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sustained both by the materials the programs provide and the feeling of contact with émigrés and the West. The Soviet leadership would also tend to view such a step as evidence of Western disinterest in their repressive policies, which would likely be intensified.
The publication and distribution of this type of literature to a receptive Communist audience could be subsidized by other Government agencies, or by private enterprise. There are, however, no known initiatives on the part of any other agency to enter this field, and such
, initiatives would lack the unattributable nature of the CIA program. Sponsorship by private corporations, institutions or universities would lack the elements of governmental control and coordination which are essential to the effective operation of the program. 4. Risks and Contingency Planning
[Omitted here is the section on "Risks and Contingency Planning.") 5. Coordination
This covert action program was last approved by the 40 Committee on 22 September 1971. The current submission was approved on 2 January 1973 by the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
The FY 1972 costs and FY 1973 budget for this covert action program are as follows:
FY 1972 FY 1973 [Omitted here is a list of the organizations that received funding.) TOTAL $3,014,000 $3,561,000
Funds for these programs are included in CIA's FY 1973 budget. 7. Recommendation
It is recommended that the 40 Committee approve the continuation of this covert action program directed against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, including the projected funding level.
119. National Intelligence Estimate
Washington, June 1, 1973.
THE SOVIET APPROACH TO SUMMIT II
This paper does not presume to develop a scenario for the Washington Summit or to describe Soviet negotiating positions in detail. Its purpose is to describe the broad aims and calculations which will underlie the Soviet, and Brezhnev's personal, approach to the occasion.
Some of the principal observations made are as follows:
- The present Soviet course of seeking normalization and détente in relations with the West is not conceived as a brief tactical phase; Brezhnev's policy has strong backing at home and it is likely to endure for some time.
— The policy springs from a calculation that a skillfully managed détente can enhance the USSR's relative power position, especially in Europe. It springs equally from recognition of vulnerabilities, especially economic weaknesses, which the Soviets believe cooperation with the West can help to overcome.
-Brezhnev's main purpose in Washington will be to give momentum to the recent positive development of Soviet-American relations; he will be less concerned to achieve substantive agreements of major significance.
-He will give great emphasis to economic relations, especially pushing MFN, promoting investment in Soviet resource development on favorable terms, and facilitating arrangements for acquiring US technology
-The occasion is unlikely to produce any major changes in Soviet positions on SALT or MBFR; Brezhnev might, however, join in some move to expedite negotiations.
-On crisis areas like Indochina and the Middle East, the Soviets may convey willingness to cooperate tacitly, but they are unlikely to
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79-R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem; [handling caveat not declassified). A note on the original indicates that the NIE was prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the NSA, the AEC, the FBI, and the Treasury; and was concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board.
enter upon joint, explicit arrangements with the US which their friends would see as "collusion."
-Even if Summit II does not produce important and concrete results on many specific issues, the atmospheric effects will almost certainly be positive and will confirm Brezhnev's belief that the present course of Soviet policy is the correct one.
1. Brezhnev comes to Washington more confident of his position and policies than he has been at any time in his years of power. He can approach Summit II with all the authority he needs to pursue a central goal, one which he sees as serving vital Soviet foreign policy and domestic requirements at this time; further progress toward a modus vivendi with the West and, as a major part of this, the further development of Soviet-US bilateral relations.
Basic Policy Determinants
2. The present Soviet policy as a whole proceeds from the Brezhnev leadership's conviction that the USSR currently has opportunities to improve its relative position, especially in Europe, but also has serious vulnerabilities. Both argue for eased relations with the West. On the optimistic side, the Soviet leaders believe that present international trends offer the USSR a chance to gain ground on the US in international power, and they see in “peaceful coexistence,” dynamically managed, a safe way of grasping the chance. The Soviets, having substantially achieved strategic parity, now find the US to be curtailing its international commitments and troubled by various problems at home; they see the Atlantic alliance as agitated by divisive trade and monetary issues, and seemingly unsure of its purposes and policies in the security sphere. By this kind of Soviet reckoning, the West, including the US, is ready for détente with the USSR—and more likely now than previously to make concessions to get it.
3. But Moscow's confidence is mixed with anxieties about other aspects of its international position and about obvious weaknesses in its domestic base. Because of this, there is reason to believe that Soviet policy is not now in one of those purely tactical and transient phases of détente so familiar in the past. The Soviets have reasons—arising out of weakness as well as strength—to seek a genuine, albeit limited, accommodation with the US and its European allies.
-The Soviet leaders recognize that a measure of mutual confidence is necessary if the costs and risks of uncontrolled competition in strategic weapons between the superpowers are to be avoided. Moreover, they are under pressure to devote resources in increasing quantity to domestic non-military purposes.
— They also appreciate that some degree of understanding, and even cooperation, between the superpowers could well be necessary to prevent the intensification of regional conflicts into which both might be drawn.
-Because of their fundamental and abiding concern with China, the Soviets want to limit Sino-American rapprochement. They fear, apparently to an irrational degree, that the mutual hostility between themselves and China, combined with the latter's moves toward normalization of relations with the US, Europe, and Japan, could one day lead to the USSR's isolation in world politics.
- They see cooperation with the US as conducive to the process of negotiation in Europe from which they hope to achieve stabilization of their sphere in Eastern Europe, gains in trade and technology, and eventually greater influence in Western Europe.
-The Soviets now frankly recognize that they cannot by their own efforts overcome the technological backwardness that keeps them from joining the front ranks of the advanced industrial states. Failures in agriculture imply some dependence on grain imports for years to come. The Soviets believe and their expectations seem exaggerated—that they can develop broader economic relations with the West which can go far toward solving these problems. Internal Factors
4. There has been internal resistance to the current foreign policy line: apparently at the top political level (the demotion and eventual dismissal from the Politburo of Shelest was probably partly due to this factor), and probably less directly from defense interests, worried about the possible consequences of arms negotiations, and from elements in the party and police bureaucracies, which fear the internal consequences of wider contacts with the West. And Soviets at many levels will continue to ask why their government, even while tightening internal discipline, should move toward cordial relations with the old capitalist enemy. Such attitudes will help to reinforce certain instincts of the Soviet leaders themselves and will set limits on how far they will want to go in East-West détente. Signs that this policy was having seriously unsettling effects within the USSR—or, equally, in Eastern Europe-would almost certainly cause them to apply the brakes.
5. Brezhnev's personal role has been pivotal. Although not the sole architect of current foreign policies, he has now made them his own, and he has at least had primary responsibility for overcoming the resistance to these policies and for shaping the political consensus which supports them. Obviously, then, he has no small political investment in their success or failure, both as a vehicle for projecting Soviet
influence abroad and as a device for extracting help for the Soviet economy. He could be hurt politically, or might himself choose to shift direction, if present expectations were seriously disappointed. Moreover, Brezhnev is now 66, and many of his principal colleagues are even older; they cannot continue indefinitely and new men will thus be moving into the top positions.
6. It follows that the line Brezhnev now espouses is not irreversible. But the chief elements in this policy have been working their way to the surface throughout the post-Stalin period; important aspects of it are likely to persist, simply because to move in other directionstoward isolationism or confrontation tactics-would hardly seem to be attractive alternatives, given the USSR's domestic imperatives and the problem of China. Thus there are strong incentives on the Soviet side to make Summit II a success and to continue on the détente course. Brezhnev's Expectations for Summit II
7. Brezhnev will be interested in the aura the Summit will generate as well as its substantive content. He is likely to view Summit II chiefly as an opportunity to reinforce the momentum established at Summit I. He has less need for specific accomplishments now than then, but the general picture conveyed-at home, in the US, and around the worldas to the state of US-Soviet relations is important to him. He wants, for instance, to show that US-Soviet relations are progressing at least at an equal pace with the improvement in US-Chinese relations.
8. Brezhnev will also be seeking-on this, his first visit to the US and the first visit by a Soviet party chief since 1959—to stimulate a conciliatory attitude toward himself and Soviet aims on the part of the American public, with the accent probably on the genuineness of Moscow's desire to see the Cold War ended and a new page in East-West relations opened. Realizing that Congress will have an influential role with respect to projects of considerable interest to him (e.g., trade and MFN legislation), he will probably be attempting to make a favorable impression in that quarter. He will no doubt want, at the same time, to cultivate his relationship with the President and to indicate that he values the President's sponsorship of a relaxation in US-Soviet relations. He will thus probably temper any inclination to extract negotiating advantage from current controversies in the US. He would expect that such a demeanor could be more beneficial for the USSR's relations with the US over the longer run.
9. In his bargaining posture, Brezhnev will naturally want to radiate confidence in Soviet strength and a sense of equality. He will take the position that the further development of Soviet-American relations is no less in the US' interest than in the USSR's. US-made "linkages", besides representing less than the best bargain as the Soviets see it, also