Soviet Union, June 1972-August 1974The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government.
This volume is part of a subseries of the Foreign Relations of the United States that documents the most significant foreign policy issues and major decisions of the administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. Five volumes in this subseries, volumes XII through XVI, cover U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. This specific volume documents United States policy toward Soviet Union from June 1972 until August 1974, following closely the development of the administration's policy of Détente and culminating with President Nixon's resignation in August 1974.
This volume continues the practice of covering U.S.-Soviet relations in a global context, highlighting conflict and collaboration between the two superpowers in the era of Détente. Chronologically, it follows volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971- May 1972, which documents the May 1972 Moscow Summit between President Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. This volume includes numerous direct personal communications between Nixon and Brezhnev covering a host of issues, including clarifying the practical application of the SALT I and ABM agreements signed in Moscow. Other major themes covered include the war in Indochina, arms control, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSE), commercial relations and most-favored-nation status, grain sales, the emigration of Soviet Jews, Jackson-Vanik legislation, and the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. |
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... . You and I must look on the big economic view . $ 650 million is out of the question . It will be difficult to reach agreement on a scheme in which you have four postponements and you take three of these September 1972 111.
... look at the past , rightly or wrongly , many nations have feared military aggression and they believed they were free of this fear because of the protection of nuclear weapons . A treaty of this kind would have profound significance for ...
... look like we were kicking it aside into a commission , even though our aim is clear . We feel there is a fundamental ... looks like . I will speak to the President and give you an answer on October 2 , but in a private meeting . Brezhnev ...
... look at numerical ratios differently . We have studied this and have con- cluded there can be a permanent agreement by wider coverage than those weapons in the interim agreement . Beyond making a permanent agreement , we have the ...
... look like compensating successes . These he could present to his colleagues on the Politburo and in the party as justification for his continued leadership . Relations with the US The Soviets evidently believe that the prospects for ...