First, I would like to know your views about economic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. I am familiar in general with the factual situation. We talked about this with Dr. Kissinger in Geneva. We appreciate your personal efforts, Mr. President, especially about MFN. But I would be interested in your assessment.

Secondly-and this goes beyond the framework of bilateral matters-I would say that there is nothing new in our relations with China in any sense of improvement. You know about our statements of readiness to improve relations with China. They have been published. We received no positive response to them. So, our relations are in bad shape. But you mustn't applaud this. Many US visitors go to China these days, and I am sure you are familiar with Chinese views. I would be interested in anything you might say on this subject as a continuation of your talk with Secretary Brezhnev about it.

(Secretary Kissinger left the room at this point.)

The President: Concerning MFN, I would be less than candid if I said there is no problem. We are continuing to work at it. I will indicate my support in a symbolic way by giving a dinner for Patolichev and Kendall when they are here in Washington.

We are working on this, but without immediate hope for success in Congress. We are trying to keep the credits alive.

I know your interest in a long-term economic agreement and we are looking at this.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Yes, Secretary Shultz will be prepared to move ahead on this with Patolichev.

The President: We want to do something that means something at the summit.

I am committed to MFN, but it is a sticky problem and we must continue to work at it until it is resolved.

About China, there is nothing much new to say. The idea that someone should applaud differences between the Soviet Union and China is really rather foolish. If one wanted differences, the most stupid way would be to applaud. About our own very young relationship with the PRC, it is primarily in the fields of trade and exchanges. We will continue this in the future. We can't leave out a billion people, just as you can't. I know that Mr. Brezhnev understands this.

I have given you assurances on all of this previously.

We won't be so foolish when two superpowers are engaged in a constructive dialogue—and we have problems and lots of fish to fry— to let any other country jeopardize this dialogue. Just as you wouldn't.

8 Kendall and Patolichev were the Directors of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council which met in Washington February 25-26. See footnote 10, Document 168.

The Soviet Union itself is a Pacific power and you understand why we should develop communication with the PRC. This is not done with any idea that it is at the expense of the Soviet Union. We recognize at this time in history that what the Soviet Union and the United States are able to do will determine the future. This is our first priority.

Mr. Gromyko: Thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to talk with you and the time you have given and what you have said.

In accordance with your comment, Dr. Kissinger will be prepared to take up in more detail some of these questions with us. I will join him in such an exchange of views with pleasure.

May I ask if you have any message for Secretary Brezhnev? What should I tell him about things here when I enter his office?

The President: You can say that we remember his visit with pleasure and everywhere he traveled people remember it with great pleasure. Despite the fact that some people for political reasons, as in Western Europe, are trying to discount Soviet-US relations, I know what our best interests are just as Mr. Brezhnev does for the Soviet Union.

Our relations are strong now and they must be strengthened. This is vital for the peace of the world, despite what politicians and the press say.

Personally, I would tell the General Secretary he should not drive too fast. I remember at Camp David when he drove his new car with me in it down the one lane road. I was frightened to death we would meet a Marine in a jeep coming the other way and there would be an international incident. But I know that he is a very good driver.

I hope that when we meet again that we will have an opportunity not only for serious talk but also for easy talk. We like each other personally, but what really counts is the progress we can make on tough issues.

Mr. Gromyko: I agree. I will convey your words to the General Secretary. I would like to say that we appreciate the fact that you have appointed an Ambassador to the Soviet Union who knows our country so well. He will be welcome there.

The President: Yes, he is a good man, and he also has a very attractive wife.

The President accompanied Mr. Gromyko and his party to his car outside the West Lobby and wished him well. The Foreign Minister departed the White House at 6:35 p.m.

Washington, February 5, 1974, noon–1:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

The Middle East; Berlin; Europe; Viet-Nam; Kissinger Trip

[The Secretary arrived at 12:00 and was ushered upstairs to meet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin. The Ambassador then left. There was a brief photo opportunity. Then brandy was served.]

visit.

Gromyko: [to Viktor]: Armenian brandy?

Sukhodrev: Yes.

Gromyko: Just a short time ago I visited the Armenian Republic.
Kissinger: It is very good. It is one of the places I would most like to

Gromyko: Leningrad too.

Kissinger: I will never see Leningrad!

Gromyko: It is, as they say in diplomatic words, a guarantee.

Kissinger: I will never see it! Although it is better to see it in the summer. Once when I went as a tourist, I saw it in February. It was colder. It was impressive-and very sinister.

Gromyko: Very impressive.

Kissinger: And also very sinister.

Gromyko: It was described by Dostoevsky. What is called the White Nights.2

The Middle East

Kissinger: Let us talk about the Middle East.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 71, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Gromyko 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy. Brackets are in the original.

2 A reference to the time during the summer in the high northern latitudes when darkness is not complete, as described in Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky's 1848 short story "White Nights."

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: We are in principle prepared for coordinated action. What we would like to do is also ask the opinion-which I am sure will be favorable—of the Syrians, and the Israelis—they won't be favorable-and the Egyptians. In fairness we should ask their view. But we will tell them we are prepared in principle for coordinated action. Gromyko: What do you mean by "agreed in principle?"

Kissinger: That we inform each other, and act in coordination, and when appropriate, that we act jointly.

Gromyko: "When appropriate?"

Kissinger: In Jerusalem, it would not be. For example, if-or when-you go to the Middle East, I will not come along.

Gromyko: The crux of the matter is not in who can or cannot go to a certain place or city, because I have had a repeated invitation to visit Egypt, Syria, Algeria. That is not a matter of principle.

Kissinger: No.

Gromyko: But if I go I will say that all matters pertaining to the Middle East must be discussed by Egypt, Syria, the Soviet Union, the United States, Jordan. What you will say, I don't know. But that is the issue that is the line.

Kissinger: I am prepared to say that. The only qualification-I have no reason to think it will arise—is if Syria or Israel say they don't want these discussions. Israel you have no diplomatic relations with.

Gromyko: In theory that is a possibility, but I doubt it will happen.
Kissinger: I do too.

Gromyko: But you should set out your own opinion, which is that all these questions should be discussed by all parties. Let the parties say that all these questions should be discussed. We [the Soviet Union] always say that we will discuss on a bilateral basis between us. Always we stress this-the U.S., Egypt, Syria, Jordan.

May I say this when I go to Moscow?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: It is a question of confidence.

Kissinger: Yes. We will do it in consultation with the Soviet Union. I am telling you this.

Gromyko: Consultation, and as far as the settlement of the question, a joint understanding?

Kissinger: Yes.

It means that both sides have to show understanding. Taking rigid positions will complicate the situation. I told you this.

What we don't want is for you to wind up as the lawyer of the Arabs and we wind up as the lawyer of Israel. We should act in a

common interest. If you keep telling the Arabs "We are more for you than the Americans," then we have to protect our interests. But if we both show a general understanding, it will not arise.

Gromyko: This by no means implies that I will say, for example tomorrow, that we agree fifty percent with the Arabs and fifty percent with Israel.

Kissinger: No, no.

Gromyko: Obviously there will be cases on which we have greater sympathy with one side, and occasions when we have sympathy with the other side. And that goes for you, too. But we should strive for a mutual understanding; that is what the Geneva Conference is all about. Kissinger: What about your relations with Israel?

Gromyko: Do you seriously believe that a normalization of our relations, or the achievement of more normal relations, will be helpful? Kissinger: Yes, I do.

Gromyko: From the point of view of our purely domestic situation, up to now our public opinion is certainly unprepared for anything of that kind, for the material implementation of that idea. Lately the situation, the unilateral actions of the U.S., has not created conditions conducive to that idea. So I cannot now say anything definite on the situation in that regard. If we did, the Arabs might-may-be certainly very critical of us, and that would complicate the situation for both of us.

As regards your advice, we will certainly take it into account and I will talk to the General Secretary about this. I will tell him your opinion. But there certainly should be some substantial advance in the Middle East situation. So it is hard indeed to give a positive response now to that question. I am sure you understand our position.

Kissinger: But it would help joint action. Because up to now only we can act in Israel.

Gromyko: Up to now nothing was done with joint action.

Kissinger: Let's take the case of Syria, which is the acute issue now. The Syrians have made a proposal. Like every first Arab proposal, it did not extend itself in the direction of taking account of the Israeli point of view. It won't be acceptable. I think they know that. But let's not worry about that. The Israelis will not negotiate without the lists of prisoners and Red Cross visits. They don't want their release, just the lists and visits. It is hard to say it is an unreasonable requirement. Gromyko: What is the reaction of the Syrians?

Kissinger: Up to now they have refused.

I have told the Israelis that maybe the Syrians are afraid that after they give the lists there would be no plan from the Israelis. But I can assure you they will give me a plan. I have not seen it; I do not have it. But after they get the lists they will give me a plan.