Richard: It would be quite monstrous if in the end the Patriotic Front came out in top when the Bishop has the votes. There is no question the Bishop has the votes. Grennan: This is how Chona is talking. They're wrong. Kissinger: Kaunda wants Nkomo. Why does Nkomo deal with Mugabe then? One thing I've learned is they usually know how to take care of their own survival. Grennan: He hasn't got any guerrillas of his own. And it's a misreading of the situation. Richard: One result of the date row was that Mugabe's position was weakened. He said he had to go back to Mozambique to get "new instructions." Kissinger: Isn't Nkomo in Saudi Arabia? Grennan: He'll be back. We'll have to go to Mozambique. They will never meet except together. Kissinger: Kaunda could probably produce him in one of his back rooms. The problem is how the black leaders will see this. Whether it looks like our final position, or whether it will be another Annex C. Grennan: They never saw Annex C, did they? Kissinger: But I thought that on every mission we talked the substance of Annex C. Grennan: The substance. That's right. Richard: Smith told me several times he had never seen the text of Annex C until after he left Pretoria. Kissinger: That's technically correct. We told him the five points were a summary of the paper, and it was a joint paper between you and us that we would stand behind. He went back to Salisbury and left his man there for a day to work on the economic paper. We gave it to him that evening. So Smith got it by Monday morning, before his caucus meeting. He never said "I've read Annex C and it's unacceptable." He wanted those two Ministers and the white chairman. After talking to Nyerere, I figured Smith should put it in rather than surface it later when it would look like a secret deal. Nyerere looked at it and said, "It's a miracle. You've done it. It's over!" [Laughter] So I cabled Smith that in my opinion he could put it in. I didn't say we'd back it; I didn't say Nyerere had accepted it. Kaunda was anguished and had some problems but on things like the ministers. Nothing major. Richard: One other question that has cropped up. Smith tried to get you to say "responsible" majority rule. He said you agreed. Kissinger: That's not correct. I don't even think I said it to Smith. Kissinger: I must have. Richard: I asked Van der Byl: How many white voters are there? He said 90,000. I said "You can't enfranchise 100,000 blacks and call it majority rule." He said "what about 150,000?" This is how he's thinking. Kissinger: How many would Annex B enfranchise?5 Richard: Oh, three million. Kissinger: I may have said it wouldn't be more than Nkomo's plan. But no further. Are you going to Salisbury? Grennan: We wanted the South Africans' advice on this. At this moment they've suggested this. Because of the Christmas holidays. Kissinger: But I think it's a lot better to let the South Africans present it to Smith, or prepare Smith. Richard: Some softening-up process would be good. Squire: This is where we would want Pik Botha's views. Do I understand it: On the first round what you said to Smith was critical, after talking to the South Africans. On this round, should we put it to Smith? Kissinger: No, we didn't deal with Smith. I refused to talk to him until the South Africans had prepared him. Richard: You'll put this to the South Africans and urge them to support this? Kissinger: Yes. But I wouldn't talk to Smith first. Tactically I think you're better off seeing the South Africans first. Richard: I'd like to see Smith. I'd also like to see the Bishop in Salisbury. Squire: [to Richard:] You'll have a free day before Salisbury to allow a South African input. Richard: Yes. Kissinger: Are you going to Gabarone? Grennan: Yes. Maybe Joshua will come there. Kissinger: I think Kaunda, if you put it to him, will produce Nkomo. 5 Annex B of the British paper given to Kissinger in September concerned proposals for the composition of Parliament and voting qualifications. See Document 202. Grennan: Yes. But we don't want early on to give the impression we're trying to split him from Mugabe. Richard: I saw Joshua alone, between us, about four times in Geneva. On the whole, you're a lot better off seeing him alone; he's reasonable. Kissinger: The Africans have impressed me with their cold-blooded appreciation of power. I wouldn't assume he's made a mistake; I'd ask what it is that makes him think it's in his interest. Grennan: He assumes he can control Mugabe. That's I think his mistake. Kissinger: That I agree. You will brief Edmondson? Richard: Yes, every day. We'll show him everything. Kissinger: You'll see Cy Vance? Richard: Yes, tomorrow. Kissinger: He may not want to take a position. We didn't have these papers when he was in town. Richard: But he can see them as far as we're concerned. I saw Andy Young. Kissinger: How is he? Richard: Fine, but he will have problems. As soon as he gets instructions to veto Chapter VII sanctions, as he sure as hell will, it will be a problem. Kissinger: I wouldn't say he "sure as hell will." Grennan: [laughs] From HMG's point of view, he'd better. Richard: I'll tell him the new element is to inject a British presence. Squire: Ivor, did you want to ask the Secretary about public guidance? Richard: I think it should be much the same as you and Crosland said in London. Kissinger: And you gave me your impressions on your trip. Squire: And when he sees Cy Vance, would it help to talk about continuity of policy? Kissinger: You'd have to ask him. I have no objection whatever. Squire: It would help allay some suspicions. Kissinger: I have no problem with that. [The luncheon broke up. At Amb. Richard's request the Secretary autographed and inscribed a copy of World Restored.] 236. Memorandum of Conversation1 Washington, December 24, 1976, 8:35-10:20 a.m. PARTICIPANTS Ambassador R.F. Botha, South African Permanent Representative to the United Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State Amb. William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Kissinger: Where are you going to spend Christmas? Here in town? Botha: Yes. My mother is here in town. Kissinger: Really? What does she think of this heathen country? Kissinger: So is South Africa. Botha: But the dimensions seem greater. Botha: I spoke to my Prime Minister the day before yesterday. He sends his regards. Kissinger: Yes. Botha: And Brand Fourie also. Kissinger: When you speak to both of them, give them my best wishes for the New Year. Botha: Thank you. Kissinger: Did Richard present his ideas? Botha: Yes. He wants to see my Prime Minister. My Prime Minister will see him on January 3. But he'll have to go down there. Kissinger: To the Transkei. [Laughter] Botha: The way he put it to me, I must say, wasn't as bad as I thought it would be. Kissinger: Let me tell you the history of it. They had something which was as bad as it could be. Then we sent Reinhardt, Wisner and Edmondson there to work on it. It's now as far as I think we can push them. A lot depends on what the British Resident Commissioner will in fact do. Whatever they call it. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 346, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, November 1976-January 1977. Secret; Nodis. Initialed by Rodman. The breakfast meeting was held in the Monroe-Madison Room at the Department of State. Brackets are in the original. Rodman: Interim Commissioner. Kissinger: Is that what you understood? If the Resident Commissioner votes with the whites, there is a blocking vote. Botha: I asked him where the power would be. He said: Although we can't say it publicly, it's this guy. Kissinger: It's more or less true. First, these Ministers will be a mess. Each delegation picks four. In the plan they gave us, the judiciary and civil service stay in place, and the military, except for some senior officers. It votes by majority, except when someone asks for a special vote. Any of the communities, or the Resident Commissioner, can ask for one. Botha: Who can call for it? Kissinger: Any of the communities. When there is a special vote, the council becomes 31. So the Resident Commissioner, by abstaining or voting with the whites, can block it. Botha: This is far worse. Kissinger: Than the Council of State, which no longer exists. Kissinger: That required a two-thirds vote. Theoretically, the whites could block it. Botha: He didn't give me these details. [Laughter] Kissinger: What did he give you? I don't believe in playing around. Botha: He said there was a blocking third. He didn't tell me they have it only when the Commissioner votes with you. Kissinger: He said theirs could be five members of the Rhodesian Front. Then the Resident Commissioner appoints five more whites. First it was required that they be non-Rhodesian Front. We protested this, and now it's three Rhodesian Front. So it depends on whether the whites stick together. Botha: They won't. If they pick people like Todd, they'll vote with the blacks, with the powers that will be. Kissinger: This is how they presented it. On the basis that the non-Rhodesian Front got 20 percent of the vote. Don't go back to Richard with these. Botha: I won't be seeing him. Kissinger: Then there is the National Security Council, composed of five ministers who represent the five delegations in Geneva, plus the Resident Commissioner, plus the three Chiefs of Staff. They'll be British. They would proceed by majority. Here the whites have a blocking majority. Botha: How? |
