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and legal groups), but there is evidence of Congressional opposition to U.S. voluntary contributions for training of southern African leaders.
-Would enhance U.S. standing with African states.
-Would be affirmation of UN responsibility for South West Africa.
-Funds involved would not be large.
-Inclusion of such funds in regular UN budget could open door for similar demands in relation to other programs for training southern African refugees.
-Could put UN (and U.S.) in position of promoting violent action or government in exile. No guarantee that UN-trained groups will restrict themselves to non-violent means. (Option 3)
Support referral to ICJ for advisory opinion on appropriate legal aspects of South Africa's administration of SWA.
-Would demonstrate U.S. commitment to human rights and our continued abhorrence of repressive policies of South Africa.
-Would undergird U.S. view of SWA as legally distinct from South Africa.
- Favorable advisory opinion would knock out South Africa's position that 1966 ICJ judgment undercut 1950 ICJ advisory opinion.
-No assurance African states would support another referral to court.
-ICJ ruling favorable to Africans could not be given practical effect. This will only stimulate pressures in UN by giving Africans additional legal reasons for demanding mandatory sanctions vs. South Africa.
-U.S. proposal of submission to ICJ is not likely to postpone immediate UN consideration of SWA issues.
The following measures parallel to proposals by the U.S.U.N. delegation would require extensive study as to feasibility and advisability prior to their consideration by the U.S. Government for possible action:
Support UN action under which members would terminate avoidanceof-double-taxation privilege for their investors in SWA.
Present Policy. U.S. investors in SWA are allowed credits on U.S. tax for taxes paid to South African Government on revenues from investments in SWA, or other means of avoiding double taxation. (Option 3)
Support measures to divert to UN tax and royalty revenues derived from foreign commercial activities in South West Africa. Annexes:6
A-Chart: Comparison of U.S. Actions under the Options
C-Memorandum to the Secretary of State from U.S. Delegation to 24th UNGA
D-Memorandum to L/AF from L/UNA, ICJ Advisory Opinions on South West Africa, February 27, 1970
E-Memorandum to AF/S from L/UNA and L/ AF, South West Africa, March 12, 1970
F-UNGA Resolution 2145 (XXI) Question of South West Africa
Annexes A-F are attached but not printed. Annex G is Document 24.
Memorandum for the Record
Washington, April 13, 1970.
NSC Review Group Meeting, 10 April 1970
1. The Review Group met at 1445 hours on 10 April under the chairmanship of Henry Kissinger to discuss the response to NSSM 89: “US Policy for Southwest Africa (Namibia)" ?
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01086A, Box 7, Subject Files, NSC Review Group Meeting Agenda/Minutes, Folder 223. Secret.
2 Document 29.
2. Mr. Kissinger opened the meeting by saying that this matter would not be brought before the NSC but would be handled by a memorandum to The President. It was ascertained that a Presidential decision was needed by 20 April so that the US representatives to the United Nations could be given instructions.
3. There was considerable discussion of the three options presented in the response to NSSM 89. All present agreed that regardless of the option selected, it is “just a matter of time" until the UK or the US would be forced to veto a resolution on imposing mandatory sanctions on South Africa.
4. State recommended Option 2-take selective actions in addition to present restrictions to dissociate ourselves from South Africa's illegal administration of the territory. State would want some flexibility in selecting specific courses of action under Option 2 with the addition of three other courses of action presented under Option 3 if necessary. Specifically, State would want authority to support a proposal in the United Nations for reporting on compliance with the arms embargo on South Africa, to provide funds for refugees from Namibia, and to support referral to the International Court of Justice for an opinion of some legal aspects of South Africa's administration of Southwest Africa.
5. JCS, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Commerce, and Treasury recommended Option 1–continue present restrictions on US activities in Southwest Africa but avoid any major new action involving the territory. When asked the position of the Agency, I said that it would be inappropriate for CIA to take a position on these policy questions. The OEP representative took a similar stand.
6. It is interesting to note that Mr. Shakespeare said that the people at USIA were for Option 2 and that he personally was for Option 1. Mr. Kissinger pressed Mr. Shakespeare for an agency position, and the response was Option 1.
7. All agencies that wish to express their positions are to do so in writing by close of business 13 April for inclusion in the memorandum to The President.
Edward W. Proctor Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence
3 Document 31.
Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National
Washington, April 15, 1970.
South West Africa (Namibia): Response to NSSM 89
Our earlier review of southern Africa touched briefly on South West Africa: NSDM 382 announced your decision that the issue be "downplayed” at the UN. The response to NSSM 89 (at Tab A) addresses the issue in more detail, in preparation for the forthcoming discussions in the UN.
In 1966, by a resolution we supported, the UN General Assembly terminated South Africa's League of Nations mandate for South West Africa, and declared the Territory to be under UN responsibility. In January, 1970, the Security Council created a subcommittee (of the whole) to study ways of implementing UN authority. This subcommittee is to report out recommendations by April 30, and these will be debated in the Council in May or June.
Ambassador Yost needs guidance on positions to take (1) in the drafting of the subcommittee's recommendations, and (2) in the formal debate.
The Africans will press for stronger measures, (e.g., mandatory sanctions), to assert UN responsibility for South West Africa. The US needs a posture which limits political damage while we essentially oppose this pressure. The response to NSSM 89 presents three alternative postures, which range from present policy (Option 1) to two levels of new operational steps dissociating us from South African policy in South West Africa and asserting UN responsibility (Options 2 and 3).
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-043, Senior Review Group Meetings, Review Group South West Africa 4/10/70. Secret. Sent for action. Tab A is printed as Document 29, Tab D is printed as Document 24; and Tabs B, C, and E are attached but not printed.
2 Document 23.
-Our present policy (Option 1) recognizes UN responsibility. We abstained in 1967, however, when the General Assembly created a Council on South West Africa to "administer" it, because we considered the terms of reference (to promulgate laws, etc.) unrealistic. We restrict US diplomatic and attaché visits, port calls and overflights in the Territory. We neither encourage nor discourage US investment there; we allow trade. We do not withhold diplomatic assistance or ExportImport Bank credit guarantees. We support some UN and some private US humanitarian programs for South West African refugees, but have not recently contributed to the UN Education and Training Fund for these refugees.
-Option 2 would (in addition to the above restrictions) limit US investment in South West Africa by verbally discouraging it, by terminating EXIM guarantees, and by withholding diplomatic assistance. It would encourage other countries to act similarly, and it would support referral of appropriate legal questions to the ICJ.
-Option 3 would (in addition to the steps in Options 1 and 2) consider much stronger measures against US investment and take more conspicuous initiatives in the UN to strengthen the arms embargo and refugee programs, and to revise the mandate of the General Assembly's Council on South West Africa (now the Council on Namibia).
Our problem in the UN is tactical, but there is a basic issue of strategy: Do we gain anything with the Africans by making concessions?
—The argument for new measures is that South Africa's occupation of the Territory is clearly illegal, and its extension of racial repression there is morally objectionable. Gestures of economic sacrifice would confirm our moral and legal stand against these policies and demonstrate our good faith to the Africans, who might then be more receptive to our counsels of moderation. Since we are prepared to veto any extreme proposals that may arise (e.g., mandatory sanctions), we have no reason to fear escalation of African pressures; demonstrations of our good faith will make it politically easier to veto if we have to.
– The argument against new steps is that there is no reliable bloc of African moderates, and the radicals are unappeasable. The Portuguese Territories, and apartheid in South Africa proper, will be raised in the UN very soon, too; US concessions on South West Africa will not dampen, and may even stimulate, pressures to do more on all these issues. Our sacrifices will gain us little or nothing; we may even be accused of hypocrisy if the sacrifices seem too modest. Individual Agency Views
Agency views are at Tab B. Defense, JCS, OEP, Commerce, Treasury and USIA recommend sticking to present policy (Option 1); Defense and JCS believe that new measures will only raise African expectations