Page images

siders refusal on the part of incarcerating officials to notify or permit notification to the nearest American Embassy or Consulate as mistreatment. Posts abroad continue to vigorously protest any mistreatment of American arrestees. This segment indicates that these actions are having a positive effect in this area.


To provide a meaningful assessment of the assistance rendered by embassy and consulate personnel to American citizens incarcerated in foreign countries, the Inspector General of the Department has been requested to provide a special evaluation of these services in regularly scheduled inspections of overseas posts. The Inspectors also evaluate the performance of the consular section and of the senior management of each post.

The Office of the Inspector General reviewed the reports of 27 inspection trips conducted during calendar year 1978 (involving 85 Missions, 57 Consulates/Consulates General, five Consular Agencies, two Branches of Embassy, two Interests Sections and one detached Consular Office), for the purpose of assessing the performance of these posts in providing assistance to American citizens imprisoned abroad. During the periods of the inspections the Inspectors found American citizens incarcerated in 45 Consular Districts. Appropriate services were being rendered to these American citizens in 44 of the 45 districts; only in the case of the Consulate at Isfahan, Iran did the Inspectors recommend that the Consular Officers increase the rate of their visits to a monthly basis. The Inspectors noted that all posts were visited on a monthly or more frequent basis, with the exception of London, Reykjavik and Goteborg, Sweden; they recommended the latter two posts increase the rate of visits to a monthly basis; however, these recommendations were due to the regulations then in force, not to any belief that the lesser frequency was inappropriate. Inspectors recommended that Consular personnel at Bombay be more aggressive in seeking out information on American citizens arrested in the State of Goa (which does not automatically notify the Consulate General). They also instructed the Consular Sections at Addis Ababa, Hamilton and Isfahan to report on arrested American citizens as prescribed. Generally, the Inspectors found during calendar year 1978 that all Consular personnel were well aware of requirements concerning American citizens imprisoned in their areas, and had commendably good attitudes toward meeting their responsibilities. The Inspectors remarked especially on the performance of personnel in Addis Ababa and Benin, where local authorities are generally uncooperative, and in Chad, Colombia, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria (Kaduna), Panama, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates and Zambia, where local bureaucratic practices sometimes result in delay of notifications of arrests. Other posts singled out for special commendation in regard to services to prisoners were Cameroon, Denmark, Greece, Iran (Tabriz), Italy (Naples), Liberia, Madagascar, Norway, Pakistan (Lahore), Seychelles, United Kingdom (Belfast and Edinburgh) and Venezuela (Caracas).

The Inspectors noted that Consular Conventions are being negotiated with Botswana, Lesotho and Turkey. They recommended also exploring the possibility of Consular Conventions with Colombia, Liberia, Nigeria, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tanzania and United Arab Emirates.

While not directly affecting the manner in which posts provide services to American citizens, Inspectors remarked on problems in the African and Near East regions that could potentially affect these services, especially the lack of sufficient experienced or trained back-up personnel for American Officers or Foreign Service national personnel in smaller posts, and the lack of appropriate language training for American Consular Officers, especially in the Near East area. Attachments:

1. Tabulation of Assistance Provided by Posts to American Citizens Incarcerated Abroad-CY 1978.

2. Americans Arrested Abroad, CY 1978 Report (5 segments).1

1 The statistical summaries on the five segments (1. Worldwide Summary; 2. Prisoner Profile Report; 3. Charges Report; 4. Drug Charges, and 5. Mistreatment Report) are being retained in Committee files.


stan, Afghanistan, Burma, and Thailand. A similar effort is under
for multilateral aid to the coca-producing areas of South America.

Late last year I met with French and German officials to dis
means of coordinating bilateral assistance programs representing t
United States at the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) :
Geneva, I continued these discussions with European counterpart

Secretary of State Vance also has discussed this issue with
counterparts in developed countries. In addition, he has instrut
U.S. Ambassadors in Western European capitals to keep the iss
economic assistance to poppy-producing regions before their

On a multilateral basis the Department of State is working ce with the Department of the Treasury to insure that multilaterals velopmental banks (MDB's) complement our international nar control objectives. Since most of the world's narcotic-producing a are found in lesser developed countries, the primary recipients of velopmental assistance from lending institutions such as the We Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Inter-Ameri Development Bank (IDB). Working with Treasury, we have bre the U.S. executive directors of these institutions. Our American rep sentatives have been instructed to work to insure that loans from the banks do not contribute to increased narcotics production, but inste provide poor populations with the economic alternatives to ena them to abandon narcotics production.

Closely related to the efforts of our executive directors, we are e couraging both multilateral and bilateral aid donors to consider the of "poppy clauses" or similar provisions in their assistance agreemen Such clauses stipulate that as a condition for receiving assistance t recipient government undertakes not to permit narcotic product in the areas benefitting from such assistance. Last April the Unit States canceled an AID irrigation project in the Dau Jui area of A ghanistan because terms of an antiopium side letter to the proje agreement were not being enforced. The World Bank is requiring cipients of its agricultural loans in Afghanistan to certify that tu will not produce opium, and the ADB is considering use of a p clause in its joint project with UNFDAC in Afghanistan's Upp Helmand Valley project.

The trans-Asian heroin problem is immense, with great potenta for harm to the United States as well as other regions of the world. is therefore vital that we succeed in our efforts to marshal the resour of other industrialized countries to counter this threat.

In addition to the adverse health effects of drugs such as cocaine an marihuana, this administration has taken full cognizance of the de structive economic and social impact which their illicit trafficking can have on the United States and other countries, particularly our L American neighbors. We are especially concerned over the war which the tremendous profits generated by this trade fuels crimina ctivities, distorts legitimate economies, and engenders political cor Over the past 2 years increased significantly efforts to control the inter ruption. Thus, while maintaining our emphasis on heroin, we have

Interrupting the flow of cocaine and marihuana from Latin America to the United States is extremely complex and requires a multi

[ocr errors][ocr errors]


faceted control strategy. Only within the past 2 years has this problem been addressed fully from the standpoint of controlling sources as well as interdicting the traffic on both the South American land mass and in the Caribbean region. However, the amounts of cocaine and marihuana being smuggled into the United States has kept pace with the steady rise in demand for them. As with heroin, exact statistics about the traffic and use of cocaine and marihuana are not possible to obtain. The Drug Enforcement Administration's best current estimates, however, indicate that in 1978, cocaine imports into the United States totaled between 19 and 25 metric tons. For marihuana, DEA believes the figure is close to 15,000 metric tons yearly. Interdicting this flow of drugs from entering our borders has been a high priority of our Government, and particularly of the Drug Enforcement Administration. (DEA), the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard. Although Peru and Bolivia are the source of coca for the manufacture of cocaine, the Drug Enforcement Administration estimates that as much as 70 percent of that cocaine coming into the United States transits Colombia. Moreover, DEA estimates that perhaps 70 percent of the marihuana entering this country comes from or through Colombia. As these illicit substances leave Colombia for this country, the problem becomes primarily one of interdiction. Because approximately three-quarters of that traffic moves through the Caribbean, that region has become a major focus of interdiction efforts by the U.S. narcotics

control agencies.

Given the prevailing smuggling patterns, cooperation with the Govfore it disperses over the entire Caribbean region. Within the past 2 ernment of Colombia is essential as we seek to interdict the traffic beyears sustained high-level exchanges between our two governments have raised narcotics control to top priority in United States-Colombia continued the drug control commitment of their predecessors and have bilateral relations. President Turbay and his administration have The most striking example of Colombia antinarcotics commitment has been the recent North Coast interdiction campaign focused on the Guajira Peninsula. This 6-month campaign designed to close down the Guajira as Colombia's major trafficking center achieved significant Success. During the campaign Colombian authorities captured 27 aircraft and 59 vessels engaged in narcotics smuggling. Additionally, approximately 455 traffickers were arrested while authorities seized 1,034

tons of marihuana.

Perhaps the most significant elements of the Guajira effort has been the commitment of the Colombian military for the first time to sustained antinarcotics activity. Involvement of the military's greater material and personnel resources has created the potential for similar campaigns in other regions of the country, such as the Llanos, the Choco, and along the southern border, all of which are real or potential

producing or transit areas.

ciency of its own narcotics control and judicial apparatus. Creation of The Colombian Government has taken measures to improve the effia central narcotics unit under the Attorney General has been a proThis centralization promises to improve coordination and reduce dupli

[ocr errors][ocr errors]


cation of effort through combining the functions of five separate agencies. The Turbay administration has also undertaken a study of its judicial system in order to improve processing of narcotics related


At the diplomatic level, Colombia has demonstrated its willingness to enter into international agreements relating to narcotics control. The Department of State, in cooperation with other Federal agencies, is working with the Colombian Government to negotiate procedures for or agreements covering extradition, maritime boarding and seizure, joint prosecution, banking, prisoner exchange, and return of aircraft. Colombia is also demonstrating its interest in cooperating closely with its South American neighbors on the narcotics issue. In December Colombia and Venezuela signed an anti-narcotics agreement setting up a joint commission to further cooperative action. Negotiations are now underway between Colombia and Peru on a similar agreement.

For fiscal year 1980 the Department of State is requesting a total of $2,042,000 to support Colombian narcotics control organizations. Of this total, $1.3 million will be to provide support to the Attorney General's narcotics unit. Another $290,000 will defray the costs of two U.S. Customs advisers and limited equipment to enhance the narcotics interdiction capability of Colombia's Customs Service. The remainder of the request will provide administrative and program development support.

Of particular importance this past year have been the increasing emphasis on maritime narcotics interdiction, and the close, effective cooperation of U.S. law enforcement agencies with their counterparts from other governments in the region. Intelligence estimates indicate that approximately 70 percent of the marihuana and substantial quantities of cocaine entering the United States is moved by vessel through the Caribbean area.

Fortunately, our law enforcement agencies are becoming increasingly successful at intercepting smuggling vessels on the high seas. In 1978 the Coast Guard seized 1,700 tons of marihuana and 140 vessels engaged in marihuana smuggling. U.S. Customs seized an additional 222 vessels in our territorial waters, netting 1,000 tons of marihuana and 60.9 kilograms of cocaine.

The key to improved vessel interdiction is improved intelligence. Currently, approximately 20 percent of the smuggling vessels seizures are the result of previous intelligence, usually from the network of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents in the Caribbean area. Since last summer the U.S. Navy has been providing the Coast Guard additional intelligence by reporting sightings of suspect vessels. Additionally, during the Commandant of the Coast Guard's recent trip through the Caribbean and Latin America he proposed to his foreign counterparts a regional arrangement for reporting at sea sightings of possible smuggling vessels. The Latin American response was favorable and the Department of State is providing diplomatic and limited financial support as the Coast Guard moves to implement its plans.

By international law, the Coast Guard cannot board and seize suspected narcotics smuggling vessels on the high seas without first obtaining permission from the government under whose flag they sail. Such permission can usually be obtained through our embassies on an ad hoc basis. At times, however, unavoidable delays have enabled

[merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][ocr errors]



1. Prisoners at time of Inspection visit: Services to prisoners appropriate:

(a) Visited on more than monthly basis:

[blocks in formation]

2. Prisoners at time of inspection visit: Improvements needed in services to prisoners:

Iran (Isfahan)-should visit prisoners monthly.

3. No prisoners at time of inspection visit: Rendered appropriate services in past and/or aware of all requirements:

[blocks in formation]
« PreviousContinue »