whose stipulations were to be "religiously observed;" a treaty decreeing "a perfect, firm, and inviolable peace and sincere friendship" between the two nations; a treaty in which, as compensation for specified" advantages and favors," the United States "positively and efficaciously" guaranteed to New Granada "the perfect neutrality of the Isthmus" and, in the same manner, "the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the said territory; " a treaty terminable on 12 months' notice. The practical interpretation and application of the treaty are plain. Under date of February 10, 1847, only two months after the initiation of the treaty, President Polk, in a special message to the Senate, said:

There does not appear any other effectual means of securing to all nations the advantages of this important passage, but the guarantee of great commercial powers that the Isthmus shall be neutral territory.

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The guaranty of the sovereignty of New Granada over the Isthmus is a natural consequence of this neutrality. New Granada would not yield this province that it might become a neutral State; and if she should, it is not sufficiently populous or wealthy to establish or maintain an independent sovereignty. But a civil government must exist there to protect the works which shall be constructed. New Granada is not a power which will excite the jealousy of any nation.

The neutrality guaranteed to New Granada undoubtedly referred to foreign nations only. It was against interference by an outside government, interference which might, among other evil results, interrupt the transit from the one to the other sea. Similarly the guaranty of New Granada's "rights of sovereignty and property was the primary reference to an invasion by a foreign power, which might imperil the isthmian transit. And since the paramount issue in the case of both the neutrality and sovereignty which the United States guaranteed was the safeguarding of the transit, there was a valid implication that the United States, on due occasion and especially at New Granada's request, would give aid against transit interference from any source whatever, whether foreign or domestic.

The direct authority, however, to be cited by the United States as warrant for the aid actually given to New Granada (now Colombia) in the maintenance of free isthmian transit, as also the clear ground of the duty of the United States to render such aid, is in the fact that by the treaty of 1846 New Granada distinctly pledged herself to keep the said transit inviolate for the free use of the Government and citizens of the United States.

The Government of New Granada guarantees to the Government of the United States that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of Panama upon any modes of transportation which now exist, or that may be hereafter constructed, shall be open and free to the Government and citizens of the United States, and for the transportation of any articles of lawful commerce belonging to the citizens of the United States.

That guaranty by New Granada, in a treaty of "peace, amity, navigation, and commerce," a treaty to make lasting and firm the friendship and good understanding" of the two nations, established a relation between the United States and New Granada, in which mutual aid became not only rightful, but also assured. Henceforth it was to be implicitly relied upon that if the weaker nation was temporarily incapable of a perfect fulfillment of its guaranty, the stronger nation would, upon request. lend assistance. In New Granada's guaranty, acknowledged by the United States as an "ad

vantage and favor" received, is the original and sufficing basis for the right and obligation of helpful interference by the United States in the emergency of transit interruption. A corroborative, complementary basis also exists in the avowed motive and purpose of the counter guaranty by the United States of New Granada's neutrality and sovereignty-" with the view that the free transit from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed in a future time while this treaty exists." Yet the prime basis' lies in New Granada's pledge, which the United States gratefully accepted. But beyond the bounds of such reciprocal right and obligation the United States might not go. In emergencies other than the disturbance of interoceanic transit or peril to the persons and possessions of Americans there might be no intervention in the affairs of New Granada (now Colombia). By the law of nations and the terms of the treaty itself, Colombia, as the successor of New Granada, was the sovereign peer of the United States.! Save for the main purpose of protecting free transit and thus safeguarding her own interests in such transit, the United States might no more land her forces on Colombia's soil, or even threaten such landing, than she might land her forces, or threaten to land them, on the soil of Russia or Japan. r

Nor is even this the full measure of the restraint which the Executive of the United States was bound to recognize and respect. It has been conceded that the guaranteed neutrality and sovereignty had reference to foreign powers. But it is to be borne in mind that in guaranteeing Colombia's neutrality and sovereignty as against foreign powers the United States distinctly decreed and surpassingly emphasized her own exclusion from acts of invasion. She determinately erected an impassable barrier against her own interference with Colombia's independent authority, and this in the simple fact that she herself was a "foreign nation." The treaty inhibition affected her first of all. She virtually named herself in the guaranty, and the guarantor, being thus included in the inhibition, was, beyond all others, forbidden to violate its terms. Otherwise it were as if the guardian of a dependent child should record his oath and give his bond to defend his charge against all unlawful acts and then should himself expropriate his ward's possessions and assume dictatorial control. It were as if an officer of the law, sworn to uphold the citizen's rights and to lay violent hands on no man save by statufory warrant and command, should wantonly assail the helpless and ruthlessly strike down the unoffending. Being a nation foreign to Colombia, the United States, in her "positive and efficacious" guaranty, freely placed herself under supreme restraint.

With the civil wars of Colombia the United States had no concern, save as they harmfully affected the persons or possessions of American citizens or interrupted or endangered isthmian transit and traffic. Yet on November 6, 1903, Colombia was informed that—

The President holds that he is bound to see that the peaceable traffic of the world across the Isthmus of Panama shall not longer be disturbed by a constant succession of unnecessary and wasteful civil wars.

The official records are open. Those records will either uphold the presidential assertion or they will prove it to be wild and inexcusable. Let it be seen to what extent, from the establishing of the

isthmian transit was so disturbed that the interference of the United States was required.

In March, 1865, our Panama consul was apprehensive of harm from local lawlessness, and a few marines guarded the consul and other citizens for 13 hours. In May, 1873, a small force of marines and sailors protected the persons and property of American citizens in Panama for 15 days. In September of the same year a similar service was rendered for 16 days. In January, 1885, 12 marines guarded property in Colon for 13 hours. Later in the same year Isthmian transit was seriously interrupted and forces were landed for 56 days. Toward the close of 1901 protection of transit was required for 14 days. In the autumn of 1902 transit was guarded for 62 days.

Thus, during full 40 years United States forces were employed in only 7 instances and for a total period of 164 days. In each case the forces were employed with Colombia's approval. In no case was there fighting, the mere precautionary measures being sufficient. In no case did the force exceed 824 men. Moreover, in 4 out of the 7 instances there was no "interruption of transit," only an apprehension of peril to persons and property. In fine, isthmian transit was interrupted in only 3 instances in the 40 years of Colombia's history, and for only 132 days.

Yet the President officially represented that isthmian transit had been disturbed almost incessantly for many years; that interruption was the chronic condition. A constant disturbing cause bringing about a virtually constant disturbance. In the comparison, the increase of Falstaff's men in buckram-"eleven grown out of two". was accuracy itself; three reduplicated into an implied constant succession. What of the author of such assertions? It would appear that he then took for his motto, "Throw mud vigorously, some of it will stick "-"Asperge fortiter, aliquid adhærebit." That was on November 6, 1903.

Meantime, on June 25, 1902, the President gave his approval to the act commonly called the Spooner Act, looking toward the construction of an isthmian canal. That act embodied the decision of the United States in favor of the Panama route. It authorized the President to acquire, if possible, at a cost not to exceed a certain sum, "the rights, privileges, franchises, concessions," and all other assets of the "New Panama Co."; and to obtain from Colombia on such terms as he considered to be fair, perpetual control (not cession) for canal purposes of a strip of land from ocean to ocean not less than 6 miles wide, such control to include the emergent defense of the canal, the instituting of needful legal tribunals, and the making and enforcing of the requisite police and sanitary regulations. The act also provided that if, from the canal company and the Colombian Government the President was unable to obtain satisfactory terms within a reasonable time, the route known as the Nicaragua route should be adopted.

After the passage of the Spooner Act the Colombian administration-not Colombia in propria persona, but only the Colombian administration-initiated negotiations in favor and furtherance of the Panama route. Those negotiations led, on January 22, 1903, to the well-known Hay-Herran convention. In that convention Colombia was to give to the United States jurisdiction over the desired

strip of land and to concede the right to construct and operate a canal for the period of 100 years, renewable at the option of the United States for periods of a similar duration. The convention reaffirmed Article XXXV of the treaty of 1846, and explicitly provided that only in exceptional circumstances, on account of unforeseen or imminent danger to the canal, railways, or other works, or to the lives and property of the persons engaged upon them, should the United States employ its armed forces, without previously obtaining the consent of Colombia; and that as soon as sufficient Colombian forces should arrive, those of the United States should be withdrawn. But the Hay-Herran convention being simply an agreement between the respective administrations, was necessarily dependent for its vital force upon its ratification by the respective Senates. It was expressly stipulated that

The convention, when signed by the contracting parties, shall be ratified in conformity with the laws of the respective countries.

The Washington administration has urged that any two governments, in initiating a treaty, "bind themselves, pending its ratification, not only not to oppose its consummation, but also to do nothing in contravention of its terms." That is true of governments in the limited sense of the executive, the administration, but it does not apply to the attitude and act of a nation's congress; and in the final event the ratifying power is to proceed in accordance with its own reasoning and conviction, no matter what administrations may have stipulated or done. Furthermore, as the canal company could in no case transfer its rights and possessions without the consent of Colombia, the first article of the Hay-Herran convention provides:

The Government of Colombia authorizes the New Panama Canal Co. to sell and transfer to the United States its rights, privileges, properties, and concessions, as well as the Panama Railroad and all the shares or parts of the shares of that company.

Of course, that and the other provisions of the administrational agreement were to come before the Colombian Senate for consideraion; and that senate, like any other independent legislature, was bound to take full cognizance of the matter and freely discuss all offered amendments. Yet even before the Colombian Senate convened the American minister to Colombia, on April 24, 1903, addressed the following note to the Colombian minister of foreign

relations:

I am directed to inform your excellency, if the point should be raised, that everything relative to this matter is included in the convention recently signed between Colombia and the United States, and that, furthermore, any modification would be violative of the Spooner Act and therefore inadmissible.

Again, and still in advance of the session of the Colombian Senate, the minister of foreign relations was advised that

If Colombia should now reject the treaty or unduly delay its ratification, the friendly feeling between the two countries would be so seriously compromised that action might be taken by the Congress next winter which every friend of ! Colombia would regret.

And after the Colombian Senate was in session, on August 5, 1903. further warning was sent through the Colombian minister of foreign relations to the effect that apparently the force of the notes of April

sion of the opinion or intentions" of the Washington Government. The warning proceeded:

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If Colombia desires to maintain the friendly relations which at present exist between the two countries, and at the same time to secure for herself the extraordinary advantages that are to be produced for her, the present treaty will have to be ratified exactly in its present form, without amendment whatsoever.

Yet the Hay-Herran instrument itself provided that "The convention, when signed by the contracting parties, shall be ratified in conformity with the laws of the respective countries." Assuredly! Else the mere Executive, the mere administration, would have full and final authority in matters involving the nation's vital interests-to a fatal usurpation of the power of the Congress. The Senate of the United States has again and again amended and rejected treaties which had been duly negotiated by the administration. Still, the Washington administration peremptorily forbade Colombia's Senate either to amend or reject!

Was this attempted coercion "not only technically justifiable, but demanded by every ethical consideration, national and international"? Was it "as free from scandal as the public acts of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln "? In utmost soberness of inquiry, did any civilized representative of superior power ever indulge in browbeating so pitiable and so pitiless? Can such cowardly disrespect be matched in the annals of treaty-making nations? And that, on the part of the Executive of a great Republic which professed to do justice and to love mercy, and against a nation helpless, yet standing in a relation of acknowledged equality of sovereignty and independence! A nation at whose hands we had confessedly received important "advantages and favors"! A nation to which we were bound by an inviolable treaty of "peace and amity," of "friendship and good understanding," a treaty whose stipulations were to be "religiously observed"! That nation coolly informed that if, in the exercise of her indisputable prerogative, she followed what might be her.patriotic judgment she should suffer a retribution whereat the ears of them that heard should tingle!

What must be the character and culture of the President who proudly affirms that such was his highest conception of what was "demanded by every ethical consideration" and should be "a matter of pride to every honest American"?

After long and vehement debate and postponement to an extra session, the American Senate, on March 17, 1903, ratified the treaty. After long and earnest debate the Colombian Senate, on August 12, 1903, despite the President's unveiled threat, refused ratification, and adjourned on October 31.

It is to be distinctly observed at this point that, while there was no stipulation for the absolute cession to the United States of the Canal Zone, there was to be perpetual occupancy and jurisdiction-periods of 100 years, with the option of renewal by the United States but no option of rejection by Colombia-the construction of vast and permanent works, the right to safeguard those works, along with police and sanitary control. The constitutional authorities in the Colombian Senate held that such a grant, although less than absolute cession, was contrary to the nation's organic law. They regarded it as, so far forth, a surrender of national sovereignty, not