South Asia crisis, 1971"The scope of this volume is limited to the political crisis that began in Pakistan in March 1971 with the government's efforts to suppress Bengali demands for virtual autonomy in East Pakistan and concluded with the establishment of the state of Bangladesh at the end of the year. The limited time frame covered by the volume enabled the editor to compile the record of the Nixon administration's response to the crisis in considerable detail. The crisis was managed largely out of the White House by President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, with the support of the National Security Council staff. The focus of the volume is on the management of the crisis by Nixon and Kissinger. The editor selected documentation to trace the evolution of the United States response to the crisis from Nixon's initial reluctance to become involved to his "tilt" toward Pakistan which was highlighted by the despatch of the aircraft carrier Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal to act as a restraint on India in the war that had developed between India and Pakistan as a result of the crisis. Nixon's response to the crisis in Pakistan was conditioned in part by the concern that he and Kissinger had to protect the emerging opening to China, which had been facilitated by Pakistani President Yahya Khan. The volume documents that concern, as well as the assurance offered to China that the United States would protect China from the Soviet Union if China took military action against India in support of Pakistan. The record of the Nixon administration's management of the crisis in South Asia thus also bears importantly on United States relations at the time with China and the Soviet Union. In that respect, the volume should be read in conjunction with Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XVII, China, 1969-1972; volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970- October 1971; and volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1971"--Overview. |
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Page 57
... arms . Mr. Kissinger : Why would they do that ? Gen. Cushman : They think that anything that makes trouble for Pakistan is in their interests . Mr. Irwin : They also fear that , if they don't intervene , the Nax- alites will make ...
... arms . Mr. Kissinger : Why would they do that ? Gen. Cushman : They think that anything that makes trouble for Pakistan is in their interests . Mr. Irwin : They also fear that , if they don't intervene , the Nax- alites will make ...
Page 58
... arms supply . Mr. Kissinger : Did they think West Pakistan could win with 30,000 troops ? Adm . Moorer : Yes . Mr. Irwin : How important is West Pakistan's concern that East Pakistan would be helpful in a war ? Adm . Moorer : Their ...
... arms supply . Mr. Kissinger : Did they think West Pakistan could win with 30,000 troops ? Adm . Moorer : Yes . Mr. Irwin : How important is West Pakistan's concern that East Pakistan would be helpful in a war ? Adm . Moorer : Their ...
Page 64
... arms that might be needed . Mr. Blee said that the Indians do not have a large enough quan- tity of unmarked , unattributable weapons to supply what the East Pakistanis need in the quantities they need , so there would be a need if ...
... arms that might be needed . Mr. Blee said that the Indians do not have a large enough quan- tity of unmarked , unattributable weapons to supply what the East Pakistanis need in the quantities they need , so there would be a need if ...
Page 67
... arms aid to the Bengalis and that this will enable them to develop at a minimum the kind of insurgency capability that the army cannot entirely suppress . -Whatever the extent of Indian support to the Bengalis , the West Pakistanis will ...
... arms aid to the Bengalis and that this will enable them to develop at a minimum the kind of insurgency capability that the army cannot entirely suppress . -Whatever the extent of Indian support to the Bengalis , the West Pakistanis will ...
Page 70
... arms to suppress the East Pakistanis . -Privately , we would inform the Pakistanis , without threatening or lecturing , that we do not believe force will provide a solution . This dialogue could begin with the President's answer to ...
... arms to suppress the East Pakistanis . -Privately , we would inform the Pakistanis , without threatening or lecturing , that we do not believe force will provide a solution . This dialogue could begin with the President's answer to ...
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Common terms and phrases
action agreed Ambassador Farland army asked Assistant for National attack Awami League Bangla Desh Bengali Bhutto border ceasefire Central Files China Chinese conversation crisis Dacca December December 12 Delhi discussion Document draft East Bengal East Pakistan effort Embassy forces Foreign Minister Foreign Secretary Gandhi Government guerrillas Haig Helms Hilaly Hollen Ibid India India and Pakistan Irwin Islamabad issue Johnson Kissinger Papers Kissinger's meeting memorandum military supply million Moorer move Mujib Mujibur Mukti Bahini National Archives National Security Affairs Nixon Presidential Materials noted NSC Files Packard Pakistan Army political accommodation political settlement President Nixon President Yahya President's Assistant Prime Minister problem refugees relief resolution Saunders Security Council Singh Sisco situation source text South Asia Soviet Union talk Telegram text not declassified tion United Vorontsov Washington West White House Williams WSAG Yahya Khan