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(2) As all the judgments in law were held in the same right and against the same parties, and as their validity depended upon the same facts, the defendant therein, in order to avoid a multiplicity of actions, and the vexation and costs arising from numerous executions and levies, was entitled to bring one suit for a final decree determining the matter in dispute that was common to all the parties; and as, under the rules of equity, such a suit could be brought in a court of the United States, the aggregate amount of all the judgments sought to be annulled was the value of the matter in dispute; consequently, the cause was removable so far as the amount involved was concerned;

(3) A Circuit Court of the United States in the exercise of its equity powers, and where divers citizenship gives jurisdiction over the parties, may deprive a party of the benefit of a judgment fraudulently obtained by him in a state court, if the circumstances are such as would authorize relief by a Federal court if the judgment had been rendered by it and not by a state court, as a decree to that effect does not operate upon the state court, but upon the party;

(4) Where a suit in equity is, in its general nature, one of which a Circuit Court of the United States may rightfully take cognizance, upon removal, it is not for a state court to disregard the right of removal upon the ground simply that the averments of the petition or bill in equity are insufficient or too vague to justify a court of equity in granting the relief asked. It is for the Federal court, after the cause is docketed there, and upon final hearing, to determine whether, under the allegations and proof, a case is made which entitles the plaintiff to the relief asked. Marshall v. Holmes, 589.


See EQUITY, 5;












JURISDICTION, A, 3, 10; B, 1, 2; C, 8; RECEIVER, 2.

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1. Where a tax deed in Illinois is relied on as evidence of paramount title, it is indispensable that it be supported by a valid judgment for the taxes, and a proper precept authorizing the sale. Gage v. Bani, 344. 2. It is well settled in that State that a tax title is purely technical, and depends upon a strict compliance with the statute; and that the giving of the particular notice required by the statute is an indispensable condition precedent to the right to make a deed to the purchaser or his assignee. Ib.

3. The owner of land in Illinois, sold for the non-payment of taxes, or of special assessments, is entitled to be informed in the statutory notice whether the sale was for the non-payment of a tax, or of such an assessment; and a notice which informs him that the sale was made "for taxes and special assessments, authorized by the laws of the State of Illinois" is a defective notice.


4. The right of an occupant of land in Illinois, sold for the non-payment of taxes or special assessments, to personal notice of the fact of sale, before the time of redemption expires, is expressly given by the Constitution of Illinois, and is fundamental: and upon a direct issue whether such notice was given, the owner testifying that he did not receive

notice, the evidence should be clear and convincing that it was
given as required by law, before the tax title can be held to be para-
mount. 16.

See Local Law, 2.

TRUST. A trust deed, covering real estate, provided that in the case of a sale by

the trustee, at public auction, upon advertisement, all costs, charges and expenses of such advertisement, sale and conveyance, including commissions, such as were at the time of the sale allowed by the laws of Illinois to sheriffs on sale of real estate on execution, should be paid out of the proceeds. Held, (1) that this provision did not impose upon the borrower the burden of paying to a lender a solicitor's fee where a suit was brought for foreclosure; (2) that the commissions referred to in the deed are allowed only where the property is sold, upon advertisement, by the trustee, without suit. Fowler v. Equitable Trust Co., 384.






USURY. 1. The question of usury, in a loan made in 1873 to a citizen of Illinois by

a Connecticut corporation — the loan being evidenced by notes of the borrower payable in New York, and secured by mortgage upon real estate in Illinois, is to be determined by the laws of the latter State pursuant to its statute providing, in substance, that where any contract or loan shall be made in Illinois, or between citizens of that State and any other State or country, at a rate legal under the laws of Illinois, it shall be lawful to make the principal and interest payable in any other State or Territory, or in London, in which cases the contract or loan shall be governed by the laws of Illinois, unaffected by the laws of the State or country where the same shall be made payable.

Fowler v. Equitable Trust Co., 384. 2. It is settled doctrine in Illinois that the mere taking of interest in ad

vance does not bring a loan within the prohibition against usury; but whether that doctrine would apply where the loan was for such period that the exaction by the lender of interest in advance would, at the outset, absorb so much of the principal as to leave the borrower very

little of the amount agreed to be loaned to him is not decided. Ib. 3. A contract for the loan or forbearance of money at the highest legal

rate is not usury in Illinois, merely because the broker who obtains a loan but who has no legal or established connection with the lender as agent and no arrangement with the lender in respect to compensa


tion for his services - exacts and receives, in addition to the interest

to be paid to the lender, commissions from the borrower. 16. 4. If a corporation of another State, through one of its local agents in

Illinois, negotiates a loan of money to a citizen of the latter State, at the highest rate allowed by its laws, and the agent charges the borrower, in addition, commissions for his services pursuant to a general arrangement made with the company, at the time he became agent, that he was to get pay for his services as agent in commissions from borrowers, such loan is usurious under the law of Illinois, although the company was not informed, in the particular case, that the agent

exacted and received commissions from the borrower. 16. 5. In Illinois, when the contract of loan is usurious, the lender, suing the

borrower for the balance due, can only recover the principal sum, diminished by applying as credits thereon all payments made on account of interest. In such cases, whatever the borrower pays on

account of the loan goes as a credit on the principal sum. Ib. 6. A Connecticut corporation made in 1876 a loan of ten thousand dollars

for five years at nine per cent to a citizen of Illinois, the loan being evidenced by note, secured by deed of trust on real estate in the latter State, providing that nothing contained in it should be so construed as to prevent a foreclosure by legal process, and that upon any foreclosure the corporation should recover in addition to the principal, interest and ordinary costs, a reasonable attorney's or solicitor's fee, not exceeding five per cent for the collection thereof. It was also stipulated in the deed, that the decree or order for foreclosure should direct and require that the expenses of such foreclosure and sale, including the fees of solicitor and counsel, be taxed by the court at a reasonable amount, and paid out of the proceeds of the sale. The highest rate allowed by the laws of Illinois at the time of the loan was ten per cent. The borrower paid the agent of the company a commission of $150 under such an arrangement as that referred to in the case of Fowler v. Equitable Trust Co., 141 U. S. 384. Held, (1) that the payment of these commissions to the company's agent did not make the contract usurious, because if that sum was added to the nine per cent stipulated to be paid, the total amount of the interest exacted was less than the highest rate then allowed by law; (2) the stipulation in the deed of trust providing for the payment by the borrower, in addition to ordinary costs, of a reasonable solicitor's fee, not exceeding five per cent, for collection in the event of a suit to foreclose, did not make the contract usurious under the law of Illinois. Fowler v. Equitable Trust Co., 411.




A testator gave all his estate, real and personal, to his executors for the

term of twenty years, “in trust, and for the uses, objects and pur-
poses hereinafter mentioned,” and authorized them to make leases not
extending beyond the twenty years, and to lend money on mortgage
for the same period; and, “after the expiration of the trust estate
vested in my executors and trustees for the term of twenty years after
my decease,” devised and bequeathed one-fourth part of all his estate,
subject to the payment of debts and legacies, to his widow, one-fourth to
his daughter, one-fourth to his brother, and one-fourth to his nephew;
gave certain legacies and annuities to other persons; directed his exec-
utors to pay a certain part of the income to his brother“ until the final
division of my estate, which shall take place at the end of twenty years
after my decease, and not sooner;” that no part of his estate should
“ be sold, mortgaged (except for building) or in any manner encum-
bered, until the end of twenty years from and after my decease, when
it may be divided or sold for the purposes of making a division be-
tween my devisees as herein directed;” and also that, in the event of
any of the legatees or annuitants being alive at the end of the twenty
years, there should then be a division of all his estate, "anything
herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding; and in such case
my executors, in making division of the said estate, shall apportion
each legacy or annuity on the estate assigned to my devisees, who are
hereby charged with the payment of the same according to the appor-
tionment of my said executors ;” and further provided as follows: "It
is my will that my trustees aforesaid shall pay the several gifts, lega-
cies, annuites and charges herein to the persons named in this will,
and that no creditors or assignees or purchasers shall be entitled to any
part of the bounty or bounties intended to be given by me herein for
the personal advantage of the persons named ; and therefore it is my
will that, if either of the devisees or legatees named in my will shall
in any way or manner cease to be personally entitled to the legacy or
devise made by me for his or her benefit, the share intended for such
devisee or legatee shall go to his or her children, in the same manner
as if such child or children had actually inherited the same, and, in
the event of such person or persons having no children, then to my
daughter and her heirs." He also declared it to be his wish that W.,
one of his executors, should collect the rents and have the general
supervision during the twenty years; and further provided that the
share devised to his daughter should be conveyed at the expiration of
the twenty years, for her sole use, to three trustees to be chosen before
her marriage by herself and the trustees named in the will, and the
net income be paid to her personally for life, and the principal be con-
veyed after her death to her children or appointees; and that, in the
event of his wife's marrying again, the share devised to her should be
held by his trustees for her sole use. Held, (1) That the powers con-

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