CHAPTER III

LABOR CONDITIONS IN RELATION TO PRODUCTION

In the preceding pages we have tried to show that: (1) the economic reorganization occasioned by the great war was characterized by centralization of control and coördination of administration, but that such centralization and coördination were not characteristic of our methods in dealing with the labor problem until almost a year after we had been at war; and (2) that the anti-war reaction on the part of a large number of workers was due to a complexity of causes, chief among which were the spread of enemy propaganda, the dissemination of the anti-war philosophy of radical forces, and certain economic conditions in American industries. We attempted to point out in this regard that an examination of the evidence led to the conclusion that the conservative workers and labor leaders of the United States were generally loyal to the government, altho there were many exceptions. In the remainder of Part I of this study it is our purpose to examine the elements in the labor problem and to analyze the causes of industrial unrest during the war period.

The nature of the labor problem in the United States during the recent war was not very different from what it has always been in normal times. We say "not very different" advisedly, for there were some elements in the war labor situation which were uncommon. The war, as novel in many respects as it was great, gave rise to innumerable strange situations and readjustments in the economic, social, and political life of participating nations, and had a marked effect upon industrial relations which constitute, in the final analysis, the labor problem. Perhaps no other war has done so much to strengthen the position of the world's common laborers and to promote the feeling of solidarity. Moreover, the indispensability of labor in the protection of national welfare and in the execution of a national program was never more fully realized. The other aspects of the problem in the recent period were the usual ones greatly magnified, due to

the extraordinary economic and social conditions incident to the war. These familiar elements were the struggle for higher wages, better conditions of employment, shorter hours, demands for recognition of the union, and the establishment of other industrial relations in keeping with the rights and conducive to the dignity of labor. But in its demands labor was more insistent than ever before. These causes of labor unrest are discussed in a later chapter. Before examining the conditions that were conducive to friction in industrial relations, it is necessary to consider the more general aspects of the labor problem that affected production.

Among the most important phases of the labor problem during the last four years were the following:

1. The supply and distribution of skilled and unskilled workers.

2. Labor migration and labor turnover.

3. Variation in wage scales and the necessity of wage standardization.

4. Housing and transportation facilities for the greatly concentrated masses of workers in war industries.

5. The need for increasing and maintaining labor efficiency. 6. Replacement of men workers by women and children, especially in war industries.

7. The tendency to break down labor safeguards.

8. The problem of industrial unrest.

There is not sufficient space within the limits of this brief study to make an exhaustive analysis of each of these several aspects of the labor problem, and only sufficient analysis will be made to form an adequate basis for scientific conclusions.

1. THE LABOR SUPPLY AND ITS DISTRIBUTION

A great deal of controversy and divergence of opinion centered about the question of labor shortage in the United States during the first ten months of our participation in the war. Immediately after the declaration of war by the government the representatives of the great industries, such as the steel, copper, lumber, iron, and textiles, were lamenting the deficiency in the supply of unskilled labor, and attempted to arouse the administrative officials of the government as well as public opinion to the need of removing restrictions on immigration of oriental and

other laborers. Representatives of the United States Department of Labor, on the other hand, just as emphatically maintained that no labor shortage existed for the country as a whole, and that the problem was not one of increasing the labor supply but of a more scientific distribution of the existing labor forces. This diversity of opinion between the representatives of industry and those of the Department of Labor necessitates brief examination of the facts.

(1) Conditions Affecting the Supply of Labor. In a period of war two conditions arise which diminish a nation's labor supply, especially of unskilled labor. There is a big decrease in the tide of immigration which in normal times furnishes a constant stream of workmen for industries, especially in countries like the United States, and a rapid withdrawal of men from the nation's industries for the army and navy. Of 20,000,000 persons engaged in gainful occupations in Great Britain at the beginning of the war, 5,000,000 were quickly taken away for the army, leaving the labor supply twenty-five per cent short.1 Later the British government was forced to recall a large force of skilled workmen in order to maintain the industrial life at home. British experience caused much anxiety in the industrial circles of the United States when it became apparent that a long war was imminent and that as a consequence there would be an unprecedented shrinkage of the labor supply, especially with the passage of the selective draft law. Threatened if not actual depletion of the ranks of labor is a conceded possibility in war-time, and the fears entertained by our industrial leaders were, therefore, not without some justification. Secretary of Labor Wilson, however, attempted to quiet all apprehension of a labor shortage. Early in January, 1918, he stated that America's situation was quite different from that of England. Altho admitting that the selective draft was bound to make inroads on our labor supply and to interfere to some extent with industry, Mr. Wilson pointed out that the United States has 35,000,000 workers, of whom only 1,500,000 would be taken in the first year of the war- a number less than the total of unemployed in normal times. Whatever comfort this explanation of the 1 Secretary of Labor Wilson quoted in the Chicago Tribune, January 10, 1918.

2 Ibid.

Secretary of Labor contained for the leaders of industry was almost dissipated when the Committee on Military Affairs of the United States Senate soon afterwards estimated that the government's tentative military program called for 4,000,000 men in the field and an additional 4,000,000 in the cantonments at home from which to fill depleted ranks in France.

It was believed by some that the expansion of war industries, which necessitated a large addition to the labor supply, would be counterbalanced by a corresponding contraction of non-war or non-essential industries. But the immobility of both capital and labor, coupled with the reluctance of business enterprises to slow down or postpone production of non-essential commodities, precluded any such complementary contraction in the production of goods of this character. Of course, the falling off in demand for non-essentials forced the curtailment of their production to considerable extent and so released labor for war industries, but there was little evidence of a reduction in the consumption of non-essentials sufficient to affect seriously the shifting of labor forces. On the contrary it was true that never had labor in this country been so well paid and so prosperous as during the war period, and this in itself contributed greatly to the buying power in the retail trade and tended to steady the retail markets which naturally would be affected by the restrictions of non-essential production. We were too far removed from the scene of conflict to feel strongly the necessity of decreased consumption of nonessential commodities, and government action was necessary to curtail the production of such goods. On the whole, the demand for labor increased. American industry responded wonderfully to the needs of production and capital was readily provided for the necessary industrial expansion, but an acute situation developed in the threatened if not actual shortage of labor.

3

The inevitable increase in production resulted in a corresponding increase in the demand for labor, skilled and unskilled. There soon appeared feverish competition for workmen, and great inequality in wage scales resulted, giving rise to unprecedented increase in labor turnover. The problem resolved itself into the following forms: (a) Securing an additional supply of labor for war industries; (b) devising means and methods of

3 See Annual Crop Report and Business Review, Continental and Commercial Bank of Chicago, 1918.

keeping the labor supply when once it was secured; (c) equipping and training laborers for their respective tasks in the given industry, which called for labor dilution.

The second condition affecting the labor supply was the decrease in the volume of immigration into the United States. The following statistics showing the ebb and flow of the tide of immigration during the last eight years give us a basis of comparison of the war period with the pre-war period.

TABLE I. SHOWING THE TOTAL ANNUAL IMMIGRATION INTO THE UNITED STATES, THE TOTAL ANNUAL DEPARTURES, AND THE NET ANNUAL ADDITION TO THE POPULATION FOR THE PERIOD 1910 To 1917 INCLUSIVE 4

From the above statistics it will be seen that the total number of immigrants arriving in the United States during the fiscal years 1910 to 1914 inclusive was 5,174,701, or an average of about 1,034,940 a year; the total number of immigrant arrivals for the fiscal years 1915 to 1917 inclusive was 920,929, or a yearly average of about 306,976. This means an average annual decrease of 727,964 during the latter, as compared with the former period. The total number of alien immigrants that left our shores during the earlier period (1910-1914) was 1,442,892, or a yearly average of 288,578, as against a total of 400,116 for the + Compiled from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1910 to 1917 inclusive.

5 Figures are for the fiscal year in each case.

6 Since this table was compiled the statistics for 1918 have been made available. During the fiscal year 1918 the number of immigrant aliens admitted was 110,618, and the departures totalled 94,585, making a net addition to our population through this source of only 16,033. Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration, 1918, p. 55.