1. Previously to a marriage, the intended husband and wife agreed in writing, that the husband should have the wife's property for his life, he paying her £80 pin-money, and that she should have it after his death. They gave instructions for such a settlement, which was prepared accordingly, when they agreed to have no settlement; the husband promising, as the wife alleged, to make a will giving her her property. The marriage took place, and the husband made a will accordingly; but afterwards made a different will. Held, that there had been no part performance to take the case out of the statute of frauds.-Caton v. Caton, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 137.

2. If a landlord verbally agrees to grant his tenant a lease for a new term at an increased rent, but dies before executing the lease, payment of a quarter's rent, at the increased rent, before his death, is sufficient part performance to take the case out of the statute of frauds.— Munn v. Fabian, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 35.

3. The plaintiff having contracted to supply goods to C. for cash, the defendant promised the plaintiff, that, if he would supply the goods to C., drawing upon C. at one month, and would allow the defendant three per cent on the amount of the invoice, he would pay the plaintiff cash, and take C.'s bill "without recourse," -that is, buy the bill of him,-held, that this was a promise to answer for the debt or default of another within the 4th section of the statute of frauds.-Mallet v. Bateman, Law Rep. 1 C. P.

163.

4. A letter, written by A. to his agent, referring to letters of the agent, stating the terms on which the latter has made a contract on A.'s behalf for the purchase of goods, is a sufficient memorandum to bind A. under the 17th section of the statute of frauds.-Gibson v. Holland, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 1.

5. A written contract was made for the sale of goods, to be delivered within a specified time. Before the time for delivery, the parties agreed orally to extend the time for delivery. Held, that the oral agreement was not "good" under the 17th section of the statute of frauds, and could not operate as a rescission of the written contract; which might therefore be enforced.-Noble v. Ward, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 117.

HEIR.

A. gave by will real and personal property to B. for life, remainder to B.'s sons in tail,

remainder to his own right heirs. B. died without issue, and, claiming to be A.'s heir, disposed of the property by will. A.'s sole next of kin then tiled a bill to recover the personal estate from B.'s executors, alleging that A. left no heir; or that, if he did, it could not be ascertained who was such heir. B.'s executors ertered into evidence to prove that B. was heir. The evidence did not establish this, but shewed that A. must have left an heir. The plaintiff offered no evidence. The court refused to direct an inquiry whether there was an heir, and dismissed the bill.-De Beauvoir v. Benyon, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 212.

HIGHWAY.

1. On a bill filed by the vestry of a parish to remove a building over a way, alleged to have been dedicated to the public for forty years, it appeared that for the first twenty years there had been a lease from the owner with a right to build over the way; that then the lease became merged in the inheritance; and that, since, the vestry had claimed the way as belonging to them for the exclusive use of the parish. Held, that the suit could not be maintained on its merits.-Bermondsey v. Brown, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 204.

2. Horses grazing on the side of a turnpike, under control of a man in charge of them, cannot be impounded as "wandering, straying, or lying," about the road, under 4 Geo. IV., c. 95, § 75.-Morris v. Jeffries, Law Rep. 1 Q.B. 26. HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. A recital in a marriage settlement of an agreement to settle after acquired property of the wife, does not control a covenant by the husband alone without the words "it is hereby agreed," and the wife is not bound.— Young v. Smith, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 180.

2. If the husband of a woman who has become entitled to property for life, under a will which provides that on her death without children the property shall go to her personal representative, covenants in a a post-nuptial settlement, that all the property which may thereafter, during the period of the joint lives of himself and his wife, devolve on her, shall be her separate property, the above-mentioned property, on the wife's death without children, is not subject to the covenant, and does not go to the executor named in the wife's will, but to the husband as general administrator.- Wyndham's Trusts, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 290.

3. A legacy, to which a woman becomes entitled during coverture, may be settled so as to give her husband a life-interest, determinable

5. An order enabling a married woman, without her husband's concurrence, to dispose of her revisionary interest in stock, on her affidavit that she was living apart from her husband by mutual consent, will not be rescinded, after the rights of third parties have intervened, on an affidavit of the husband, that, though he generally resided apart from her on an allowance out of her estate, he occasionally visited and slept with her.-In re Rogers, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 47.

See MARRIAGE; POWER, 5; SEPARATE USE. ILLEGAL CONTRACT.-See CONTRACT; LEASE, 3. INDICTMENT.

An indictment for refusing to aid a constable, and to prevent an assault on him by persons in his custody, with intent to resist their lawful apprehension, need not show that the apprehension was lawful, nor aver that the refusal was on the same day as the assault, nor that the assault which the defendant refused to prevent was the same as that which the prisoners made on the constable, nor is it an objection that the assault is alleged to have been made by persons already in custody; and a warrant of a refusal, without an allegation that the defendant did not aid. is sufficient.-The Queen v. Sherlock, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 20. INFANT.

1. A father, a beneficed clergyman of the Church of England, appointed his widow and a clergyman, guardians of his two infant children. The widow became a member of the sect of Plymouth Brethren. On the application of the other guardian, the court ordered the children, twelve and fifteen years old, to be brought up as members of the Church of England, and restrained their mother from taking them to a chapel of the Plymouth Brethren. The court paid no regard to the fact, that the father was well affected towards dissenters, and associated with them; nor was it influenced by the wishes of the infants. In re Newbery, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 431; and S. C. on appeal, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 263.

2. After a decree absolute for the dissolution of a marriage, on the ground of the husband's

adultery and cruelty, the court, being of opinion that neither the father nor mother were fit to be intrusted with the custody of the children, gave it to interveners, relatives of the husband; but directed that the parents should be allowed reasonable access. Chetwynd v. Chetwynd, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 39.

INJUNCTION.

1. A mandatory injunction may be granted where the injury is completed before the filing of the bill, whether the injury is to easements or to other rights; but such injunction will be granted only to prevent very serious damage. -Durell v. Pritchard, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 244.

2. A claim of a writ of injunction cannot be pleaded to.-Booth v. Taylor, Law Rep. 1 Ex.

51.

See CARRIER, 5; COVENANT, 1, 2; LEASE, 4; LIGHT, 2; MORTGAGE, 1; NUISANCE; PATENT; PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 4; TRADE MARK, 3.

INNKEEPER.

A licensed victualler cannot be convicted of opening his house on Sunday for the sale of wine, &c., "the same not being for the refreshment of any traveller," if he has opened his house for the bonâ fide supply of refreshments to travellers by a railway train, from the mere fact that refreshment has been supplied to persons residing within a mile of his house who did not come by the train.-Peache v. Colman, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 324.

INSOLVENCY See BANKRUPTCY.
INSURANCE.

1. A vessel insured "at and from" Havana was injured by coming in contact with an anchor after entering the harbor of Havana, and whilst passing over a shoal to her place of discharge. Held, that the policy had attached. Haughton v. Empire Marine Insurance Co., Law Rep. 1 Ex. 206.

2. A ship-owner effected a policy on freight from a colonial port. The master, without the knowledge or privity of the owner, stowed a portion of the cargo, which was timber, on deck; and sailed without any certificate from a clearing officer, that the whole cargo was below deck, contrary to 16 and 17 Vict. c. 107, SS 170-172. Held, that no authority could be implied in the master to load the cargo, so as to violate the statute; neither was it an act of the master which the owner must be presumed to have assented to; that the ship's having sailed without the certificate did not render her unseaworthy so as to prevent the policy attaching; and that therefore the insured could recover on a loss by a peril insured against.Wilson v. Rankin, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 162.

3. A policy of insurance, written on the common printed form of a marine policy, contained the following words:-" At and from I to N., the risk to commence at the lading of the cable on board, and to continue until it be laid in one continuous length between I. and N., and until one hundred words shall have been transmitted each way. The ship, &c., goods, &c., shall be valued at £200 on the Atlantic cable, value, say on twenty shares, at £10 per share;" and also, "it is agreed, that this policy, in addition to all perils and casualties herein specified, shall cover every risk and contingency attending the conveyance and successful laying of the cable." The attempt to lay the cable failed, through its breaking while being hauled in to remedy a defect in insulation; but half the cable was saved. Held, that the policy was on the "adventure," and the plaintiff could recover for a total loss.- Wilson v. Jones, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 193.

4. By an insurance policy, plate-glass in the plaintiff's shop front was insured against damage "originating from any cause whatsoever, except fire, breakage during removal, alteration, or repair of the premises," none of the glass being "horizontally placed or movable." A fire broke out on premises adjoining the plaintiff's, and slightly damaged the rear of his shop, but did not approach the part where the glass While the plaintiff was removing his stock to a place of safety, a mob, attracted by the fire, broke the window for the purpose of plunder. Held, that the proximate cause of the damage was the lawless act of the mob, and that the damage was not within the exception. -Marsden v. City and County Assurance Co., Law Rep. 1 C. P. 232.

was.

5. An insurance policy on plate-glass windows, effected through L., the local agent of the defendant company, was subject to a condition, that, in case of loss, notice must be given to some known agent of the company. After the making of the policy, but before loss, the defendants transferred this branch of business to another company. Held, that notice of loss by the plaintiff (who did not know of this transfer) to L., who made his report thereon to the latter company, was sufficient.-Marsden v. City and County Assurance Co., Law Rep. 1 C. P. 232.

6. A mere agent having no lien on goods for advances, commission, or otherwise, nor the possession or custody of them as carrier or other bailee, nor any liability to account for their loss by perils insured against, has no insurable interest in them, though he is named as shipper and consignee in the bill of lading.

-Seagrave v. Union Marine Insurance Co., Law Rep. 1 C. P. 305.

7. An insurance company paying under a decree on a lost policy are not entitled to any indemnity from the persons to whom payment is made.-England v. Lord Tredegar, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 344.

See PARTICULARS.

INTEREST.

See MAINTENANCE; MORTGAGE, 3; PARTNERSHIP, 3; VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE, 7.

INTERROGATORIES.

1. In an action of trover, an interrogatory to the plaintiff, how, when, and from whom, he obtained the property, was disallowed; as was also an interrogatory as to the plaintiffs's dealings with the person from whom the defendant obtained the cotton, the defendant not making affidavit that there had been any dealings, or that he had made inquiry of that person.Finney v. Ferwood, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 6.

2. To an action by surviving partners for goods sold, money lent to, and on accounts stated with, the defendant, by them and their late partner, and to a similar action by the executors of the late partner, the defendant having pleaded a settlement of the account between him and the deceased, by bill not due, interrogatories were allowed to be put to the defendant as to the circumstances of the alleged settlement.-Hawkins v. Carr, Law Rep. 1 Q. B.

89.

3. In an action for a breach of contract whereby the plaintiff's patent became void, laying as damages loss of profits, the defendants, who had paid money into court, were refused leave to deliver interrogatories to ascertain the probable value of the patent.-Jourdain v. Palmer, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 102.

4. It is irregular to demur alone to part of a bill when interrogatories have not been filed, and the time for filing them has not expired.Rowe v. Tonkin, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 9.

5. A bill may be dismissed for want of prosecution, though the plaintiff's enlarged time for answering interrogatories filed by the defendant has not expired.-Jackson v. Ivimey, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 693.

JOINT STOCK COMPANY.-See COMPANY.
JURISDICTION,

If a cause, brought in a superior court, is tried in a county court by a judge's order, the jurisdiction to grant a new trial remains in the superior court.-Balmforth v. Pledge, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 427.

JURY.

1. The record of a conviction for a capital felony showed, that, on the trial, the jury being unable to agree were discharged by the judge, and that the prisoner was again put on trial and convicted. Held, that the judge had a discretion to discharge the jury, which could not be reviewed on writ of error; and that there was no error on the record.- Winsor v. The Queen, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 289. Confirmed on appeal. Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 390.

2. It is no ground for error, either in fact or law, that the whole of the special jurors struck were not summoned; or that the special jury panel was called over and that a tales prayed before 10, A. M., the time for which the special jurors were summoned.-Irwin v. Grey, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 171.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

1. One who occupies as his own another's land, and before the end of twenty years becomes tenant to that other of land adjacent to the land so occupied, can, while he remains tenant, acquire against the landlord a prescriptive title to the land first occupied.-Dixon v. Baty, Law Rep. 1 Ex, 259.

2. To raise the presumption that an encroachment on waste land by a tenant was made for the benefit of his landlord, the land encroached on need not be contiguous, in the sense of being coterminous with the land held by him as tenant.-Earl of Lisburne v. Davies, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 259.

3. If a servant occupies premises of his master, rent free, as part remuneration, if the occupation is subservient to the services, the occupation is that of the master: if it is not so subservient, the occupation is that of a tenant, and the servant is a "substantial householder" within 43 Eliz. c. 2, and therefore eligible as overseer of the poor.-The Queen v. Spurrell, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 72.

See LEASE; TENANT FOR LIFE AND REMAINDER
MAN, 5.

LEASE.

1. A., in 1861, underlet to B. for twenty-one years from Michaelmas, 1861. In 1864, he underlet the same premises to C. for twenty-one years from Michaelmas, 1863, at the same rent. B. never attorned to C. Held, that the demise to C. did not pass the reversion, but only an interesse termini.-Edwards v. Wickwar, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 403.

2. An agreement by A., tenant from year to year, to let to B. “ all his right, title, and interest" in the premises, provided that, if B. should not be accepted as a tenant by F. and

H.. the landlords, subject to the terms mentioned in the margin (which were,-" F. and H. agree to grant B. a lease of thirty-five years, at £200 rent, &c.), the agreement should be void, is not well declared on as a contract by A., that F. and H. should grant the lease, and make good title.—Tweed v. Mills, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 39.

3. A lessee of a house, which he knew had been used inany years as a brothel, assigned the lease absolutely, knowing that the assignee intended to use the house in the same way. The original lease contained covenants to deliver up in good repair, and not to use as a brothel, and the assignment contained a covenant to indemnify the lessee from the covenants in the lease. The lessee had to pay for repairs at the end of the lease. Held, that he could not recover the amount so paid from the assignee, everything arising out of the assignment being so tainted with the immoral purpose.Smith v. White, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 626.

4. The underlessee of a person, who has covenanted not to carry on a certain trade, will be restrained from carrying it, though such covenant is not in the original lease, but only in an assignment, and though the underlessee had no actual notice of it. So also an assignee of the under lessee.-Clements v. Welles, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 200.

66

5. Under a stipulation in an agreement to release to A. without adding or his assigns," that the lease should contain all usual covenants for the lessor's protection, held, that the lease need not contain a covenant against alienation. Buckland v. Papillon, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 477.

6. In August, 1856, the plaintiff agreed to let a house to the defendant for seven, fourteen, or twenty-one years; the defendant to repair, paint, and paper; and the defendant was let into possession. In 1859, the parties agreed that W. should be accepted as tenant in room of the defendant, upen the same terms, the defendant guaranteeing the rent. W. had just before this been let into possession by the defendant, and paid rent till 1863, when the defendant gave a notice to determine his tenancy at the end of the first seven years. W. and the defendant both denied their liability to paint and paper according to the original agreement. Held, on bill filed in November, 1864, that the defendant could not be compelled to accept a lease.-Moore v. Marrable, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 217. 7. Under an agreement to let a house for three years at a yearly rent, by which the landlord agreed, at the tenant's request, to grant a lease for a term from the expiration of the three years' occupancy at the same rent, the tenant

March, 1867.]

to keep the house in repair,-held, that the tenant was entitled, four years after the expiration of the three years, to have the agree ment specifically performed; and that neither application by him two years before for a lease at a reduced rent (which was refused), nor an application for repayment of money spent on repairs (which was allowed), was a waiver, but that he was bound to refund the cost of the repairs.-Moss v. Barton, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 474. 8. If lands are limited in fee defeasible, but if all persons who would be entitled in any event are before the court, leases may be granted under 1 Wm. IV. c. 65, which enacts, that, if any infant is seised of land in fee or tail, the court may grant leases.—In re Clark, Law Rep.

1 Ch. 292.

9. Leases granted by the governor of New Australia, of crown lands, sealed with the public seal of the province, but not enrolled or recorded in any court, are not records, and cannot be annulled or quashed by a writ of scire facias.-The Queen v. Hughes, Law Rep. 1 P. C. 81.

See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 2; LANDLORD AND TENANT; PARTIES, 2; POWER, 3; Rent; SpeCIFIC PERFORMANCE, 3; TENANT FOR LIFE AND REMAINDER MAN, 4, 5.

LEGACY.

1. A testatrix gave to A. for life the interest of £300, or thereabouts, invested by her in a certain company, and the interest of £200; and, after A.'s death, she gave the "said principal sum of £500" toA's. children, and directed, if her personal estate proved insufficient for the payment of legacies, the deficiency should be made up out of her real estate. By a codicil, she gave "all her personal estate" to B. Held, that the whole personal estate passed by the codicil; that the legacy of £300 was specific and was revoked, but that the legacy of £200 remained charged on the real estate.-Kermode v. Macdonald, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 457.

2. A bequest, after the death of J. (to whom an annuity was given out of the fund), to E. for life, but in case of E.'s death during J.'s life, then to M. for life, and after the decease of both E. and M., over: J. died, and afterwards E. Held, that M. had a life estate.-Smith's Trusts, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 79.

3. A testator, having five sons, gave an annuity to one (a lunatic), and a legacy “to each of my sons," naming only the other four, and directed that his residuary personal estate should be invested in stock, "the interest therefrom to be divided half-yearly between my four sons above-named, and, at the decease

of either without lawful issue, such share to revert to the remainder then living, their child, or children." Held, 1st. That the four sons only were entitled; and 2nd. That they took only for life, with an estate by implication to their issue, living at their death, as joint tenants.-Dowling v. Dowling, Law Rep. 1 Eq.

442.

4. Bequests of stock to A. for life, remainder to any wife he might thereafter marry for life or widowhood; remainder to A.'s children absolutely; and if A. should die unmarried and without issue, then, from and after his decease, to B., C., and D., in equal shares; or to such of them as should be living at A.'s death, his, her, or their executors, administrators, and assigns absolutely. A. survived B., C., and D.; and died a widower, without ever having had a children;" child. Held, that "issue" meant " that "unmarried" meant " without leaving a widow;" and that the representatives of B., C., and D. took the legacy in equal shares.-Sanders's Trusts, Law Req. 1 Eq. 675.

5. In a gift to daughters for life, with remainder to the child or children of such daughters, as they should appoint; in default of appointment equally, and, on the death of such of said daughters after twenty-one as should die without issue, her share to be paid to her personal representative,-held, that "issue" means children; and "personal representative." administrator or executor.- Wyndham's Trusts, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 290.

6. Bequests by will, made in 1857, of "my shares in the Great Western Railway." At the date of the will, testatrix had no shares, strictly speaking, in any railway company; but she had Wilts and Somerset stock of the Great Western Railway, and also preference and other stock of the Great Western Railway, which was increased by further purchase of stock in same company after the date of the will. Held, that all the Great Western and Wilts and Somerset stock, held by the testatrix at her death, passed by the bequest.-Trinder v. Trinder, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 695.

7. Bequest of thirty-three shares in a company among four children, and bequest of "the remaining shares" to a godchild. The testatrix held seventy-four shares, of which thirty-seven were original paid-up shares of £25; and thirtyseven, new £25 shares, on which £15 was paid, and which had been allotted to the holders of original shares by way of bonus. Parol evidence to show that the testatrix was in the habit of treating, and intended to treat, the the shares as double shares (so as to pass to