Kissinger: The moment when it becomes irreversible is when an interim government is formed. The constitution is suspended and the white structure is dismantled.

My worry about a protracted negotiation on a Constitutional Conference before an interim government is that it plays into the hands of both Smith and the black radicals.

Elwyn-Jones: I agree completely.

Kissinger: Nkomo and Kaunda want it. Nyerere wants to keep his options open.

Healey: Would a Kenyan meeting place be possible?

Kissinger: I didn't try it. I think no African country could afford to have Smith's representative there.

Callaghan: I think Livingstone is it.

Kissinger: The Foreign Secretary would enjoy it.

Crosland: What country is it in? [Laughter]

Kissinger: Zambia!

Foot: At what point do you see the British response?

Kissinger: I think there will be a vaccum when Smith speaks. So, some approach by the Prime Minister to Kaunda and Nyerere.

Callaghan: And perhaps Seretse [Khama, of Botswana].

Kissinger: Yes, if just for his ego. They will all be in Gaborone Tuesday for his celebration. Tony could follow it up, and the Government could make a formal declaration Monday, just so they know what the terms of reference are.

I repeat, we are in a more awkward position than you.

Callaghan: I agree. The Soviets would be unhappy, and some of the people in Dar es Salaam.

Kissinger: And some of the people in Dar es Salaam. This would be clearer that we were trying to install our government in an area where we have no traditional responsibility.

Elwyn-Jones: One of the problems is we have a legal responsibility but no political power. This has been our agony.

Kissinger: Insofar as we have political power, we will back you up. It would be a defeat for us if either Smith used it or it became chaos. Crosland: What if there is a change of Administration?

Kissinger: I would like to talk about this in a smaller group, because I have been taking some precautions. But if there are further disquisitions on sexual habits ... [Laughter].

Callaghan: Are there any other points?

Crosland: Many of them.

Healey: If Smith announces this... Incidentally, is the matter of the brackets cleared up [i.e., the bracketed phrase about a white chairman with no special vote, on the Council of State]?

Kissinger: Yes, we told them they could include it because no one raised the slightest objection.

Healey: We would send a representative to help structure the negotiations toward an interim government.

Kissinger: Exactly.

Healey: Then-you are right—there is a whole different ball game, and you get into a dicey situation.

Kissinger: Definitely.

Healey: Then the inducements to the white community could become crucial. It could take a long time, especially in your country, even

two years.

Kissinger: I think a new President, if he put himself behind it, could do it in his honeymoon period, perhaps in the first months. I know President Ford would do it immediately when Congress reassembles.

Healey: Would you give it priority over the support fund?

Kissinger: I haven't thought about it in those terms. We could perhaps do both. We got our Middle East money in a few months when we could demonstrate that peace there depended on it. And I have some assurance from the Democrats so I am not just speculating.

Healey: You might get an even more irresponsible Congress.

Kissinger: You can't get assurances from the Congress, but from the candidates. We have had a very chaotic situation in the last 18 months.

Healey: But it could be the same result as before.

Kissinger: But an elected President would have, first of all, a more disciplined Administration, unlike the recent time when the President had to worry about the Republican structure.

Callaghan: But this is an area where you have no responsibility. Kissinger: We can't afford to let it happen. Paradoxically it is easier for us if you are in charge, than if we have to explain why we are butting in in an area .......

We have suffered setbacks before.

I briefed forty-seven Senators before I left. Mike Mansfield announced, on the day before Congress left, that I would be available. He expected ten to show up; 47 came and I received the most unanimous backing I have received since 1974.

I didn't give magnitudes but I told them exactly what they would be expected to do. No one said: "Wait a minute; this won't fly here." Bill was there.

Rogers: And your breakfast too.

Kissinger: Of course, I also told them the odds were against it then. So it was easier to approve. [Laughter]

Healey: My concern is should we accept some form of responsibility that the position between UDI and independence is a British responsibility-and it goes sour in that period. Either the money isn't available, or the blacks break up, or radicals challenge it. Then it is the hardest time. I must say it is most imaginative attempt to break the deadlock yet, but if it breaks down, we need some assurance we are not just landed high and dry. And we have other commitments in Northern Ireland.

The money to the whites is to persuade them to stay; before, when we thought about money it was to get them to go. As you know, half of them came there since UDI—and most are Southern Europeans, South Africans.

But the rationale is perfectly sensible. But we must have your absolute firm backing.

Kissinger: The rationale is the trust fund produces funds for investment, and the increase is available for the whites. If it works perfectly, there is no problem.

Healey: If it breaks down... it looks like an incentive for the black government to nationalize.

Kissinger: Except then they won't get the investment.

Healey: But they don't always think like economic men.

Kissinger: I think President Ford will make this a high priority and we can get the Democratic candidate to take the same position. And Congress I can't believe will take on a new President on a foreign policy issue.

Healey: What reaction have you got from the other contributors? Kissinger: Giscard said they would, but he gave no percentages. Helmut...

Healey: Quoted some provision of the Bundesbank.

Kissinger: Article 134(a) of the Constitution. [Laughter] He never said no. They'd be willing to do more in Namibia.

Healey: We have decided we had to limit ours to 20 percent, or 15 million a year over five years.

5

5 Duff confirmed afterwards that this was Pounds Sterling. [Footnote is in the original.]

Kissinger: We haven't studied it.

Callaghan: We have other things we have cut.

Healey: I shall resign and seek refuge in Washington if the contingency reserve is cut.

If there is any shortfall anywhere else, we would go down pro tanto; we wouldn't make it

up.

Kissinger: I understand that any figure you give is your total contribution, that you can't make it up.

Callaghan: I spoke to Trudeau, and he said he would recommend it favorably to his Cabinet. But again I have no idea how much.

Kissinger: Smith said he wasn't too anxious for too much money to be available in the first two years, because he was interested in keeping people there.

Callaghan: Did he feel confident?

Kissinger: He said it would depend on whether he could retain those two ministries.

Callaghan: In full independence?

Kissinger: No, he recognizes that in full independence most ministries-in fact all the ministries-would be black.

Callaghan: Did you discuss the integration of the security forces and black forces?

Kissinger: We didn't discuss it.

Crosland: What do you think made Smith make this quantum jump? South African pressure, the guerrilla warfare?

Kissinger: All of those factors. I think the guerrilla war is pinching more than I had thought; economic sanctions are biting, especially the port of Maputo. And I told him he could not count on any contingency where he could count on American support. And the morale problem among his young people, who wonder why they should die indefinitely...

Callaghan: How did he strike you?

Kissinger: I had heard all your accounts, but frankly he behaved with dignity. They had to convince themselves they had no alternative-but frankly they behaved like men.

Elwyn-Jones: That is our experience—until the point of final agreement. I remember on HMS Tiger, we had him agreed to sign a document, and we were all about to dine together with the Admiral. We waited for him to come and we asked: Any news from Smith? The answer was: He's taking a tour of the boat; he has decided not to sign. Kissinger: Any explanation?

Elwyn-Jones: He had to go back to the Cabinet and caucus.

Kissinger: We had the same situation on Sunday: We had told him we wouldn't negotiate-and we had the presence of the South African Prime Minister, who we said we would hold responsible.

Lord: Plus his Cabinet.

Kissinger: You had only Smith.

Callaghan: Yes.

Kissinger: We had three other Cabinet members.

Elwyn-Jones: Plus you gave a new framework.

Kissinger: That is a big difference.

Healey: What future is there for him?

Kissinger: Maybe he could ask for a ministry, but I doubt the Rhodesians would put him forward. But I deliberately stayed away from personalities.

Callaghan: Yes. When they agree on formation of an interim government, could they also agree on a date for majority rule?

Kissinger: We wouldn't object to that.

Callaghan: It would look different if it's the 25th of December 19... whatever.

said.

What about Machel?

Kissinger: We would be glad to get in touch with him.

Crosland: I think you should.

Callaghan: There should be some coordination of what should be

Kissinger: We won't drop out of this. We didn't do it just to have a [study?]. I agree with Denis it could blow up in a lot of ways, but it is mathematically certain to blow up if we don't take this step. The flight of the whites, civil war among the blacks.

Crosland: [To Callaghan:] Tomorrow morning his officials and mine could prepare a draft statement of what is to be said if the answer is yes, and a program of communications.

Healey: Is Smith going to tell anybody before he tells the Rhodesian people, after the caucus?

Kissinger: We are on the same communication channel as you. We sort of assumed he would tell the South Africans, who would tell us. For all we know he might go on television and read the weather report. [Laughter]

Having come this far, I think it is irreversible. We hear he's already briefed his military people. If he reversed himself, he would have to

6 Bracketed insertion by the editor. The original is illegible.