by Kissinger. Sent to Rabat, Monrovia, Bangui, Libreville, Nairobi, and Yaounde. 2 The OAU meeting was held in Addis Ababa January 10–13, 1976. All delegations condemned South African entry into Angola; however, discussion of the issue of the MPLA regime in Angola ended in stalemate, with 22 members voting in favor of recognition, and 22 voting in favor of a government of national unity. (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1976, pp. 27662-27663) should express your gratification at seeing the moderates of Africa for once so united and effective in defense of their principles, and argue that the battle is only just starting. Now it will become even more essential, but also difficult for the moderates to act together to blunt pro-MPLA efforts to gain recognition. You should also encourage your host leadership to go on the offensive, using their prestige and resources to rally OAU members in support of a policy of conciliation. 4. You should encourage host government official to discuss options facing us all in light of OAU standoff and try and elicit: -Any playback of impressions from the summit (including who were the main driving force on the MPLA-side, who were the compromisers, what was the role of the Cubans, did the Soviets play any roles)? -What is host government's estimate of the recognition situation (stalemate, continued danger of more recognitions of MPLA, likelihood someone will recognize the "Huambo government")? -Are there any plans for further coordination among the anti-MPLA grouping? What is moderates' next step? -Are there any specific steps which host government can suggest which might be taken by moderate African states and/or by us which would help build pressure for a withdrawal of all foreign forces and the establishment of some form of compromise coalition? 5. You should also use occasion to reaffirm the main lines of US policy (cease fire, withdrawal of all foreign forces, efforts to conciliate the factions and form a government of national unity) and say that the administration intends to do whatever it can to see that an equitable solution along the above lines eventually emerges. You should draw upon the pertinent parts of the Secretary's January 14 press conference3 (sent by septel) and provide a copy to the official. Kissinger 3 Kissinger's press conference on January 14 addressed the impact of Soviet intervention in Angola on U.S.-Soviet relations and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. For the complete text of the news conference, see Department of State Bulletin, February 2, 1976, pp. 125-132. 172. Memorandum of Conversation1 Brussels, January 24, 1976, 7:30 a.m. PARTICIPANTS Mr. Journiac, Staff of French President Giscard d'Estaing Journiac: I have just returned from Kinshasa where I saw Mobutu and his Foreign Minister and discussed Angola. I found the diplomatic situation favorable, with the moderate Africans prepared to face the leftists. The situation could, however, be improved. For the Africans, Angola is a white man's affair which they look to the West to solve. This present confidence in the West, however, will not last if the military situation continues to deteriorate. Most of the moderate African regimes are not ideologically motivated, and they tend to favor the west because they see us as their traditional friends and as stronger than the Communists. Whether this state of things will last will depend on the military outcome. We believe the military collapse in northern Angola thus far is not too significant because the Zaire Army never was an effective fighting force. A relatively modest effort on our part could re-establish the situation. If the [dollar amount not declassified] is still available, the necessary operation could be mounted to retake some of the lost territory and stabilize the situation. If, on the other hand, nothing is done, South Africa will reduce its involvement. If we do act, South Africa will maintain its presence. The question is whether you have the resources to mount such an operation and on this score your people are pessimistic. Secretary: Can it be done with available money, or is additional money needed? Journiac: Our people say the necessary money is presently not available. An account was to have been opened, but nothing has happened. Secretary: This is a national disgrace. The Cubans are able to send 10,000 men to Angola, and we are unable to even send money! The effects of this will be negative for years to come. I will let you know at the end of next week what the possibilities are. Journiac: I do not see any alternative policy to the one I outlined. The Zairians are pessimistic about the situation. What the US does in 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 344, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, JanuaryApril 1976. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Hilton Hotel. The Secretary was in Belgium to brief NATO officials on U.S.-Soviet arms limitation talks. |
