REGULATING THE DUTIES OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, OUT OF SESSIONS, WITH RESPECT TO INDICTABLE OFFENCES, SUMMARY CONVICTIONS AND ORDERS, AND FOR THE PROTECTION OF JUSTICES IN THE (11 & 12 VICT. C. 44,) KNOWN AS JERVIS'S ACTS; TOGETHER WITH The Act for the Submission of Points of Law Second Edition. BY W. CUNNINGHAM GLEN, Esq. BARRISTER-AT-LAW. LONDON: SHAW AND SONS, FETTER LANE, PREFACE. THE importance of the Justices Acts, known as Jervis's Acts, to those engaged in the administration of Criminal Justice and in proceedings before Justices. in Petty Sessions, can scarcely be over-estimated. They contain within themselves a complete code of magisterial practice with relation to indictable offences, and to summary convictions and orders, and they provide for the due protection of the Justices in the fair and reasonable discharge of their duties. Since Sir Robert Peel's and the Marquis of Lansdowne's Acts, no measure has passed the legislature which has so much improved the local administration of justice in England as the statutes known as Jervis's Acts, and the admirable manner in which they have worked is the best evidence of the skill and judgment with which they were framed. The first of the series contained in this work relates to the duties of Justices out of Sessions with respect to persons charged with indictable offences; it defines the duties of the Justices, with respect to such offences, and, step by step, from the issuing of the summons or A warrant to the discharge or final commitment of the accused for trial, indicates the course of proceeding to be adopted. The second relates to the duties of Justices with respect to summary convictions and orders; and the third is for their protection from vexatious actions for acts done by them in the execution of their office. The publication of a second edition of this work has been taken advantage of to add to it the statute of the 20th and 21st Victoria, which enables Justices to submit to the Superior Courts at Westminster points of law arising in cases adjudicated upon summarily by them in Petty Sessions. The 11 & 12 Vict. c. 78, provided for the decision of any difficult question of law that might arise in criminal trials; but until the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, there was no power by which the decision of the Justices who had adjudicated in summary proceedings within their jurisdiction upon a point of law could be removed into a Superior Court for the consideration and authoritative decision of that Court. The rule is well established that no appeal lies from a decision of Justices either in a matter of fact or law, unless it be expressly given by statute; but though the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, remedies that defect in respect of questions of law, it leaves untouched appeals in which matters of fact are involved, which therefore still lie only to Quarter Sessions, when they are expressly allowed by statute. The general effect of the statute is to allow an appeal against any conviction or order of Justices to a Superior Court of Common Law upon the ground that it is erroneous in point of law. Except where the application is made for a case to be stated under the direction of the Attorney General, the Justices may refuse to allow the appeal if they are of opinion that the application is merely frivolous; but in such a case the appellant, if he think fit, may apply to the Court of Queen's Bench for a rule calling upon them to show cause why the appeal should not lie. The form of the appeal is by special case, which is to be stated and signed by the Justices, provided the application for that purpose be made in writing, and security to prosecute be given within three days after their decision. The appellant on receiving the case is to give a copy of it and notice of appeal to the respondent, and is to transmit the case itself (without certiorari) to the Superior Court within three days after he has received it. The Court or a Judge at chambers is then to decide the question, and order as to costs, and the decision is to be enforced by the Justices. The Act has been most salutary in its operation, and the extent to which its provisions are resorted to is thus adverted to by Lord Chief Justice Cockburn in a letter which he addressed, on the 21st April, 1860, to Lord Campbell, then Lord Chancellor, on the subject of remodelling the Divorce Court:-"New duties," he said, "have been thrown on the Courts,—for instance, on the Court of Queen's Bench, by the power of |
