the part of the allies, had now called down this mortifying castigation. But the best exposition of the merits of this question was made by the conqueror of Waterloo.

The Duke of Wellington heard with contempt the absurd and affected clamour which was propagated against him, until it was roundly alleged, that, in being accessary to the removal of these specimens of art, he had broken the convention of Paris, which he had himself ratified. He then Sept. 23. made public, in a letter to Lord Castlereagh, the grounds of his proceeding, and shewed plainly, that, so far from this property being guaranteed to France by the capitulation, a proposed article to that effect had been refused as inadmissible. The very proposal of such a stipulation argued the sense entertained by the French commissioners of the title of the allies to remove these pictures; and the rejection of that article, not only reserved entire, but greatly advanced their claim. The rest of the letter is in the same style of manly good sense, which characterizes all the duke's compositions.

"The conduct of the allies, regard ing the Museum, at the period of the treaty of Paris, might be fairly attri buted to their desire to conciliate the French army, and to consolidate the reconciliation with Europe, which the army at that period manifested a disposition to effect. But the circumstances are now entirely different. The army disappointed the reasonable expectations of the world, and seized the earliest opportunity of rebelling against their sovereign, and of giving their services to the common enemy of mankind, with a view to the revival of the disastrous period which had passed, and of the scenes of plunder which the world had made such gigantic efforts to get rid of.

"This army having been defeated

by the armies of Europe, they have been disbanded by the united council of the sovereigns, and no reason can exist why the powers of Europe should do injustice to their own subjects, with a view to conciliate them again. Neither has it ever appeared to me to be necessary, that the allied sovereigns should omit this opportunity to do justice, and to gratify their own subjects, in order to gratify the people of France. The feeling of the people of France, upon this subject, must be one of national vanity only. It must be a desire to retain these specimens of the arts, not because Paris is the fittest depository for them,-as, upon that subject, artists, connoisseurs, and all who have written upon it, agree that the whole ought to be removed to their ancient seat, but because they were obtained by military successes, of which they are the trophies.

"The same feelings which induce the people of France to wish to retain the pictures and statues of other nations, would naturally induce other nations to wish, now that success is on their side, that the property should be returned to their rightful owners, and the allied sovereigns must feel a desire to gratify them.

It is, besides, on many acccounts, desirable, as well for their own happiness, as for that of the world, that the people of France, if they do not already feel that Europe is too strong for them, should be made sensible of it; and that whatever may be the extent, at any time, of their momentary and partial success against any one, or any number of individual powers in Europe, the day of retribution must

come.

"Not only, then, would it, in my opinion, be unjust in the sovereigns to gratify the people of France on this subject, at the expense of their own people, but the sacrifice they would make would be impolitic, as it would

deprive them of the opportunity of giving the people of France a great moral lesson."

During these agitating transactions, the articles of peace, so necessary for all parties, were at length finally adjusted. They were of course dictated by the conquerors, with such modifications as the king could obtain by his personal influence with the allied sovereigns, or through the mediation of the Emperor Alexander, to whom the Duke of Richelieu had access as a valued servant.

The allies assumed, for the basis of the treaty, the principles consecrated by those of Chaumont and Vienna, but they were qualified by stipula tions tending to humble the pride of France, to deprive her, at least for some years, of the power of unsettling her own government, or disturbing the peace of Europe, and to indemnify the victors in some degree for the enormous expenses of this wonderful campaign. They were fixed by the protocol of the conference of the 2d of October, in the following terms :"1. The boundaries of France, as they were in 1790, from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, shall form the fundamental principles of the territorial arrangements, so that those districts and territories of former Belgium, of Germany and Savoy, which, by the treaty of Paris of 1814, were annexed to Old France, shall remain separated therefrom.

2. Where this principle is departed from, the boundaries of 1790 shall be modified and better arranged, according to mutual conventions and interests, both in regard to civil jurisdiction, so as to cut off inclosed districts, and assign on both sides a more regular territory, and also in regard to military jurisdiction, so as to strengthen certain weak parts of the boundaries of the counterminous countries.

"In conformity to this principle, France cedes to the allies-Landau, Saarlouis, Phillippeville, and Marienburg, with those circles of territory which are more fully laid down in the plan of treaty proposed by the four allied cabinets, on the 29th Septem. ber.

Versoy, with the necessary territory, shall be ceded to the Helvetic Confederation, in order to bring the Canton of Geneva in direct communication with Switzerland, and the French line of customs shall be there established in the manner most convenient for the administrative system of both countries.

"The works of Huningen shall be demolished. The French govern

ment binds itself to erect no others within a distance of three leagues from Basle.

"France relinquishes her rights to the principality of Monaco.

"On the other hand, the possession of Avignon and the Venaissin, as well as of the county of Montbelliard, and the possession of every other territory which is included within the French lines, shall be anew secured to France.

"3. France pays to the allied powers, by way of indemnity for the expense of their last armaments, the sum of 700 millions of francs. A special commission shall fix the mode, the periods, and the securities for this payment.

4. A military line of the following 17 fortresses, viz. Conde, Valenciennes, Bouchain, Cambray, Le Quesnoy, Maubeuge, Landrecies, Avesnes, Kocroy, Givet, Mezieres, Sedan, Montmedy, Thionville, Longwy, Buche, and the Bridge-head of Fort Louis, shall be occupied by an army of 150,000 men, which the allied powers shall appoint. This army, which shall be placed under the command of a general chosen by these

powers, shall be wholly maintained at the expense of France.

A special commission shall fix all that relates to its maintenance, which shall be regulated in the best way for supplying all the wants of the army, and at the same time the least burthensome to the country. "The longest duration of this military occupation is fixed at five years. However, on the expiration of three years, after the allied sovereigns have weighed the situation of things and of mutual interests, as well as the advances which may have been made in the restoration of order and tranquillity in France, they will come to a common decision with the King of France, whether the above term of years may be shortened.”

The payment of 700 millions of francs, or about twenty-nine millions sterling, was supposed to be an assessment sufficient for the punishment of France, though inadequate to repay the expenses of the allies, and particularly of Britain. A sum of one hundred and eighty-seven millions was set apart by the sovereigns, as the expense of fortifying the north-eastern frontier of the Netherlands and Germany. Twelve millions and a half were to be divided among the states of Spain, Portugal, Denmark, and Switzerland, which, though prevented by the rapidity of events from bringing up their troops, were never. theless parties to the European league. For the corresponding reason, fifty millions were to beequally divided between Britain and Prussia, upon whom the burthen of the war had chiefly fallen. The balance of the contributions being about five hundred millions, was thus divided :- Prussia, Austria, Russia, and England, each were to receive one fifth; and the other states, who had acceded to the treaty of the 25th March, were to receive the remaining fifth, to be divided amongst

The Duke of Wellington, well deserving that high trust, was named generalissimo of the allied army; and respecting the nature and extent of the powers entrusted to him, the allied sovereigns declared, that "although chiefly guided with respect to this measure, by motives tending to the safety and welfare of their subjects, and being very far from ha ving any intention of employing their troops in aid of the police, or of the internal administration of France, or in any manner that might compromise or interfere with the free exercise of the royal authority in this country, the allied sovereigns have, however, in consideration of the high interest which they take in supporting the power of legitimate sovereigns, promised to his most Christian Majesty to support him with their arms against every revolutionary convulsion which might tend to overthrow by force, the order of things at present established, and to menace, also, again the general tranquillity of Europe. They do not, however, dissemble, that in the variety of forms under which the revolutionary spirit might again manifest itself in France, doubts might arise as to the nature of the case which might call for the intervention of a foreign force; and feeling the difficulty of framing any instructions precisely apr

plicable to each particular case, the allied sovereigns have thought it.better to leave it to the tried prudence and discretion of the Duke of Wellington, to decide when and how far it may be advisable to employ the troops under his orders, always supposing that he would not in any case so determine, without having concerted his measures with the King of France, or without giving information as soon as possible to the allied sovereigns, of the motives which may have induced him to come to such a determina

tion.”

Such being the regulations respecting the requisitions made upon France, it only remains to notice the effect of the other articles of the treaty. Landau, Saarlouis, Philippeville, and Marienburg, are all places of strength and importance, particularly the three first, which lie conveniently to forward any plans which France might entertain of foreign aggression. To the sixteen fortresses which were destined for temporary occupation, the allies had proposed to add Lisle and Strasbourg, but desisted in consequence of the earnest remonstrances of the French monarch. There is, indeed, little doubt that, but for the good will the allied sovereigns bore to Louis XVIII., the necessary delicacy to wards him, the desire to give him respect in the eyes of his subjects, and the wish to establish a solid peace, France would have been compelled to restore the conquests of Louis XIV., as well as those of the Republic and Buonaparte. As it was, the campaign of 1815 and the battle of Waterloo lost to France the temporary posses sion of her whole defended frontier from Cambray to Alsace, and put the keys of the kingdom in possession of foreigners, enabling the army of occupation, on any occasion of necessity, to march straight to Paris without op position,

The treaties or conventions establishing this memorable treaty, were four in number one for establishing peace between the allied powers and France; the second relating to the occupation of the fortresses, and the subsistence of the troops by whom they are to be occupied; the third fixed the amount of contributions, and aranged the made of raising and pay. ing them; the fourth ascertained the time and mode of paying the foreign creditors of France. Their effect on the public mind in France will be best conceived by the tone of the King's speech to the Chamber of Deputies, when he opened their session on the 17th of October;

"Gentlemen-When last year I assembled the two Chambers for the first time, I congratulated myself upon having by an honourable treaty resto, red peace to France. She began to taste the fruits of it; all the sources of public prosperity were re-opening, when a criminal enterprise, seconded by the most inconceivable defection, arrested their course. The evils which this ephemeral usurpation caused our country deeply afflicted me; yet I ought to declare here, that had it been possible to affect none but my. self, I should have blessed Providence. The marks of affection which my people have given me in the most critical moments, have consoled me in my personal sufferings; but, those of my subjects, of my children, weigh upon my heart, and in order to put a period to this state of affairs, more burthensome even than the war itself, I have concluded with the powers, which, after having destroyed, the usurper, still occupy a great part of our territory, a convention which re gulates our present and future relations with them. It will be communicated to you without any restriction, as soon as it has received its last formality. You well know, gentlemen,

my reso

and all France will know, the profound grief I must have felt; but the very safety of my kingdom rendered this great determination necessary, and when I took it, I felt the duties it imposed upon me. I have ordered that there should this year be paid, from the treasury of my civil list, into the treasury of the state, a considerable portion of my revenue. My family were no sooner informed of lution than they offered me a proportionate gift. I have ordered similar diminutions in the salaries and expences of all my servants, without exception. I shall always be ready to share sacrifices which imperious circumstances impose upon my people. All the statements shall be submitted to you, and you will know the importance of the economy which I have commanded in the departments of my ministers, and in all parts of the government; happy if these measures shall suffice for the burthens of the state. In all events, I rely upon the devotedness of the nation, and the zeal of the two Chambers."

The deep sentiment of affliction and humiliation thus sounded from the throne, was echoed back from all parts of France. Yet such is the temper of the people, that the sensation was manifestly less acute upon the occupation of their country by strangers, and the heavy mulct to which they must look forward for years as a burthen on their agriculture and commerce, than the pangs they had felt at the removal of the Corinthian Horses or the Venus de Medicis.

Before quitting this important subject, the reader may expect from us some general remarks upon the line of policy adopted by Louis XVIII. after his restoration.

The circumstances in which the King of France was placed, were of such unexampled difficulty, that any erroneous measures which he adopted

must be considered as matter of regret rather than censure. Perhaps he chose the least exceptionable course, in neither giving way to the headlong zeal of the royalists, nor altogether throwing himself into the arms of Fouché. In the former case, he must have rendered desperate all that numerous and powerful class, who had in various degrees countenanced or yielded to the usurpation of Buonaparte, would have missed the opportunity of subjecting the army to his authority, and in fact given the signal for a civil war of the most rancorous description. On the other hand, by going entirely and without reserve into the measures recommended by Fouché, the king would have lost entirely the confidence and attachment of the royalists, his only adherents who acted upon principle, and thrown himself into the arms of the very party, nay the very men, to whose love of revolution Louis XVI. had sacrificed branch after branch of the royal authority, until they were enabled to approach to and hew down the defenceless trunk. It seems to have been the policy of Louis to steer a middle course betwixt these extremes, to adopt the counsels of the royalists in so far as might strike a wholesome terror into those who trade in revolutions, but to qualify it by showing a slowness and reluctance to use severity, and giving the guilty time and opportunity of making their escape from menaced punishment. Unhappily (for the king's choice was a choice of difficulties,) this course had its peculiar inconveniences, of which it was not the least, that the royal measures seemed irregular and uncertain, and, fluctuating between severity and lenity, kept remembrance of the national guilt and apprehension of its punishment too long afloat in the minds of the people. Even in the ordinary administration of justice, our horror of the crime fades away, and our sympathy