they take no interest, they take great interest in many other matters with which they have no concern. On the third reading of the Bill in the House of Lords, the Marquis of Waterford proposed and carried a provision which might have been of great practical importance, providing that the man who utters defamatory words at a public meeting which are consequently reported in a newspaper, shall be held answerable for their publication in the paper, just as though he had directed the reporter so to print and publish them. The clause as introduced by the noble Marquis was as follows: "Where any person makes a speech to a meeting, and a report containing libellous words, purporting to be a report of such speech, is published in any newspaper, then, on proof that the words so published, or words of like import, were uttered by the person making such speech, that person shall, in the event of any civil proceedings being instituted against him for libel in respect of such words, be deemed for the purposes of such proceedings to have himself written and published the libellous words attributed to him in such report, or words of like import. The report so published shall be primâ facie evidence of the words therein attributed to the speaker having been spoken, but it shall be competent to him to prove any inaccuracy in the report of any matter explaining the words attributed to him. Such proceedings, if taken, shall be in substitution for, and not in addition to, any proceedings, whether civil or criminal, that may be instituted against him." The Marquis of Salisbury moved to insert the following proviso: "Provided also, that no proceeding under the section shall be taken more than two months after the words were uttered," which was agreed to; and Lord Monks well then moved the following addition: "Provided also that the speaker shall be entitled to any defence of privilege arising from the occasion on which the words were spoken which he would have had in case the spoken words had been of themselves actionable," which was also carried. But in the end the House of Commons (which contains so many speakers whose words are always reported) rejected the whole section. It was no doubt intended as a corollary to section 4, which renders the newspaper report privileged in certain circumstances. It is right that the speaker who first utters the words complained of should be held responsible for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of his act; but I think the section should have been limited to cases where the speaker either knew or ought to have known that reporters were present, and would take down his words. Four clauses of the Bill passed through both Houses without any amendments-the two formal sections 1 and 2, and sections 6 and 9, which are both of obvious value. Section 9 allows the defendant and his wife to give evidence in prosecutions for libel. Section 6 enables the defendant to prove at the trial of a civil action that the plaintiff has already recovered damages or brought actions for substantially the same libel-a fact which always tends to mitigate the damages. Under the law as it previously existed, the defendant could crossexamine the plaintiff if he went into the box about other actions; but he was bound by plaintiff's answer, and could not call any evidence to contradict it, as such evidence would have been irrelevant to any issue in the case. For the same reason interrogatories as to such other actions were disallowed in Tucker v. Lawson, 2 Times L. R. 593. But that decision is now no longer law, so far as newspapers are concerned. It is, in my opinion, a great pity that the beneficial provisions of section 6 should be limited to libels contained in a newspaper. Precisely the same considerations apply to booksellers and circulating libraries, and they ought to be protected in the same way. Instances have occurred in which a plaintiff has recovered heavy damages, first from the publishers of a book, then from Messrs. Mudie and Messrs. Smith & Son, and has then proceeded to attack various small booksellers up and down the country, who had sold some two or three copies in the ordinary way of their business without the least suspicion that the book contained a word libelling any one. I should like to see the words "contained in a newspaper struck out of this section; so that, like sections 5 and 9, it might apply to all libels. But, in spite of the trifling defects which I have thus ventured to point out, there is no doubt that the Law of Libel Amendment Act, 1888, is a useful and practical measure, for which its framer, Lord Glenesk, deserves the thanks of all journalists and the congratulations of the public. APPENDIX C. STATUTES. CONTENTS. 1. 32 Geo. III. c. 60 (Mr. Fox's Libel Act) 2. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96 (Lord Campbell's Libel Act) 3. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 75 4. 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76 (C. L. P. Act, 1852), s. 61 5. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 83 6. 44 & 45 Vict. c. 60 (Newspaper Libel and Registration Act, 1881) 748 749 752 753 ib. 7. 46 & 47 Vict. c. 57 (Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883), 8. 32. 8. 51 & 52 Vict. c. 64 9. 52 & 53 Vict. c. 18 10. 54 & 55 Vict. c. 51 (Law of Libel Amendment Act, 1888) 11. 58 & 59 Vict. c. 40 (Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1895) 1. MR. FOX'S LIBEL ACT.* 32 GEO. III. c. 60. An Act to remove Doubts respecting the Functions of Juries in Cases of Libel. [A.D. 1792.] WHEREAS doubts have arisen whether on the trial of an indictment or information for the making or publishing any libel, where an issue or issues are joined between the king and the defendant or defendants, on the plea of not guilty pleaded, it be competent to the jury impanelled to try the same to give their verdict upon the whole matter in issue: Be it therefore declared and enacted by the King's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present Parliament * This Act is "only declaratory of the common law." Per Brett, L.J., 5 C. P. D. at p. 539; see ante, p. 588. assembled, and by the authority of the same, that on every such trial the jury sworn to try the issue may give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty upon the whole matter put in issue upon such indictment or information, and shall not be required or directed by the Court or judge before whom such indictment or information shall be tried to find the defendant or defendants guilty merely on the proof of the publication by such defendant or defendants of the paper charged to be a libel, and of the sense ascribed to the same in such indictment or information. 2. Provided always, that on every such trial the Court or judge before whom such indictment or information shall be tried shall, according to their or his direction, give their or his opinion and directions to the jury on the matter in issue between the king and the defendant or defendants, in like manner as in other criminal cases. 3. Provided also, that nothing herein contained shall extend or be construed to extend to prevent the jury from finding a special verdict, in their discretion, as in other criminal cases. 4. Provided also, that in case the jury shall find the defendant or defendants guilty it shall and may be lawful for the said defendant or defendants to move in arrest of judgment, on such ground and in such manner as by law he or they might have done before the passing of this Act, anything herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding. See ante, pp. 101, 587, 638. 2. LORD CAMPBELL'S LIBEL ACT. 6 & 7 VICT. c. 96. An Act to amend the Law respecting Defamatory Words and Libel. [24th August, 1843.] IN any action for defamation it shall be lawful for the defendant (after notice in writing of his intention so to do, duly given to the plaintiff at the time of filing or delivering the plea in such action) to give in evidence, in mitigation of damages, that he made or offered an apology to the plaintiff for such defamation before the commencement of the action, or as soon afterwards as he had an opportunity of doing so, in case the action shall have been commenced before there was an opportunity of making or offering such apology. See ante, pp. 369, 569, 692. 2. In an action for a libel contained in any public newspaper or other periodical publication it shall be competent to the defendant to plead that such libel was inserted in such newspaper or other periodical publication without actual malice, and without gross negligence, and that before the commencement of the action, or at the earliest opportunity afterwards, he inserted in such newspaper or other periodical publication a full apology for the said libel, or, if the newspaper or periodical publication in which the said libel appeared should be ordinarily published at intervals exceeding one week, had offered to publish the said apology in any newspaper or periodical publication to be selected by the plaintiff in such action, and that every such defendant shall, upon filing such plea, be at liberty to pay into Court a sum of money by way of amends for the injury sustained by the publication of such libel, and such payment into Court shall be of the same effect and be available in the same manner and to the same extent, and be subject to the same rules and regulations as to payment of costs and the form of pleading, except so far as regards the pleading of the additional facts hereinbefore required to be pleaded by such defendant, as if actions for libel had not been excepted from the personal actions in which it is lawful to pay money into Court under an Act passed in the session of Parliament held in the fourth year of his late Majesty, intituled An Act for the further amendment of the law, and the better advancement of justice," and that to such plea to such action it shall be competent to the plaintiff to reply generally denying the whole of such plea. See ante, pp. 369, 571, 573, 608, 693. 3. If any person shall publish or threaten to publish any libel upon any other person, or shall directly or indirectly threaten to print or publish or shall directly or indirectly propose to abstain from printing or publishing, or shall directly or indirectly offer to prevent the printing or publishing, of any matter or thing touching any other person, with intent to extort any money or security for money, or any valuable thing from such or any other person, or with intent to induce any person to confer or procure for any person any appointment or office of profit or trust, every such offender, on being convicted thereof, shall be liable to be imprisoned, with or without hard labour, in the common gaol or house of correction, for any term not |
