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heavy U.S. investment, and a major trade potential—which require some involvement with the white authorities. These interests are sometimes at odds in fact, and sometimes because others—in Africa or here at home-regard them so. A recent example was the call of the Carrier FDR at Capetown, which was suddenly cancelled by the Johnson Administration after a major furor by U.S. civil rights groups.
(3) Finally, the NSC should have the arguments on all the options open to U.S. policy in dealing with the white regimes. I think Dean Acheson had a point in his recent conversation with you that State has been tied rather stubbornly to one track on this aspect of the problem. There is clearly a legitimate case for a quite different policy than the current posture toward the white regimes.
If you approve, we can schedule a NSC session on Southern Africa for mid-May. Recommendation:
That you authorize me to sign the NSSM on Southern Africa at Tab A. Approve NSSM Disapprove Speak to me
3 Nixon initialed this option.
The President has directed a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward Southern Africa (south of Congo (K) and Tanzania).
The study should consider (1) the background and future prospects of major problems in the area; (2) alternative views of the U.S. interest in Southern Africa; and (3) the full range of basic strategies and policy options open to the United States.
The review of interests and policy options should encompass the area as a whole-including Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, the Portuguese territories, and adjacent African states.
The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa perform this study.
The study should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by April 25th.
Henry A. Kissinger
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-144, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 39. Secret. Haig initialed the memorandum. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Administrator of AID, and Acting Director of NASA.
Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate
Washington, May 2, 1969, 2141Z.
69050. Subj: SWA 10. Ref: Cape Town 1488.?
1. Agree representations along lines reftel timely and appropriate both here and Cape Town.
2. Suggest Embassy avail self first opportunity make known growing concern USG. Be sure you leave no doubt continued application TA and similar legislation inhabitants of SWA, including both detention and criminal proceedings, is central issue. If SAG has support it claims among people such measures superfluous as well as contrary to rule of law and illegal in their application to international territory. Their continuance can only entrench rejection by moderate overseas opinion of bona fides of SAG development objectives SWA and qte outward looking unqte initiatives.
3. Avoid any implication we suggest continued detention under section 6 TA4 rather than trial under TA. Former more heinous than latter. Moreover, propriety any trial, whether for TA, other statutory or common law offenses, vitiated if trial follows after detention under section 6 TA. Thus, trial of qte Tenunqte for common law offenses can be viewed as in right direction only if SAG moves to cease application TA and similar legislation to SWA and SWAfricans. Moreover, dropping Sobukwe clause, however helpful, vis-à-vis parliamentary opposition, likely be lost on international community if TA remains, especially in its application SWA.
1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 29 SW AFR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Runyon; cleared in AF, UNP, L, EUR/SCAN, and EUR/BMI; and approved by Crosby. Repeated to Pretoria, Helsinki, Lusaka, London, Stockholm, Geneva, Durban, and Johannesburg.
2 "1488" is an error; reference is to telegram 639 from Cape Town, May 1. In that telegram, Rountree proposed the Department consider démarches to the South African Government expressing concern over the treatment of Southwest Africans, especially the use of the Terrorism Act against SWAPO. (Ibid.)
3 In telegram 684 from Cape Town, May 9, Rountree reported on his meeting with Fourie, during which the Ambassador expressed U.S. concerns regarding the upcoming trial of Southwest Africans. Rountree reported that Fourie made notes during the meeting, but his "comments were mainly to seek clarification.” Rountree also asked about replies to previous démarches on Southwest Africa and was told that replies were forthcoming. (Ibid.)
Section 6 of the Terrorism Act (1967) allowed someone suspected of involvement in "terrorism" to be detained for an indefinite period without trial on the authority of a senior police officer.
5 In early 1969, 10 members of SWAPO were detained in Pretoria. The “Ten" were advised on February 22 that they would be tried under the Terrorism Act. The trial began on July 1, 1969.
4. Dept preparing for oral démarche to Embassy here at appropriate level. May profit slightly from groundwork extensive discussions Justice Steyn, substance of which on rule of law side presumably conveyed Taswell. Will keep you informed.
5. Appreciate very much your efforts paras 1 and 2 reftel.
6 General Law Amendment Act 37 of 1963 allowed the South African Government to detain political prisoners beyond the length of the prisoners' original sentences. It was referred to as the “Sobukwe clause" because it was used to extend the 3-year prison sentence of Pan Africanist Congress leader Robert M. Sobukwe for an additional 3 years. Sobukwe was the only person imprisioned under this clause.
Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security
Washington, May 5, 1969.
Chrome Imports and Rhodesian Sanctions
At Tab A is a memo from Bob Haldeman telling you that the President has made a policy decision on imports of Rhodesian chrome on the strength of a recommendation from Pat Buchanan.” (Buchanan's piece is at Tab B.)Haldeman is asking you to implement the decision.
This is the first I have heard of this process. The major U.S. chrome companies in Rhodesia-Union Carbide and Foote Mineral—are always lobbying hard to obtain relief from sanctions. And OEP is taking up their case (for its impact on our stockpiles) in the context of the
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Rhodesia, Vol. I. Confidential; Sensitive. Sent for action.
2 Tab A, dated May 1, is attached but not printed.
ongoing NSC review of Southern African policy. * Buchanan's memo is clearly an end-run around the NSC channel. The problem is that there are several issues here in honest dispute within the Government, and the President should certainly see all sides of the question before making a final decision. Here is a brief run-down:
1. The first UN Security Council Resolution on mandatory Rhodesian sanctions in December 1966—which the U.S. implemented by Presidential Executive Order still in force—specifically prohibits UN members from importing chrome from Rhodesia.
2. There was provision accompanying our Executive Order to issue licenses for chrome imports from Rhodesia in certain “hardship cases." This was generally interpreted to cover imports of chrome which had left Rhodesia prior to the adoption of the Security Council Resolution but were still in transit after its adoption.
3. Union Carbide and Foote Mineral are now asking for an import license for some 200,000 tons of chrome which had not left Rhodesia prior to December 1966. Buchanan argues that both companies should be given the licenses because they paid for this ore prior to the sanctions.
In fact, Foote's 57,000 tons of this total was not even mined until 1967–68—and even then with money which was licensed by the U.S. on the clear understanding that (a) the mining would only serve to keep the Foote mine operating as a salvageable U.S. property in Rhodesia, and (b) none of the ore so mined would be licensed for import to the U.S. in violation of the sanctions. Union Carbide's 150,000 tons was paid for after the Security Council Resolution, yet just before the formal U.S. Executive Order. Thus, in both cases the legal point here about when the ore was paid for is by no means clear cut.
4. The merits of the chrome sanctions—as for all sanctions—are certainly arguable. Honest men will disagree about the general impact of sanctions on the Smith regime, the hardship to U.S. industry, the market benefits to other chrome suppliers like the Soviet Union, etc. All these points bear on the license for this deal.
5. Buchanan argues, for example, that the sanctions have brought "serious pressures" on the domestic chrome industry. Yet there is a 1to 2-year supply of chrome presently available in the U.S. There are significant quantities of chrome purchased from our stockpile but still unused by the purchaser. And chrome ore is available on the world market, albeit at higher prices.
4 See Document 6.
Resolution 232, adopted December 16, 1966, prohibited the importation of chrome and other products from Rhodesia. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1966, pp. 116–117) Executive Order 11322 was signed on January 5, 1967.